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SUMMAR~' ~e ~ ~

Federal/Civil

Timely

l ta te university consistent with the

Free Exercise Clause may prohibit a recognized student group from
using university facilities for religious worship services or
teaching.
2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

Resp is an officially

recognized student organization on the campus of the University
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of Missouri.
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From 1973 until
1977 resp sought and obtained
....

permiision to use

univer~ity

facilities for its weekly . bible

studies and worship services.

In 1977, the university prohibited

'~~-------------this
practice
on the ground that resp's meetings violated

regulations adopted by the Board of Curators in 197 2.

The

regulations provide that no" university buildings may be used for
purposes of religious worship or religious teaching by their
student or nonstudent groups.
Eleven student members of resp brought suit in federal DC
claiming that the university had deprived them of their rights to
free exercise of religion and freedom of speech.

The federal DC

found that the University's ban on religious activities in

c

university owned buildings is required by the Establishment
Clause.

A University policy permitting regular religious

services in university buildings would have the primary effect of
advancing religion.

No free exercise right was violated since it

did not appear that the practice of holding religious services in
a university owned building is a matter of deep religious
conviction to these plaintiffs.

It also found that the

infringement, if any, of free exericse rights was justified by a
compelling state interest - Missouri's long history of strict
separation of church and state.

--

The CA reversed.

The CA first noted tha t the University had

undertaken a policy of permitting a wide vari ty of student
groups to use the student center and other fa c ilities for
--------~

---

meeting, discussions, and so on.

It has created an l(open forum"

for the activities of its recognized student groups.

The

.

---

-

3 -

;

University's only condition is that no religious worship or
religious teaching may take place.

The Court held that if the

University's limitation applied to all religious speech, it would ·
be invalid because the university has no right to regulate
content.
The Court then rejected the University's contention that the
regulation was constitutionally required by the Establishment
Clause.

The CA conceded that a neutral policy would have a

secular purpose and would avoid an entanglement with religion,
but it disagreed with the conclusion that such a policy would
have the primary effect of advancing religion.

"An

open door

policy would no more commit the University to religious goals
than they are now committed to the goals of the SDS, for example.

v(

See Healy v. James 408 U.S.l69 (1972).

Moreover, in contrast

with a neutral policy, the regulation has the primary effect of
inhibiting religion.

It singles out and stigmatizes certain

religious activity and in consequence discredits religious
groups.
Finally, the Free Exercise Clause compels government to make
some accommodation to religious realities and needs. Equal access
to a public facility is such an accommodation.

See O'Hair v.

Andrus, 613 F. 2d. 913 (DC Cir. 1979) where the CA held the mall
could be used for the Pope.

This case is distinguishable from

those that involve the requested use of class r ooms for prayer or
bible study by high school student groups.

Hi gh school students

require more supervision than do young adults of college age and

(-

the high school, unlike the university, is not a "public forum"
or a self contained community.
On request for hearing en bane Judges Bright and McMillan
dissented primarily on the grounds that the Missouri Constitution
is more restrictive than the First Amendment and specifically
prohibits entanglement of church and state . .
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr's claim that this decision conflicts

with a federal DC opinion which had previously addressed the
issue of religious worship in a public college.
Western Washington University
appeal to theCA 9).

F. Supp.

Ditman v.

(W.O. wash. 1980)

(on

The decision below ignore9 the pertinent

Supreme Court Establishment Clause cases and errs because it
requires a public university to open up its buildings and grounds
supported and maintained by public tax monies, to regular
religious worship services.
672 (1971).

Cf. Tilton v. Richardson, 430

It also contends that the

state constitutional issues.

decisio~

u.s.

below ignored

Petrs distinguish this from O'Hair

in that a mall, unlike a university, is multi-purposed and must
be open to the public.

The mall is an area, unlike a college

campus, where any group can go and "make a statement".
4.

DISCUSSION:

In my view, there is no;fEstablishment

Clause problem with allowing a variety of religious organizations
to use public buildings for such things as bible study.

Whether

or not an open door policy is required by the Free Exercise
Clause is a more difficult question.

I tend to agree with the

result reached by theCA 8.

--. .

_

..........""'~- ., ·

-
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The CA 2 recently decided in Brandon v. Board of Education
of Guilderland, 49 L.W. 2355 (1980) that a school board's refusal
to permit high school students to conduct prayer meetings on
school premises does not violate the · Free Exercise Clause.

There

the court found that the school's rule was not restrictive and
was supported by a compelling state interest in the state's
'

.

de sire to avoid Establishment Clause 'problems.

Moreover, "to an

impressionable student the mere appearance of secular involvement
in religious activities might indicate that the state has placed
imprimatur on particular regligious creed".

The Court

distinguished this case from a university where those facilities
have been identified as a "public forum".

Thus, even if the CA 2

is correct in Brandon, an question not free from doubt, this case
is distinquishable.
There are three responses, including two amicus.
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JUSTICE WHITE, di sse nting,
of ~uri

In this c a se, the Univ e rsity
p e rmits

student

facilities

for

org a nizations
political,

9 FEB 1981

Circ ul a t ed:

- Kan s as City, which

use

to

cultural,

university

certain

e ducational,

s ocial

and

.

r e creational e vents, prohibits the use of similar facilities for
..._... ........
,_, .,
~ligiou~hip _9~ relig~

the purpose of eith e r
religiously-ori e nt e d

s t udent group brought

t e aching.

suit challe nging

A
the

r e gulation on various constitutional grounds, including the claim
that

the

me mb e rs

r e gulation
to

s p e ech.
among

practice

The
other

religious

infringed
their

district
things,

services

a nd

sustained

"that

establishment clause" of

constitutional

religion

court

in

the

the

its

to
the

engage

in

present
r e quired

is

of

holding
ban

The Court of App e als for

nvo

on

by

the United States Constitution.

v. Widmar, 480 F.Supp. 907, 916

its

religious

r e gulation,

university's

buildings

rights

the
Chess

Mo. 1979).

the Eighth Circuit r e versed.

That

court held that religious speech is prot e cted under the First and

~

~---------~~---------------------

Fourteenth Amendme nts and that s ince the eff e ct of the regulation
was to s ingle out

those groups

involved

in religious activities

and communication, the regulation was unconstitutional b e cause it
burd e ned the constitutional rights of the groups' members and was
not

justified

by

a

compelling

establishment of religion.

state

The court

interest
found

in

avoiding

an

that an open access

-2-

rule permitting all

student groups

to use

the

facilities

would

not violate the Establishment Clause since the University could
not be said to be promoting any one religion.
of

Appeals

held,

because

the

prohibition

Indeed, the Court
had

the

effect

of

inhibiting religion and creating an entanglement between religion
and the University in that school officials would be called upon
to determine what proposed events
teaching,

the

regulation

involved religious worship or

itself

violated

prohibits

any

the

Establishment

Clause.
The

Amendment

First

establishment

of

religion,

or

law

prohibiting

"respecting

the

free

an

exercise

thereof." These two clauses, both cast in absolute terms, are in
considerable tension, and constitutional adjudication under these
~

\.__

provisions

requires

a

values.

See

(1970).

Typically,

either

Walz

compelled

schools,
Vitale,

see
370

balanced accommodation of their competing

v.

Tax

Commission,

Establishment

religious

Zorach
U.S.

v.

421

Clause

training

Clauson,
(1962),

343

or

397

U.S.

cases

or

664,
have

exercises

U.S.

306

aid

to

involved
in

(1952);

government

668-669

public

Engel v.
religious

organizations, see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Tilton
v.

Richardson,

403

U.S.

672

(1971).

In

my

view,

the

above

decisions do not provide clear guidance on the question presented
in this case.

Here, we are faced with a

question concerning
that

it

is

activities.
"--...-

'-------

desired,

not

-------the extent to

using

its

Even assuming

provide

open

access

which a state may act to assure

facilities

that a
to

fundamentally different

to

promote

religious

state university could,
its

facilities

to

all

if it
groups

-3-

- ...
without
the

violating

question

access.

the

Establishment

remains

whether

Accordingly,

access

to

a

public

the

a

cf.

university

cases

facility

Clause,

permitting

for

a

Zorach,

must
a

Pope

to

U.S.App.D.C.

,

government

property

use

613 F.2d 931
for

a

to

such

provide

purpose

necessarily apposite to the issue presented here.
Andrus,

provide

state

religious

supra,

are

not

Cf. O'Hair v.

(1979) (permitting the

religious

service

since

government had a policy of open access to the facility).
Certainly,

the

asserted

goal

of

assuring

independence from any religious activity is valid.
be

provided

legitimate
Clause.
~

some

range

of

nonentanglement

discretion

interest

in

under

the

state's

States should

forwarding
the

their

Establishment

While it may appear that permitting a religious group to

use university meeting

rooms does not

involve much entanglement

with religion, it may well be that a state has the constitutional
power

to

Appeals-

make

that

determined

determination
that

the

for

state

itself.l
had

not

The

Court

of

demonstrated

a

compelling state interest justifying the challenged prohibition.
But no decision of this Court has explicitly determined that the
compelling
standard,

~

state
is

interest

appropriate

test,
in

a

as

case

opposed
involving

to

some

competing

lesser
First

1
Missouri's determination to pursue the separation of church
and state is reflected in its constitution. See, e.g., Americans
United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711, 720 (Mo.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1029 (1976); Paster v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97, 101-102 (Mo.
1974), cert. denied sub nom. Reynolds v. Paster, 419 u.s. 1111
(1975). It has been noted that Missouri has a long history of
maintaining
"a very high wall
between church
and
state."
Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 364 F.Supp. 376 (W.D.Mo. 1973), aff'd,
419 u.s. 888 (1974).

-4-

Amendment

values.

Thus,

important

question

concerning

this

case
the

poses

a

difficult

and

between

the

relationship

Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
Review

is

also

warranted

because

lower

state

and

federal

courts have reached divergent results involving similar claims by
~~---------------~-----~---------------~-----------religious groups
against
state
rules
involving
educational

_______________________________

---------~~------_,

institutions.

Compare Brandon v. Board of Education,

F.2d

(CA2 Nov.l7, 1980) (upholding high school officials' refusal to
permit
Board
high

use

of

school

of Education ,
school

building

for

321 F.Supp.

regulation

religious

1263

prohib.i ting

groups);

(SD W.Va.

use

of

Hunt

v.

1971) (upholding

school

building

for

religious pu~poses) ;2 Dittman v. Western Washington University,
~

F.Supp.
No.

, No.

80-3120

79-1189V (W.D. Wash. 1980), appeal docketed,

(9th Cir.

1980) (upholding

university

rule

charging

\

religious-oriented

groups

facilities

nonreligious

free

to

University of Delaware,
424

U.S.

934

for

rooms

providing

student groups)

349 A.2d

(1976) (rejecting

while

14

(Del.

1975),

university's

with

Keegan v.

cert.

attempt

such

denied,

to

enjoin

religious group from conducting services in the dormitory).
Given

that

a

conflict

exists

question of constitutional law,

on

an

important

and

difficult

I would would grant the writ of

certiorari.
2

The issues involved in Brandon and Hunt concerned high
schools.
The Court of Appeals in this case distinguished those
cases on this ground, finding that a university is an open forum
thus limiting any restraints on First Amendment values which
might be otherwise possible.
While this distinction may have
some legitimacy, and indeed may ultimately control this case, the
state's interest in separation of church and state is equally
valid in both contexts.

~nprtntt cqourt of tfrt ~b ~taft.&'
~Ml(i:n~ 'l9. (!}. 20gfJ!.~
CHAMB E RS OF

-JUSTICE

w ...

February 17, 1981

-.1. BRENNAN , -JR .

RE:

No. 80-689 Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Byron:
Will you please add at the foot of your dissent
in the above:
Justice Brennan would grant the
petition for certiorari.
11

11
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J

, .~\_,~
' L,

Mr. Justice White
cc: The Conference
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Mr . Juo':'c.:1 :~ L'3h:tl l
Mr . Jt1r;L·e8 Bla·~ ~111Un
~r. Ju ,,_; c~ Po ,JC: d
M:-. Ju•c:t lee R h•Vl<liS t
Mr. Just .c0 St..wons
~

STYLISTIC CHf.NCES THROUGHOUT.

SEt PAGES: ~

From: Mr . Juatice White

Recirc ul r,ted :

SlJl>REME OQVBT OF THE UNITE:O S'fA'fES
ET AL,

v. CLARK VINCENT

ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 8()-.{i8!l. Decided February -, 1981

dissenting.
In this case, the University of Missouri-Kansas City, which
permits student organizations to use certain university facilities for political, cultural, educational, social and recreational
events, prohibits the use of similar facilities for the purpose
of either religious worship or religious teaching. A religiouslyoriented student group brought suit challenging the regulation
on various constitutional grounds, including the claim that the
regulation infringed the constitutional rights of its members
to practice their religion and to engage in religious speech.
The District Court sustained the regulation, holding among
other things, "that the university's present ban on religious
services in its buildings is required by the establishment
clause" of the United States Constitution. Chess v. Widmar,
480 F. Supp. 907, 916 (WD Mo. 1979).
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.
That court held that religious speech is protected under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments and that since the effect
of the regulation was to single out those groups involved in
religious activities and communication, the regulation was unconstitutional because it burdened the constitutional rights of
the groups' members and was not justified by a compelling
state interest in avoiding an establishment of religion. The
court found that an open access rule permitting all student
groups to use the facilities would not violate the Establishment Clause since the University could not be said to be
promoting any one religion . Indeed, the Court of Appeals
held, because the prohibition had the effect of inhibiting religion and creating an entanglement between religion and the
JusTICE WHITE,

u
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University in that school officials would be called upon to
d<'termine what proposed events involved religious worship or
teaching, the regulation itself violated the Establishment
Clause.
The First Amendment prohibits any law 11 respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof." These two clauses, both case in absolute terms, are
in considerable tension, and constitutional adjudication under
these provisions requires a balanced accommodation of their
competing values. See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S.
66 t 668-669 (1970). Typically, Establishment Clause cases
lw.ve involved either compelled religious training or exercises
in nublic schools, see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952);
Ewrrl v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962), or government aid to
reli2:ious organizations, see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602
(1 071); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In my
view, the above decisions do not provide clear guidance on the
qu rstion presented in this case. Here, we are faced with a
fundamentally different question concerning the extent to
which a State may act to assure that it is not using its facilities to promote religious activities. Even assuming that a
stntc university could , if it desired, provide open access to its
fn rilities to all groups without violating the Establishment
Clause, cf. Zorach, supra, the question remains whether a
university must provide such access. Accordingly, the cases
permitting a State to provide access to a public facility for a
religious purpose are not necessarily apposite to the issue
U. S. App. D. C.
presented here. Cf. O'Hair v. Andrus, - , 613 F . 2d 931 (1979) (permitting the Pope to use government property for a religious service since government had a
·policy of open access to the facility).
Certainly, the asserted goal of assuring the State's independence from any religious activity is valid. States should
be provided some range of discretion in forwarding their legitimate nonentanglement interest under the Establishment
Clause. While it may appear that permitting a religious·
group to use university meeting rooms does not involve much
ent~ngtement wit.h re~igion ,. it may welt be that a State hM

.WIDMAR v. VINCENT
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the constitutional power to make that determination for itself.l The Court of Appeals determined that the State had
not demonstrated a compelling state interest justifying the
challenged prohibition. But no decision of this Court has
explicitly determined that the compelling state interest test,
as opposed to some lesser standard, is appropriate in a case
involving competing First Amendment values. Thus, this
case poses a difficult and important question concerning the
relationship between the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause.
Review is also warranted because lower state and federal
courts have reached divergent results involving similar claim"
by relig;ious groups against state rules involving educational
institutions. Compare Brandon v. Board of Education, F. 2c1 - · (CA2 Nov. 17, 1980) (upholding high school officials'
refusal to permit use of school building for religious l!'rouns):
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263 (SD W. Va.
1971) (upholding high school regulation prohibiting use of
school building for religious purposes); 2 Dittman v. Western
Washinqton University, F. Supp. - . No. 79-11~9V
(WD Wash. 1980). appeal docketed, No. 80-3120 (CA9 1980)
(upholding universitv rule charging religious-oriented groups
for rooms while providing such facilities free to nomeligious
student groups) with Keegan v. University of Delaware, 349
Missouri's determination to pursue the separation of church and state
i::; rPflected in its constitution. See, e. g., Am eri~ ans United v. Rogo.rs, 538
S. W. 2d 711, 720 (Mo.), cert. deniE'd, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) ; Paster v.
Tussey, 512 S. W. 2d 97, 101- 102 (Mo. 1974) , cert. denied sub nom.
Reynolds v. Paster, 419 U. S. 1111 (1!:175) . It has been noted that Missouri has a long histo ry of mainta ining "a very high wall between rhur~h
a.n d state." Luetkemeyer v . kaufmann, 364 F. Supp . 376 (WD Mo .
1973), aff'd, 419 U . S. SSS (1974).
2 The is.;;ues involved in Brandon and Hunt concerned high schools.
The Court of Appeals in this case distinguished t.hose cases on this ground ,
finding that a university is an open forum thus limiting any restraints on
Firs1 Amendment values which m:ght be otherwise possible. While this
distinction may have tiOme lPgitimacy, and indeed may ultimately control
this casE', the state's interest in separation of church and state is equally
n.Jirl in both contexts.
1
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A. 2d 14 (Del. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U. S. 934 (1976) (rejecting university's attempt to enjoin religious group from
conducting services in the dormitory).
Given that a conflict exists on an important and difficult
question of constitutional law, I would grant the writ of
certiorari.
JusTICE BRENNAN

would grant the petition for certiorari.
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3rd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STArfFHrcuhted:
GARY E. WIDMAR ET

A.L,

v. CLARK VINCENT

ET A.L.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 80-689. Decided February -, 1981

JusTICE WHITE, with whom JusTICE PowELL joins,\
dissenting.
In this case, the University of Missouri-Kansas City, which
permits student organizations to use certain university facilities for political, cultural, educational, social and recreational
events, prohibits the use of similar facilities for the purpose
of either religious worship or religious teaching. A religiouslyoriented student group brought suit challenging the regulation
on various constitutional grounds, including the claim that the
regulation infringed the constitutional rights of its members
to practice their religion and to engage in religious speech.
The District Court sustained the regulation, holding among
other things, "that the university's present ban on religious
services in its buildings is required by the establishment
clause" of the United States Constitution. Chess v. Widmar,
480 F. Supp. 907, 916 (WD Mo. 1979).
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.
That court held that religious speech is protected under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments and that since the effect
of the regulation was to single out those groups involved in
religious activities and communication, the regulation was unconstitutional because it burdened the constitutional rights of
the groups' members aii:dWas not JUstified by a compelling
state interest in avoiding an esta61isfiment of religion. The
court found that an open access rule permitting all student
groups to use the facilities would not violate the Establishment Clause since the University could not be said to be·
promoting any one religion. Indeed, the Court of Appeals·
tleid, because the prohibition' had the effect of inhibiting reli•
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gion and creating an entanglement etween religion and theb.{
University in that schoo o mas would be called upon to •' ~
determine what proposed events involved religious worship or
,teaching, the regulation itself violated the Establishment
~...._
Clause.
~
~ ,•
The First Amendment prohibits any law "respecting an -- _ • ~ .... }establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise ~
~·
thereof." These two clauses, both case in absolute terms, are114 ~ ~·
in ~nside~e ten~on, and constitutional adjudication under ~.~ JA..A.~
these provisions requires a balanced accommodation of their
~~
co:tppetinK_,v~lues~ See Walz v. Tax Vommtsswn, 397 0. S. ~ _ ~,
1
664, 668-669 (1970). Typically, Establishment Clause cases ;---. ~1f--have involved either compelled religious training or exercises ~ _~~
in public schools, see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); vy~ .l. . ~
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962), or government aid to ~ """· l~l
religious organizations, see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 ~
~ (1971); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In my ~
view, the above decisions do not provide clear guidance on the
question presented in this case. Here, we are faced with a
fundamentally different question concerning the extent to
which a State may act to assure that it is not using its facilities to promote religious activities. Even assuming that a
state university could, if it desired, provide open access to its
facilities to all groups without violating the Establishment
Clause, cf. Zorach, supra, the question remains whether a
university must provide such access. Accordingly, the cases
1
permitting '~ Sta.:t.e_ to provide access to a pl.!,blic f~Yrof a
religious purpose att not necessarily _ap~ite to the issue
presented here. Cf. O'Hair v. Andrus, - U. S. App. D. C.
- , 613 F . 2d 931 (1979) (permitting the Pope to use government property for a religious service since government had a
policy of open access to the facility).
Certainly, the asserted goal of assuring the State's independence from any religious activity is valid. States should
be provided some range of discretion in forwarding their legitimate nonentanglement interest under the Establishment
Clause. While it may appear that permitting a religious
~oup to u~~ un~versity meeting rooms does not involve much

l.D
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entauglemen t with religion, it may well be that a State has
the con stitutiollal power to make that determination for itself.l The Court of Appeals determined that the State had
not demonstrated a compelling state intere.s t justifying the
challenged prohibition. But no decision of this Court has
explicitly determined that the compelling state interest test,
as opposed to some lesser standard, is appropriate in a case
involving competing First Amendment values. Thus, this
case poses a difficult and important question concerning the
relationship between the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause.
Review is also warranted because lower state and federal
courts have reached divergent results involving similar claims
by religious groups against state rules involving educational
institutions. Compare Brandon v. Board of Education, - .
F . 2d- (CA2 Nov. 17, 1980) (upholding high school officials'
refusal to permit use of school building for religious groups);
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263 (SD W. Va,
1971) (upholding high school regulation prohibiting use of
school building for religious purposes); 2 Dittman v. Western
F. Supp. - , No. 79-1189V
Washington University, (WD Wash. 1980). appeal docketed, No. 80-3120 (CA9 1980)
(upholding university rule charginp; religious-oriented groups
for rooms while providing such facilities free to nonreligious
1

1\lh:;:>ouri's determination to pursue the separation of church and state
is reflected in its constitution. See, e. g., Am e ri~ans United v. Rogers, 538
S. W . 2d 711 , 720 (Mo .), cert . denied, 429 U . S. 1029 (1976); Paster v.
Tussey , 512 S. W . 2d 97 , 101- 102 (Mo. 1974), cert. denied sub nom.
R eynolds v. Paster, 419 U . S. 1111 (1975) . It has been noted that Missouri has a long history of maintaining " a very high wall between rhurrh
and state." Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 364 F . Supp. 376 (WD Mo.
1973), aff'd, 419 U . S. 888 (1974) .
2 The issues involved in Brandon and Hunt concerned high schools.
The Court of Appeals in this rase distinguished those cases on this ground,
finding that a university is an orwn forum thus limiting any restraints on
First AmendmPnt valur,s which might be otherwise possible. While thi~·
distinction may have some legitimacy, and indeed may ultimately control
this case, the st a te's interest in separation of church and state is equallY.
ndid in both contexts .

4
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student groups) with Keegan v. University of Delaware, 349
A. 2d 14 (Del. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976) (rejecting university's attempt to enjoin religious group from
conducting services in the dormitory).
Given that a conflict exists on an important and difficult
question of constitutional law, I would grant the writ of
certiorari.
JuSTICE BRENNAN

would grant the petition for cer:tiorarir

February 19, 1981

No. 80-689

Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Byron:
cert.

Please add my name to your dissent from denial of

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White

LFP/lab
Copies to the Conference

l./ourt ................... .

Voted on .................. , 19 . . .
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C H A MBE R S OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

November 18, 1981
Re:

No. 80-689

Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

I
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

November 18, 1981

Re:

80-689 - Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Lewis:
I join.

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

·~ <!fouri of tlrt ~a JJhdte
..u!tittgton. ~. <!f.
C HAMBERS O F

..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

,

Re:

No. 80-689 - Widmar v . Vincent

Dear Lewis:
This will confirm my joinder in your third draft circulation of November 17 .
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

[note to Justice Powell only]
P . S.

I hope that Byron will see fit to eliminate his citation of
United States v . Lee , on page 8 of his dissenting opinion ,
so that th1s case• need not be held until Lee comes down.

.§u:vum:t (Q:o-u:rl ttf tlrt 'JitttUth .§tlrltg

~a$Jrittgtott:. IB· (Q:. zo&r'1~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR .

November 21, 1981

Dear Mr. Lind:
Enclosed please find page proofs for Polk County, No. 80824, and Widmar, No. 80-689.
The Polk County proofs seem fine. A lineup is still
unavailable. Just1ce Blackmun dissents. Justice Marshall has
not yet joined any opinion. The other Justices have all joined
the opinion of the Court. The Chief Justice, although he has
joined, will also file a brief concurrence.
In sum, we are
waiting for Justice Marshall to complete the lineup.
I have indicated two sets of changes on the Widmar proofs.
The first occur in the first paragraph of the second page; their
import is essentially to convey the contingency surrounding
claims about the effects of policies that have not actually been
implemented. The more important change involves the second
paragraph. Substantive changes in Part III B of the opinion will
require this section of the syllabus to be changed substantively
as well.
I have therefore included a xerox copy of part III B of
the most recent circulated draft.
The tentative in Widmar calls for Justice White to dissent
and Justice Stevens to file an opinion concurring in the judgment
of the Court. All other members are tentatively committed to
join the opinion of the Court.
Sincerely,

Dick Fallon

Nv,

)

'--'"'----------- . ··-· ---·-- - ...
DICK FALLON
~dmar
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The chang
It seems
small

Novembe ~ 23,

1981

v. Vincent: Justice White's Third Draft
/'

/
/

in Footnote 10, as edited by you, appears below.
/

On my copy of the opinion I have also noted

chang~ equest~d

they will

/

/

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

RE:

/

by Justice Brennan and the Chief Justice;

o to the printer with the next draft.

you think the next

c~rculation

likely to be the last, it

RIDER A, for insertion as Footnote 10, page 8:

10.

As the dissent emphasizes, the Establishment Clause

requires the State to distinguish between "religious" speech-speech, undertaken or approved by the State, the primary effect
of which is to support an Establishment of Religion--and
"nonreligious" speech--speech, undertaken or approved by the
State, the primary effect of which is not to support an
Establishment of Religion.

This distinction is required by the

plain text of the Constitution.

It is followed in our cases.

-..

E.g., Stone v. Graham,

- - u.s.- -

(November 17, 1980).

The

dissent attempts to equate this distinction with its view of
a1alleged constitutional difference between religious "speech"
and religious "worship."
4.

See dissenting opinion, post, at 5 & n.

We think that the distinction advanced by the dissent lacks a

foundation in either the Constitution or in our cases, and that
it is judicially unmanageable.

November 27, 1981
TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

DICK FALLON

RE:

Widmar v. Vincent and Justice Stevens's Opinion

Attached please find a marked draft of this much-circulated
opinion.

I have marked changes on pages 4, 5, 7, and 13.

The

only one of substance occurs on page 7, where I have suggested a
footnote responding to Justice Stevens's opinion concurring in
the judgment.

It is attached as a "Rider" to page 7.

My reasons for suggesting the changes are as follows:
Page 4.

~

Footnotes 5 and 6 have come to seem to me to be

almost "schizophrenic."
students do have rights.

Footnote 5 makes a strong statement

tha~

Footnote 6 then seems to "take away"

some of what Footnote 5 appeared to "give."

In order to present

a more coherent picture, I think it better to reflect the
"balancing" of concerns in a single footnote.

Due to the problem

of excessive length, I have cut a substantial chunk from the
center.
Page 5.

One footnote has been renumbered.

I have suggested

~

adding one phrase to clarify that the prohibition against
"content discrimination" is limited to the "public forum."

As

Justice Stevens rightly argues, the University can of course make
content discriminations in structuring courses and grading
examinations.
Page 7.

'r!

I have suggested a footnote, attached as a Rider,

intended as a response to Justice Stevens.

You might want to

delete the explicit reference to Justice Stevens; that seems to
me a matter of style.

Substantively, however, he has raised an

implicit question about the scope of the holding.
question should be answered.

~

I think that

~

This footnote reflects an attempt

~-

to do so.
Page 13.

~

The word "here" was added to the most recent draft

at the request of Justice Brennan.

Rereading the opinion,

however, I am struck that it is jarringly redundant.

The

sentence already contains one other "here", an "in this case",
and an "as well".

Something has to go.
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No. 80-689, Widmar v. Vincent

In this case we hold that a public university, which makes
its facilites available for the activities of all other student
groups, may not exclude a student group wishing to engage in
religious worship and discussion.
This case, Widmar v. Vincent, involves the policies of the
University of Missouri at Kansas City.

The University has chosen

to provide facilities for all student groups wishing to meet on
campus.

For a period of about four years, the University allowed

a religious group called Cornerstone to meet in University
facilities.

In 1977, however, University officials decided that

Cornerstone could no longer meet in the buildings available to
all other student groups.

The University took this step based on

the group's desire to engage in religious worship and discussion.
Eleven student members of Cornerstone sued the University in
the federal district court, claiming a violation of their rights
under the First Amendment. The district court dismissed the suit,
because it found that religious speech and association were not
entitled to the same protections as other speech and association
under the First Amendment.
decision.
appeals.

The court of appeals reversed this

We are in essential agreement with the court of

y

-

By its policy of accommodating their meetings, the
University created for its students a public forum, in which all
students had an equal right to speak and to associate.

Having

done so, the University then sought to enforce a content-based
discrimination against religious speech and association.

These

are forms of speech and association protected by the First
Amendment.

Because of the fundamental principle that state

regulation of speech must be content neutral, the University
would need to present a compelling interest in order to justify
discrimination against religious speech.
The University argues first that allowing the use of its
public buildings for religious worship and discussion would
offend the Establishment Clause of the Constitution of the United
States.

Under the peculiar facts of this case, however--in which

the University would not be sponsoring religious speech any more
than the speech of other student group using university
facilities--we cannot agree.

The University also argues that it

could not allow religious groups the same benefits as all other
groups without providing support for religion forbidden by the
Missouri State constitution.

But the rights of the excluded

group are protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States.

This is the Supreme law of the land, which

must in this case prevail over the state interest asserted by the
University.
Justice Stevens has filed a separate opinion concurring in
the judgment of the Court.

Justice White has filed a dissent.

lfp/ss 12/05/81

80-689 Widmar

Vincent

~-

This case, here from the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, involves the validity of a regulation of the
University of Missouri / at Kansas City.
The university provides facilities / for all student
groups that wish to meet on campus.

More than a hundred

such groups - including a religious group named Cornerstone

.~

~-

. .
. db y the un1versity.
.
were off1c1ally
recogn1ze

The

~ Cornerstone group was informed that it could no longer ~e ;!

~ ~

~~

in university buildings.

The exclusion was based on a

regulation that prohibited the use of its buildings or

1

grounds/ "for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching".
This suit was instituted by members of

Cornerstone .

~leged

a violation of their right,lto free

exercise of religion;land freedom of speech under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
The university defended on the

groun~hat

use of

its facilities for religious worship or discussion { ould
offend the Establishment Clause of the Constitution as well
as the Missouri Constitution.

~;

--

<]'/ ~~G ~~~

.
)
~~ t~

.
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~4-i;;,~i
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The District Court dismissed the suit, agreeing
with the university's position.

2.

The court of Appeals

..9~~~-n,-~~

reversed. '1 Jt(e aree with the Court- of ~ppeals.
we hold that religious worship and discussionJ'~re
forms of speech and association/ protected by the First
Amendment.

A state university's regulation of speech must

-

be content neutral, absent a showing of a compelling state

interest~that justifies some discrimination.
university policy of

And a

neutralit~as to the content of speech /

)Wo~~~~sponsor~

religion/ any more than the speech of

other student groups.
A university's mission is education., a-ad & ur
decision today is entirely consistent with the authority of
a university/ to impose reasonable regulations - compatible

-

with that mission - upon the use of its campus and
facilities.

In this case, however, the University created a

public forum from which on!X religious groups were excluded.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Justice Stevens has filed a separate
concurring in the judgment.
dissenting opinion.

opinion~

Justice White has filed a

Washington Post, Dec. 9, 1981
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Supreine Court ruled yesterday that public colleges and universities may not prevent campus or- .
- ganii~tions from conducting reli' · gmus' services · on campus, even
though it means that ·state-financed
facilitieS aie used to benefit religion. ·
.. In an 8-to-1 decisioi1 in one of the
m:Ost impbrtant church--state"cases or"
~ecent years, the justices struck
down a University of Missouri ban
qn organized ·praye~ and Bil;>le. read- ·
ipg at its Kansas City campus.' ·
- ~- ·Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr., writi!lg _f9r the ,majority, said that .a ban
ori religious worshig and prayer is a
bah on free speech. Universities are
public forums, he said, and may riot
~rohibit ·one ·form of expression
while allowing all others.
- While yesterday's decision does
not alter the ban on prayer in public
secondary and elementary : schools
iJ;nposeq by t?e ~urli, in the 1~60s, it
~
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undoubtedly will fuel the c~rently
intense debate over those earlier rulings. The lone dissenter· yesterday,
Justice Byron R. White, · expressed
.concern . that "all ' of these' ·cases'
would have to be reconsidered,.
· under the majority'!l reasoning yes· terday.
. . ·
. The court has always treated universities differently · from grade
schools, where pupils are believed to
be of an "impressionable" age.
Most public universities already
permit prayer and · religious worship
in their facilities. Had the court upheld the Missouri ban, imposed because officials there thought a per- .
mis~ive policy amounted . tO state
sponsorship of religion, ·the other
schools would have been forced to ·
rethink their policies. That likely
1would have led tO objections from
state legislators, and the Supreme
Court might have found itself once
again embroiled in a -major political
Se'e COURT, i\."7; Col. I '
·
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'COURT, From At
·( like its. content, he said. The unh:er- . the.content of speech on its campus.
.. c~ntroversy. The Uni~ersity of Mis.:: sity did just that by differe'ntiatirw White, in his dissent, s~d the prop"' souri at Kansas City officially rec- between "religious speech" and, for osition that religious worship is no
ognizes more than 100 student or- example, political speech.
different from any other form of ex1
~-·- ganizations and ro utinely provides
'" ... Having created a forur gen- pression is "plainly wrong." _ "Were it right; the religion clauses
- fa'dlitie8 for their use. Among those erally open to student groups, Pow- ··.
groups was Cornerstone, a. Christian . ell said, "the university se~ks to en- . [of the First Amendment] would be .
·.: organization that had been freely for~~ a content-based e~cltision of. \ ~~P!~ed. of ruiy ind~p~nden~ me~. using facilities from 1973_ to 1977. In rehg10us speech. Its exclus10nlll?' pol, mg m circumstances m whiCh reh. 1977, however, the university told icy violates the fundamental prind~ ·. gious practice _took the form of
· tne group that its meetings, which · pie that a state regulation of speech : ~ speech.~
, ' , .' 1· . •
regularly included prayer and Bible should be content-neutral and the
If the majority "were rignt that no
1
., reading, would no longer' be per- · university is unable' to justify this· distinction inay be· drawn between
' mitted. . ' . .
violation under applicable ~onstitu: verbal acts of worship and other ver. Upiversity officials contended that tional standards."
· hal acts," he said, all of the cases
they had no choice but to ban the . The university';_Citing · the court's . concerning religious worship 'in pubgroup. Allowing Cornerstone's activ- . 'justifications for · banning prayers in : lie institutions would have to be re\
·ities on the taxpayer-financed cam- ·· grade schools, had contended . that' considered. ·
,!
· .
•
:~ 'pus, they said, amounted to an "es- - allowing ' ,. .Gornerstone's · · worship .' · Among the ·ca.Ses cited. by White ~.
~ ( tablishm~nt" of religion, forbidden . woul~ ~ount to state r?onsorship . was one banning .~rayer in pu?lic
. by the Fust Amendment to the Con- of rehg1on.
·
. · grade schools, a ruhng conservatives
stitution.
, •.
·
·
Po~ell djsagreed. "An open forum
are now trying to ,reverse Jhrough .·
The students argued, :under the 'in a public university does not confer Congress, in bills stripping the
s~dard grounds for such chalany imprimatur of state approval on courts o( certain powers.
.
'· lenges, that th~ ban infr_inged thejr religious sects or practices," he said,~ : Jn·a footnote the majority .opinion .
,, _right to· the free exercise· of religion. any more than allowing the Young noted that unlike grade ~ school chil,. . ··But they also contended that reli- , ·Socialist Alliance meetings gives · oren, · "~;~niversity students aJe, of
·:. gious worsbip was· a form of speech state approval to socialism. Any beri~ ; · course, young adults. They are less
;efit confer~ed on religion by permit- · impressionable than younger stu; and therefore e~titled to . the free
3
~· speech .' protections · of_ . the First
ting Cornerstone's worship is "in~i- dents and should be able to appre1 A!_Jlendment. ifhat has not been so .
dental," Powell said, quoting a prior _> ciate that the . university's policy 'is
' c~ear in prior.Supreme Court rulings: . court ruling that if the Con-stitution . . one of neutrality toward religion.~ .
"~ Yesterday, upholding the 8th U.S. barred general benefits to religious
Powell and church-state experts
Circuit Court of Appeals in Widmar groups " 'a church could not be pro- , interviewed yesterday also .said that
.us. Vi'!cent, Powell agreed 'with the tected by the police and fire depart-.. :grade schools ' have never been 'con,' students.
· ·
·
r ments or nave its public sidewruk sidere<l "public forums". for , ex pres;
:, "The U~iversity of Missouri has' kept in repair.'"
.
'sion ·ofpojitical view~. ·:;
\
discriminated against student groups
~ Justice John Paul Stevens, in a ·
In addition, university clubs do
, an'd speakers based on their desire to· concurring opinion, agreed that the not require supeivision by ·teachers
' use a generally open forun{to engage ban 'Was impermissible: but he gave-r as do activities in elem~ntary and
in 'religious worship and discuss_ion," different reasons thari Powell: The high schools. The courts have held
Powell said. "These are forms -of university simply had no valid rea- that that supervision could create
~peech and association protected by son for banning the group, Stevens
the impression in younger children
the First Amendment." . ' ·
said, and he said the majority went that they had an obligation to parSpeech may not be regulated or too far when it said the university ticipate in praye~ or thatjthe ~chool
bann~.d because somebbdy doesr_!'t could not m~ke decisions based _on was endorsing.the r~ligious worship.
------- · - - - - - ---

·.

New York Times, Dec. 9
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of this case" by focusing almost exchi-

·

·•

· tal "establishment" of religion.
- - Exluslon Over
Content
1 "The university
opened its faclli.ties
for use by student groups," he continued, "and the question is whether it

has

Supreme Court Backs·· St·u._dent
' Group,on the Right to Meet ~~t~~~~~r~:=~ because of tile
·
·
"Religious worship and discussion,"
i~ a Campus Facility
Justice Powell •said, "are forms of

•t'}

speech and assqciation protected by the
' First Amendment." The Government
may discriminate against a type of conBy LINDA GREENHOUSE
stitutionally protected speech, the opln'-' Specla!toTheNewYorkTim•
ion continued, only if it can "show that
WASHINGTON, Dec. 8 - The Su- its regulation is necessary to serve a
preme Court ruled today, 8 to 1, that a compelling state interest and that it is
public unlversi~y that permits student narrowly drawn to achieve that end."
groups to meet on campus for secular
It is only at this point that the estabactivities must also allow student reli- lishment clause properly becomes part
gious groups to meet for worship and of the analysis, Justice Powell said. Mis- I
religious study.
sourl argued that the establishment i
The Court struck down a regulation clause- maintaining the separation beadopted by the University of Missouri tween church and state- was itself the ·
that prohibited the use of university "compelling state interest" that justiproperty "for purposes of religious wor- fied the ban on religious activity. But
·ship or religious teaching." The regula- numerous Supreme Court decisions over
tion was challenged by an evangelical the last decade interpreting the estabChristian student group called Corner- lishment clause have required a more
stone, one of more than 100 recognized precise examination.
student organizations at the university's
Associate Justice John Paul Stevens,
Kansas City campus, that was denied while agreeing with the majority's conthe use of a room for itS weekly Satur- elusion, did not join Justice Powell's
day night meetings.
opinion. He said that for reasons of acaThe Court today based its ruling on demic freedom the university should
the students' constitutional rights of have to show only a "valid" rather than
free speech and association, rather than a "compelllng" justification for its pollon their right to the free ~xerCise of their cy.
religion. Associate Justice Lewis F.
Dissent by Justice White
Powell Jr., writing for the majority,
Associate
Justice White, in dissent,
said it was not necessary to decide the
"free exercise" Issue in light of the said the majority was "plainly wrong"
in equating religious worship with nonCourt's free speech holding. .
religious speech. If "no line may ever be
The case, arriving at the Supreme drawn"
between worship and other
Court at a time of renewed political interest in the relationship between reU- · speech, he said, "the majority would
have to uphold the university's right to
glon and Government, attracted wide- offer
a class enti tied 'Sunday Mass.' "
spread notice, with a numw of major .
Instead, Justice White said, the Court
religious organizations filing briefs. The
should have examined the burden that
dissent was by Justice Byron R. White.
the university's policy placed on the stuNo Change on Prayer Issue
dents' ability to practice their religion.
Justice Powell emphasized that "the' Noting that the students could have met
basis for our decision is narrow." The "about a block and a half" from the
campus, Justice White concluded that
ruling, applying only to voluntary religious practices at state-supported uni- the burden was "minimal" and that the
versities, indicates no change in the policy should have been upheld.
The decision, Widmar v. Vincent, No.
Court's view that the Constitution bars
officially sponsored prayer in the public 80-689, upheld a decision by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
schools. .
·
Circuit.
.
The decision is significant, nevertheAnother Federal appeals court, the
less, in that it provides what may be the
Second Circuit, in New York, last year
- Court's clearest explanation so far of
reached an opposite conclusion in a
how religious observance fits within the
similar case, upholding the refusal by
free speech guarantees of the First
Amendment..
the board of education in Guilderland,
N.Y., to allow public school students to
The university had defended Its policy
hold voluntary religious meetings on
on the ground that the Constitution reschool grounds before the start of the
quired a prohibition against any relischool day. The students have asked the
gious activity on campus. To facilitate
Justices to hear their appeal. The Sustudent religious practice in any way
preme Court has · applied different
the university said, would be to give reu:
standards to college students and
gion the "symbolic approval" of the
younger students in past religion cases
State of Missouri and to breach the conand may announce soon whether It will
stitutionally required separation between church and state
hear the New York case.

I

'George F . .Will

\

Confused About Relig~o~ . '
j

I

I

The Constitution has emerged without new all religious. worship comes under tqe protection
wounds from another brush with the Supreme of ·free , speech, wha~ additional purpose is ·
Court. This is especially gratifying because the served by the constitutional guarantee.of "free
case concerned an issue about which the court exercise" of religion? The protection of fre«;
·· has been 'and remains especially confused: the speech should be suffiCient. · ·
· ·
"establishment" of religion. ' ·
'
Furthermore, last term the' oourt held that
,;· · The court has held, 8-1, that the Upiversity posting the Ten Commandments in a classroom
' of Missouri, Kansas City, erred when it promul- constitutes "es'tablishment" of religion. Clearly
gated a regulation prohibi~ing the use of univer- the court then thought the content of religious
. sity property for "religious worship or religious_ communication could justify discrimination
teaching." A student religious group S\.led, . against it.
.
.
'claiming violation of First Amendment rights of
Justice John Paul Stevens, although joining the
freedom of speech and free exercise of religion.
majority, argues that the court~s particular apKlower court held that the university was right proach to analysis of this question Ulldermines
in thinking that the regulation was not only per- the academic freedom of public universities. "A
missible but mandatory because of the constitu- university," he says, "legitimately may regard
tional ban on "establishment" of religion.
some subjects.as more relevant to its ~ucational
Onward .the Christians soldiered, to an !IP: mission than others." If two groups r~uest the
peals court, yvhich held for tJlem. It rUleq that use of the only suitable facility at a particular
the regulation constituted unconstitutional dis'- time, one for frivolity, the other for rehearsing
crimination against a·category of speech-re,i- "Hamlet," the First Amendm.ent does not require
'· gious speech-because of its content. The that the room be reserved for the group that
fo~ces of Darkness pressed on to the Supreme ' asked first. The university could prefer the con. Court, but Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr., an agent . tent of one form of expression over the other.
'·• of Light if ever there. was one, spok~ for the maThe intellectual tangles and potential problems
> jority in sustaining the appeals court and the tpat White and Stevens note are unintend~ rereligious group.
.
·
'
.
. . . suits of unnecessary complexity woven by the
,.
He employed the cumbersome, not to say roco- . court since it abandoned the correct construction
·oo, criteria the court has .'constructed to test of the Establishment Clause. Properly construed,
!..
;..hether a state practice offends the Establishment it requires the state to be neutral between religion .
Clau8e: does the practice have a secular purpooe? and irreligio~-with the predictable and often inDoes its primary .effect neither enhance nor inhibit tended effect of enhancing the latter.
.
religion? Does it footer excessive state entangleIt is the court's fault that the university was
rpent with religion? Powell concluded that univer- confused about what the Establishment Clause resity openness toward religious groups would serve quires. It is the uriiversij;y's fault that the univer. the secular plll"})OOe of, and have the primary effect. sity argued that providing a forum for the religious
·of, enhancing intellectual exchange, with negligible . group would undermine its secular purpooe Of
"entrulgiement."
.
,
. .
· . providing a forum for the exchange of ideas. The .
. . The fact 'that the court ~id not say a univer- university may be terminally confused about vari•sity can prohibit ieligioUs "worship" but not .' ous impOrtant ideas, including the idea of a univerreligioils "diScussion" may indicate that pru- . sity. '
dence is tempering the court's recent appetite . . :The sort of people who favor proscribing relifor constitutional hair-splitting. .The dissenting gious groups probably would unhesitatingly favor '
.'justice, J3yron White, suggests such a distinc- campus hospitality for groups advocating com~
tion, but Powell calls .it "judicially unmanage- munism, homosexuality, ·astrology. even supplyable." ·
side economics. But the court has so muddled the
White argues that a· university may, without nation's mind concerning the Establishment
violating the Establishment Cl~use; permit .its Clause, the university felt a constitutional duty to
pz:operty to be wied for religious purposes, but _ drive off campus a group whose interest is the
that the clause dries not stipulate what the state religion that is a wellspring from which the nation
is required ,to ,do. And he asks, interestingly: if · and its Constitution derive.
i

December 30, 1981

~0-689

Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Byron and John:
I enclose copy of a let,ter of December 23 from r.~arc n.
Stern, "of counsel" on the amicus brief file~ In this case
by the American Jewish Congress. Mr. ~tern is correct in
the sense my citat5on of ~rannon in footnote 13 noes not
supoort, without some quafifi.catton, the text of the note.
The same is true of the citation in the same note of Hunt.
Accorc'Hnqly, I propose simPlY to omit bot11 citations,
leaving the substance ot the note as written. I have
discussed thiA with qenry Lind and he agrees.

We ~enied cert in Brandon at our Oecember 14
Conference. ~hat case \nvolven serious "entanglement"
problems an~ I continue to think denial of cert there was
clearly the correct disposition.
I brinq this to your attentton as ~yron dissented in
Widmar and John wrote a concurrinq opinion. ! am not
5othering the other Justi.ces, as I cannot imagine that they
have even your theoretical interest.

Sincerely

Justice White
Justice Stevens

LFP/vde

J5U;Jtrttm <!fcuri of Hrt ~tlt ~bdts
Jlas4ingt~ ~. Q1. 2llfi'l-~
CHAMI!IERS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR .

January 21, 1982

Re:

No.80-1396, Brandon v. Board of Education
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

The cert list for the February 19 Conference includes a
petition for rehearing in No. 80-1396, Brandon v. Board of
Education. As noted in the petition, this case is
rnischaracterized in Footnote 13 of the Slip Opinion in No.
80-689, Widmar v. Vincent.
When this error carne to my attention, I arranged with
Henry Lind to have the reference to this case omitted from
the Widmar opinion that will be printed in the u.s. Reports.
I also advised Byron and John--the two Justices who had not
joined the Court opinion in Widmar. As reflected in my
letter to them of December 30th (copy enclosed) , the
inadvertent inaccuracy in Widmar does not--in my opinion-affect our earlier denial of cert in Brandon.
Brandon involves serious "entanglement" problems not
implicated in Widmar, including those raised by the
requirement of New York law that student religious meetings
in school facilities would require faculty supervision. See
635 F.2d, at 979. The difference in maturity between high
school and college students also provides a distinguishing
factor. See Widmar, slip op. at 10 n.l4~ Brandon, 635 F.2d,
at 978, 980.
I

would deny the petition for rehearing.

L.F.P., Jr.
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Note from Justice Rehnquist:
Lewis I agree with your draft in Widmar v. Vincent with
the possible exception of the "overbreadth" analysis.

As to

the "overbreadth" analysis as to the Mo. constitutional
provision justification as a "compelling interest" to
justify an exclusion.

Isn't the supremacy clause enough?
~R

~UVftutt <l}ltltd ttf

tqt ~uittb ~taft.tr

Jla,gfti:ugt.on, ~. <!}.

2ll~'!~

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

November 3, 1981

No.

80-689

Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Lewis,
Please join me in the proposed opinion. It is
handled very well. I have several minor suggestions which I
would ask you to consider.
On page 6 of the draft it states "We agree that
the University has a compelling interest in complying with
its constitutional obligations." This statement may be
unnecessarily broad, since it implies that compliance with
any constitutional provision constitutes a compelling
~~~
interest for disobeying any other provision. While this may
in fact be true, the Court might want to leave itself more
room to maneuver in future cases. The statement could be
easily dropped from this opinion and the following sentence
reworded: "We disagree with the University's conclusion
that . . . "
Footnote 13 on page 9 might mention the
University's argument that the students themselves seemed to
admit that holding meetings on campus influences other
students' perceptions. For example, this language could be ~ . J.,1 ~~
added to the end of the footnote (no new paragraph) : The
~
University argues that the Cornerstone students themselves
admitted in affidavits that "[s)tudents know that if
C
something is on campus, then it is a student organization,
.A~~~
and they are more likely to feel comfortable attending a
Y~'
meeting." Similarly, the students claimed that meeting off
campus "tends to make students think that there is something
'wrong' with us." Affidavit of Florian Frederick Chess,
Joint Appendix at 18, 19 (Sept. 29, 1977). In light of the
large number of groups meeting on campus, however, we doubt
students could draw any reasonable inference of University
support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place. And
in any case, the University has a less restrictive

2.

alternative available if it wishes to remove any inference
of State sponsorship: It may disseminate statements
disavowing endorsement of any particular campus meetings.
In fact, the University's student handbook already notes
~
that the University's name will not "be identified in any
way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opinions f ~
of any organization or its members." 1980-1981 UMKC Studen
Handbook, at 25.
Finally, I am somewhat concerned about the
citation to Luetkemeyer in footnote 16, page 10. The
parenthetical explanat1on could imply that this Court found
the State had a compelling interest in complying with its
own constitution. In fact, this Court summarily affirmed a
lower court opinion to that effect. This Court, therefore,
either could have agreed with the finding of a compelling
interest or could have concluded that the state's practice
infringed no constitutionally protected right. To avoid
this problem, I would replace the parenthetical explanation
with a phrase like this: See Luetkemeyer .•. (1974), in
which the district court found Missouri had a compelling
interest in compliance with its own constitution.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Cbpies to the Cbnfe.rence

November 4, 1981
TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

DICK FALLON

RE:

Responses to Widmar draft

Five Chambers have now entered formal or informal responses
to Widmar.

I would recommend awaiting further response before

re-circulating, but I wanted to alert you to the current status
as I understand it.
Justice White has indicated that he will dissent.
Justice Rehnquist has communicated, directly to you and
again through his clerk.
of Section III B.

He dislikes the "overbreadth" analysis

He would rely entirely on the Supremacy Clause

to dismiss the University's argument under its state
constitution.
requested.

I would strongly hesitate to make the change

I think it is true that the Supremacy Clause elevates

First Amendment "rights" above the State's interest.

The problem

is one of circularity in argument: The question is whether there
are First Amendment rights here; and the answer to this question
requires a balancing of the free speech "interests" of the
respondents against the State's "interest" in compliance with its
constitution. In other words, I think that direct reliance on the

Supremacy Clause--without allowing some consideration of the
state's "interest"--would be entirely conclusory and therefore
unpersuasive.
Justice O'Connor has "joined."

She asks three changes.

Two

are entirely stylistic, and I would recommend that they be made
(even though one will make for a decidedly "un-lean" footnote} .
The third request--the first presented in her memo--asks deletion
of a sentence on page six: "We agree that the University has a
compelling interest in complying with its constitutional
obligations."

She seems to concede that the sentence is "true,"

but objects that it is misleadingly "broad."

I do not agree.

In

addition, deletion of the sentence would leave it unclear why the
opinion even bothers to inquire whether the State's
constitutional obligation is implicated--i.e., why it even
bothers with the Establishment Clause analysis.

I would

therefore reject this suggestion, on which Justice O'Connor does
not seem to insist.

I gather she will be satisfied if the other

changes are included in the next circulation.
Justice Brennan has asked for the addition of one sentence
to footnote 12. In effect, it reserves the possibility that
provision of a public forum, under some situation that he does
not specify, might possbly violate the Establishment Clause.
This proposal is slightly puzzling and slightly troubling.

A

sentence on page 10 already seems to reserve this possibility:
"At least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious
groups will dominate UMKC's public forum, we agree with the Court
of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not be the

forum's primary effect...
Footnote 14.

This sentence immediately follows

If Justice Brennan's sentence were to be accepted,

this would be the more logical place to put it.
would be redundant.

But then it

It would also conflict with a suggestion by

Justice Blackmun, see infra, that the implication of the quoted
sentence ( 11 At least in the absence •.. } should be weakened.
Justice Blackmun, according to his clerk, would like to see
the addition of a sentence to Note 12:

11

Because we decide this

regulation is an infringement on respondent's free speech and
association interests, we need not decide the extent to which it
might infringe their Free Exercise rights...

I have no objection

to this, except that its tone is inconsonant with Justice
Brennan's proposed amendment.

This problem could be solved if

Justice Brennan's sentence were put in Footnote

14~

but there it

would much strengthen the implication that, in a proper case, a
public forum might offend the Establishment Clause.

And Justice

Blackmun's second substantive request is for the substitution of
(unspecified} language weakening this implication.
It is hard for me to guess the strength of Justice
Blackmun's concern.

His clerk said that he generally liked the

opinion and admired the way it

11

walks the tightrope ...

He also

made several trivial suggestions, which can easily be
accommodated in a recirculation.

These may mollify him.

For the time being, I have no strong intuition how to
proceed.
11

If you think a prompt recirculation desirable to try to

lock in 11 Justices Brennan and Blackmun, I would tentatively

suggest that an altered version of both their suggestions should

be included in footnote 12, where they both wanted their
amendments to appear.

The end of the paragraph would then read

as follows (with changes underscored):

"Here the University's forum is already available to other
groups, and respondents' claim to use that forum does not--as in
Brandon or Hunt--rest solely on rights claimed under the Free
Exercise Clause.

Respondents' claim also implicates First

Amendment rights of speech and association, and it is on the
bases of speech and association rights that we decide this case.
Accordingly, we need not inquire into the extent, if any, to
which Free Exercise interests are infringed by the challenged
University regulation.

Neither do we reach the difficult

questions that would arise if State accommodation of Free
Exercise and Free Speech rights should, in a particular case,
conflict with the prohibitions of the Establishment Clause."

The first of the underscored sentences would be for Justice
Blackmun, the second for Justice Brennan.

I reiterate that any

recirculation should include a number of trivial suggestions
offered by Justice Blackmun, which might also help to win his
vote.

,jnprtntt <qottrt 4lf tift ~tb .jtaftl\'
~Jtingtttn, ~.

<q.

2llgt'!~

CHAMBERS OF

J U S T ICE BYR ON R . W HIT E

November 4, 1981

Re:

80-689 - Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Lewis,
I shall probably file a dissent in
this case.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
cpm

'

CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE

w .. .

November 4, 1981

..J . BRENNAN, ..JR .

RE:

No. 80-689 Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Lewis:
My hope was that you might be willing to add a
sentence at the end of footnote 12 on page 8 along
the following lines:
This is not to say that governmental
sanction of the use of such rights for
religious worship at a public forum may
not in other circumstances violate the
Establishment Clause. 11
11

Sincerely,

Justice Powell

November 5, 1981
TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

DICK FALLON

RE:

Justice White's Dissent in Widmar v. Vincent

"The dissent argues that "religious worship" is not speech
generally protected by the "free speech" guarantee of the First
Amendment and the "equal protection" guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

If "religious worship" were protected "speech," the

dissent reasons, "the Religion Clauses would be emptied of any
independent meaning in circumstances in which religious practice
took the form of speech."

Dissenting opinion, post, at 4.

argument is both novel and difficult to comprehend.

This

The dissent

does not deny that speech about religion is speech is entitled to
the general protections of the First Amendment.
n.l.

See id., at 3 &

It does not argue that descriptions of religious

experiences fail to qualify as "speech."

Nor does it repudiate

last Term's decision in Krishna, which assumed that religious
appeals to nonbelievers constituted protected "speech."

Rather,

the dissent seems to attempt a distinction between the kinds of

---------

----

religious speech explicitly protected by our cases and a new

--

._

__,...

class of religious "speech acts," see dissenting opinion at 5,

Worship, like pornography, is then said to

--

the protection of the "free speech" clause of the

------------------------Perhaps Justice White

First Amendment.
it."

"knows it when he sees

We find at least three difficulties with his attempted

distinction.
First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction
has intelligible content.

There is no indication when "singing

hymns, reading scripture, and teaching biblical principles," id.,
at 2-3, cease to be "singing, teaching, and reading"--all
apparently forms of "speech," despite their religious subject
matter--and become unprotected "worship."
Second, even if the distinction could be made intelligible,
it is highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial
competence.

Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345

u.s.

67, 70 (1953).

Merely to draw the distinction would require the university--and
ultimately the courts--to inquire into the significance of
various words and practices to different religious faiths.

Such

an inquiry would tend inevitably to entangle the State with
religion in a manner forbidden by our cases.
Finally, the dissent fails to establish the relevance of the
distinction on which it seeks to rely.

The dissent apparently

wishes to to preserve the vitality of the Establishment Clause.
See dissenting opinion, post, at 4.

But it gives no reason why

the Establishment Clause, or any other provision of the
Constitution, would require different treatment for religious
speech designed to win religious converts, see Krishma, supra,
than for religious worship by persons already converted.

It is

far from clear that the State gives greater support in the latter
case than in the former.
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protected by the "free speech" guarantee of the First

Amendment and the "equal protection" guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

If "religious worship" were protected "speech," the

dissent reasons, "the Religion Clauses would be emptied of any
independent meaning in circumstances in which religious practice
took the form of speech."

Dissenting opinion, post, at 4.
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does not deny that speech about religion is speech
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the general protections of the First Amendment.
n.l.

~entitled

to

See id., at 3 &

It does not argue that descriptions of religious

experiences fail to qualify as "speech."

Nor does it repudiate
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last Term's decision in Krishna, k which assumed that religious
appeals to nonbelievers constituted protected "speech."

Rather,

the dissent seems to attempt a distinction between the kinds of
religious speech explicitly protected by our cases and a new
class of religious "speech ac t(sj ,"
comprising "worship."

~issenting

opinion? at 5,

There are at least three difficulties with

this distinction.
First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction
has intelligible content.

There is no indication when "singing

hymns, reading scripture, and teaching biblical principles," id.,
at 2-3, cease to be "singing, teaching, and reading"--all
apparently forms of "speech," despite their religious subject

o1 I

matter--and become unprotected "worship."
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tend inevitably to entangle the State with

religion in a manner forbidden by our cases.
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Such

Finally, the dissent fails to establish the relevance of the
distinction on which it seeks to rely.
wishes to

~ preserve

The dissent apparently

the vitality of the Establishment Clause.

See dissenting opinion, post, at 4.

But it gives no reason why

the Establishment Clause, or any other provision of the
Constitution, would require different treatment for religious
speech designed to win religious converts, see Krishma, supra,
than for religious worship by persons already converted.

It is

far from clear that the State gives greater support in the latter
case than in the former.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w.. . J .

BRENNAN, JR.

RE:

tq. 20&tJ.l.~

November 5, 1981

No. 80-689 Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Lewis:
I agree.
Sincerely,

.

. i

I
't

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

November 5, 1981

Re:

No. 80-689 - Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Lewis:
I await the dissent.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

~mu~~ttrl~f~t~b~mug
.,ra,g!p:ngt~n, J. ~· 20P:~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR.

RE:

November 5, 1981

No. 80-689 Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Lewis:
I agree.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

November 5, 1981
80-689 Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Bill:
Thank you for your note of November 4.
I also have word from Harry that he would like a
sentence added to note 12 along the following lines:
"Because we decide this regulation is an
infringement on respondents' free speech and
association interests , we need not decide the
extent to which it might infringe their free
exercise rights."
I have no objection to saying this. Yet, because
of the difference in tone, 1 propose' to blend your
suggestion and Harry's into the following language to be
added at the end of note 12:
"Accordingly, we need not inquire into
the extent, if any, to which Free Exercise
interests are infringed by the challenged
University regulation . Neither do we reach
the difficult questions that would arise if
State accommodation of Free Exercise and Free
Speech rights should, in a o~rticular case,
conflict with the prohibi tbrYrs of the
Establishment Clause."

As you spoke to me first, I will make this change
and recirculate if it meets with your approval. I think it
is prudent to 1eave both of these questions wide open,
without inviting marginal litigation.
With my thanks.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss

November 5, 1981
80-689 Widmar v. Vincent
Dear Bill:
This refers to the little note you sent me on the
bench in which you inquired whether the Supremacy Clause
alone does not justify dismissing the University's argument
under its state constitution.
I hesitate to rely solely on that Clause, although
I agree - of course - that it elevates First Amendment
rights above the state's interest. But the question before
us is whether there are First Amendment rights upon which
respondents may rely:--The answer to this question requires
a weighing - as I see it - of the asserted free speech and
assembly interests of the respondents against the state's
interest in complying with its constitution.
I would prefer to leave SIII-B substantially as I
have drafted it, as it seems more persuasive and less
conculsory than relying entirely on the Supremacy Clause.
Sincerely,

Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss

;inpumt <IJomt qf tlf~ ~nitih ;ibrlts
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

November 5, 1981

Re:

80-689 - Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Lewis:
For two reasons I am reluctant to join the court's
opinion. First, I do not believe that it is correct to
characterize the University's school activity program
as a "public forum," as that concept was developed in
Hague v. CIO, 307 u.s. 496, 515. The facilities are
available to students; by hypothesis, the public is
excluded. The relationship between a university and
its student body is sufficiently different from the
relationship between the sovereign and the citizenry to
make it inappropriate to consider the public forum
concept equally applicable to both.
Second, the characterization of the exclusion of
religious groups as based on the content of their
speech is, in my judgment, somewhat imprecise. The
University's regulation is content neutral in the sense
that it evidences no hostility to, or disagreement
with, the point of view of any particular speaker. It
excludes a certain category of subject matter from the
student activity program; like the exclusion of
political advertisements from buses, in one sense the
exclusion is content-neutral and in another sense it is
content-based.
The distinction is of some importance because
school facilities are often in short supply. In
allocating such facilities university administrators
may reasonably conclude that some subjects are more
relevant than others to campus life or to the
particular academic objectives of the school. In this
context, the notion that they must support their
judgments by reference to "a compelling state interest"
seems too strict to me.

-2-

Even if I cannot join your opinion, I intend to
concur in the Court's judgment. In this case, there is
no question about the availability of adequate
facilities. Student participation in Cornerstone
meetings is entirely voluntary. No danger of apparent
University sponsorship of a religion is disclosed by
the record. Since the University's only justification
for the exclusion--its fear of violating the
Establishment Clause--is without merit, as you
demonstrate, and since no other significant
justification has been advanced, the regulation must
fall for it unquestionably does inhibit the students'
right to speak and to associate freely.
I am not sure you will want to (or be able to)
accommodate my concerns, but I thought you would want
to know what they are.
Respectfully,

(~
~

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

Rider

lfp/sn 1.1/05/81
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p. 6 (Widmar)

We agree that the interest of the University i.n complylng
with its constitutional obligations may be characterized as
compelling.

It i!oes not follow, however, that

access" policy wouJ.d

b~

incomoat ibte

Establishment Clause cases.

\-T). th

~n

"equal

this Court's

TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

DICK FALLON

RE:

Justice Stevens's Widmanr Views

If you wish to respond to Justice Stevens's communication of
yesterday, I think you might consider speaking directly to what
seems to be his underlying concern--namely, that the Court should
~

not make it too difficult for the University to allocate scarce
facilities to their best educational use.

He seems worried that

the "public forum" notion restricts the University's capacity to
make choices of this kind. Quite the contrary is true.

In the

first place, the opinion clearly recognizes that the University
campus could never be an open forum--even for its students--in
the classic sense.

This is the point of the Footnote 6, quoting

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393
506 (1969):

u.s.

503,

First Amendment rights must be analyzed in light of

the special characteristics so the school environment."

Perhaps

more important, the invocation of "public forum" jurisprudence
explains the source of the students' rights.

By creating a forum

generally open t ;-all student groups, the University has
implicitly conceded that there is no scarcity problem at the
present time.

It has thus implicitly conceded the right of the

religious groups to share equally in tqe forum, absent some
compelling reason to keep them out.

This kind of analysis is

entirely neutral about the University's obligations in a case
where there was no open forum--most notably in a case in which
there was a need to allocate scarce classroom of other facilities
to their best educational use.

By not grounding the students'

access rights in an open-forum model, Justice Stevens may
implicitly require the University to bear the same burden of
jusitifying exclusions in a case of scarcity as in a case of
resources ample to accommodate all.

The draft opinion places the

decision on the narrowest possible ground.

Given the

complexities of the subject matter, this is the best course.

November 5, 1981
TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

DICK FALLON

RE:

Justice White's Dissent in Widmar v. Vincent

Justice White has now circulated his dissent.

It relies

principally bn an argument that "religious worship" is not
"speech" protected generally by the "free speech" guarantee of
the First Amendment.

Its protection, if any, must come from the

"Free Exercise Clause."

This is a direct intellectual challenge

to the theory of the draft opinion, and I think it should be met.
Very tentatively, I would recommend the following rider, to be
added as a footnote on page 5.

It would follow the sentence:

"These are forms of speech and association protected by the First
Amendment."

"The dissent argues that "religious worship" is not speech
generally protected by the "free speech" guarantee of the First
Amendment and the "equal protection" guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

If "religious worship" were protected "speech," the

dissent reasons, "the Religion Clauses would be emptied of any
independent meaning in circumstances in which religious practice
took the form of speech."

Dissenting opinion, post, at 4.

This

0v-t
'"'~
/\. argument, is.. bo-th

r:mv,el and diffi<Ju.J..t to

eemp~.

does not deny that speech about religion is

speech ~

the general protections of the First Amendment.
n.l.

The dissent
entitled to

See id., at 3 &

It does not argue that descriptions of religious

experiences fail to qualify as "speech."

Nor does it repudiate

last Term's decision in Krishna, which assumed that religious
appeals to nonbelievers constituted protected "speech."

Rather,

the dissent seems to attempt a distinction between the kinds of
religious speech explicitly protected by our cases and a new
class of religious "speech acts," see dissenting opinion at 5,
comprisipg "worship."

There are at least three difficulties with

this distinction.
First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction
has intelligible content.
\

.

There is no indication when "singing

hymns, reading scripture, and teaching biblical principles," id.,
at 2-3, cease to be "singing, teaching, and reading"--all
apparently forms of "speech," despite their religious subject
matter--and become unprotected "worship."
t );..~
~l,
~ ax..-a.-r< ~ /. ~ "
Second, even if the distinction ~ · · telli~ le,

t~
J

it is highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial

-1-D

Rhode Island, 345

competence~

u.s.

67, 70 (1953).

Merely to draw the distinction would require the university--and
ultimately the courts--to inquire into the significance of
~

ve~iOUG

J'f..(

.;

4 ·~ 1"').-~~
Such ~ ·

words and practices to dif erent religious faithsA

~ inquir~ould tend inevitably to entangle the State with
religion in a manner forbidden by our cases.

Finally, the dissent fails to establish the relevance of the
distinction on which it seeks to rely.
wishes

t~

The dissent apparently

preserve the vitality of the Establishment Clause.

See dissenting opinion, post, at 4.

But it gives no reason why

the Establishment Clause, or any other provision of the
Constitution, would require different treatment for religious
speech designed to win religious converts, see Krishma, supra,
than for religious worship by persons already converted.

It is

far from clear that the State gives greater support in the latter
case than in the former.

November 6, 1981
80-689 Widmar v. Vincent
Dear John:
~hank you for your letter.
Although, as you
suggest, I do not think I can accommodate your concerns bv
revisions of the draft opinion, I share the foll.m'linq
thoughts on what seems to be your principal concern:
namely, that a university should be able, without
interference, to allocate scarce facilities to their best
educational use.
~y opinion clearly recognizes that a university
campus is not an open forum in the classic sense, even for
its students. In footnote 6, after a quote from Tinker, ~y
draft says:

"A university ojffers in significant respects
from oublic forums such as streets or parks
or even municipal theaters. A university's
mission is education, and decisions of this
Court have never denied its authority to
impose reasonable regulations compatible with
that mission upon the use of its campus and
fac1.1itJes."
In this case, as you agree, there is no "scarcity
problem". Rather, the uni. v~rsity has created a forum open
to a11 100 or more of its student qroupR. The only reason
assigned by it for excluding this religious group is the
Establish~ent Clause - not that the speech of the religious
group would be incompatible wtth the E~>ducational ah'ts of the
university.
I believe the opinion rests on the narrowest
ground consistent with our cases. I agree fully that the
area is one of i.nherent complexities, but my opi.nion leaves
a university administration with substantially the freedom
you have in mind.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

To:

The Chief Jus
Justice Br
Justice Mars
Justice Blac m
ustice Powe 1
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor

From:
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Justice White

Circulated:
Recirculated:

1st DRAFT
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-689

GARY E. WIDMAR, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
CLARK VINCENT, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[November-, 1981]

Jus~~ dissenting.
In af ming the decision of the Court of Appeals, the majority rejects petititoners' argument that the Establishment
Clause of the Constitution prohibits the use of university
buildings for religious purposes. A state university may
permit its property to be used for purely religious services
without violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
With this I agree. See Committee for Public Education v.
Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 813 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 661 (Opinion of WHITE, J.); The
Establishment Clause, however, sets limits only on what the
State may do with respect to religious organizations; it does
not establish what the State is required to do. I have long
argued that Establishment Clause limits on state action
which incidentally aids religion are not as strict as the Court
has held. The step from the permissible to the necessary,
however, is a long one. In my view, just as there is room
under the Religion Clauses for state policies that may have
some beneficial effect on religion, there is also room for state
policies that may incidentally burden religion. In other
words, I believe the states to be a good deal freer to formulate policies that affect religion in divergent ways than does
the majority. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398,
422-423 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The majority's position

11/6/81
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will inevitably lead to those contradictions and tensions between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses warned
against by Justice Stewart in Sherbert v. Verner, !d., at 416.
The university regulation at issue here provides in pertinent part:
"No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious
worship or religious teaching by either student or nonstudent groups.
Student congregations of local
churches or of recognized denominations or sects, although not technically recognized campus groups, may
use the facilities . . . under the same regulations that apply to recognized campus organizations, provided that no
University facilities may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching."
Although there may be instances in which it would be difficult to determine whether a religious group used university
facilities for "worship" or "religious teaching," rather than for
secular ends, this is not such a case. The regulation was applied to respondents' religious group, Cornerstone, only after
the group explicitly informed the University that it sought
access to the facilities for the purpose of offering prayer,
singing hymns, reading scripture, and teaching biblical principles. Cornerstone described their meetings as follows:
"Although these meetings would not appear to a casual observer to correspond precisely to a traditional worship service, there is no doubt that worship is an important part of
the general atmosphere." J. A., at 34. 1 The issue here is
1

Cornerstone was denied access to university facilities because it intended to use those facilities for regular religious services in which "worship is an important part of the general atmosphere." There is no issue
here as to the application of the regulation to "religious teaching." Reaching this issue is particularly inappropriate in this case because nothing in
the record indicates how the University has interpreted the phrase "religious teaching" or even whether it has ever been applied to activity that
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only whether the University regulation as applied and interpreted in this case is impermissible under the federal Constitution. If it is impermissible, it is because it runs afoul of
either the Free Speech or the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment.
A large part of respondents' argument, accepted by the
court below and implicitly accepted by the majority, is
founded on the proposition that because religious worship
uses speech, it is protected by the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment. 2 Not only is it protected, they argue,
but religious worship qua speech is not different from any
was not clearly "religious worship." The District Court noted that plaintiffs did not contend that they were "limited, in any way, from holding oncampus meetings that do not include religious worship services." J. A., at
38. At oral argument, counsel for the University indicated that the regulation would not bar discussion of biblical texts under circumstances that
did not constitute "religious worship." Transcript of Oral Argument, at 9.
The sole question in this case involves application of the regulation to prohibit regular religious worship services in university buildings.
2
Given that the majority's entire argument turns on this description of
religious services as speech, it is surprising that the majority assumes this
proposition to require no argument. The majority assumes the conclusion
by describing the University's action as discriminating against "speakers
based on their desire to engage in religious worship and discussion."
Supra, at 5. As noted above, it is not at all clear that the University has
or intends to discriminate against "religious discussion"-as a preliminary
matter, it is not even clear what the majority means by "religious discussion" or how it entered the case. That religious worship is a form of
speech, the majority takes to have been established by three cases.
Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.-- U. S.
(1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New
York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). None of these cases stand for this proposition.
Heffron and Saia involved the communication of religious views to a nonreligious, public audience. Talk about religion and about religious beliefs,
however, is not the same as religious services of worship. Niemotko was
an equal protection challenge to a discriminatory denial of one religious
group's access to a public park. The Court specifically stated that it was
not addressing the question of whether the state could uniformly deny all
religious groups access to public parks. 340 U. S. at 272.
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other variety of protected speech as a matter of constitutional principle. I believe that this proposition is plainly
wrong. Were it right, the Religion Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in which
religious practice took the form of speech.
Just last term, the Court found it sufficiently obvious that
the Establishment Clause prohibited a state from posting a
copy of the Ten Commandments on the classroom wall that a
statute requiring such a posting was summarily struck down.
Stone v. Graham, --U. S.-- (Nov. 17, 1980). That case
necessarily presumed that the state could not ignore the religious content of the written message, nor was it permitted to
treat that content as it would, or must treat, other-secular-messages under the First Amendment's protection of
speech. Similarly, the Court's decisions prohibiting prayer
in the public schools rest on a content based distinction between varieties of speech: as a speech act, apart from its content, a prayer is indistinguishable from a biology lesson.
See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962); School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963). Operation of the Free Exercise Clause is equally dependent, in
certain circumstances, on recognition of a content based distinction between religious and secular speech. Thus, in
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 (1961), the Court struck
down, as violative of the Free Exercise Clause, a state requirement that made a declaration of belief in God a condition
of state employment. A declaration is again a speech act,
but it was the content of the speech that brought the case
within the scope of the Free Exercise Clause.
There may be instances in which a state's attempt to disentangle itself from religious worship would intrude upon secular speech about religion. In such a case, the state's action
would be subject to challenge under the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment. This is not such a case. This case
involves religious worship only; the fact that that worship is

:
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accomplished through speech does not add anything to respondents' argument. That argument must rely upon the
claim that the state's action impermissibly interferes with the
free exercise of respondents' religious practices. Although
this is a close question, I conclude that it does not.
Plausible analogies on either side suggest themselves.
Respondents argue, and the majority agrees, that by permitting any student group to use its facilities for communicative
purposes other than religious worship, the University has
created a "public forum." Supra, at 4. With ample support, they argue that the state may not make content based
distinctions as to what groups may use, or what messages
may be conveyed in, such a forum. See Police Department
v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S.
536. The right of the religious to nondiscriminatory access
to the public forum is well established. See Niemotko v.
Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U. S. 105 (1943). Moreover, it is clear that there are
bounds beyond which the University could not go in enforcing its regulation: I don't suppose it could prevent student's
from saying grace before meals in the school cafeteria, or prevent distribution of religious literature on campus. 3
Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that allowing use of
their facilities for religious worship is constitutionally indistinguishable from directly subsidizing such religious services:
It would "[fund] a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting." Hunt v. McNair, 413
U. S. 734, 743 (1934). They argue that the fact that secular
student groups are entitled to the in-kind subsidy at issue
3

There are obvious limits on the scope of this analogy. I know of no
precedent holding that simply because a public forum is open to all kinds of
speech-including speech about religion-it must be open to regular religious worship services as well. I doubt that the state need stand by and
allow its public forum to become a church for any religious sect that
chooses to stand on its right of access to that forum.

::
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here does not establish that a religious group is entitled to
the same subsidy. They could convincingly argue, for example, that a state University that pays for basketballs for the
basketball team is not thereby required to pay for bibles for a
group like Cornerstone. 4
A third analogy suggests itself, one that falls between
these two extremes. There are a variety of state policies
which incidentally benefit religion that this Court has upheld
without implying that they were constitutionally required of
the state. See Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236
(1968) (state loan of texbooks to parochial school students);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952) (release of students
from public schools, during school hours, to perform religious
activities away from the school grounds); Everson v. Board
of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (state provision of transportation to parochial school students). Provision of university
facilities on a uniform basis to all student groups is not very
different from provision of text books or transporation.
From this perspective the issue is not whether the state
must, or must not, open its facilities to religious worship;
rather, it is whether the state may choose not to do so.
Each of these analogies is persuasive. Because they lead
to different results, however, they are of limited help in
reaching a decision here. They also demonstrate the difficulty in reconciling the various interests expressed in the Religion Clauses. In my view, therefore, resolution of this case
is best achieved by returning to first principles. This requires an assessment of the burden on respondents' ability
freely to exercise their religious beliefs and practices and of
the state's interest in enforcing its regulation.
'There are, of course, limits to this subsidy argument. Sherbert,
supra, and Thomas, supra, demonstrate that in certain circumstances the
state may be required to "subsidize," at least indirectly, religious practices, under circumstances in which it does not and need not subsidize similar behavior founded on secular motives.
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Respondents complain that compliance with the regulation
would require them to meet "about a block and a half" from
campus under conditions less comfortable than those previously available on campus. 5 I view this burden on free exercise as minimal. Because the burden is minimal, the state
need do no more than demonstrate that the regulation further somes permissible state end. The state's interest in
avoiding claims that it is financing or otherwise supporting
religious worship-in maintaining a definitive separation between church and state-is such an end. That the state
truly does mean to act toward this end is amply supported by
the treatment of religion in the state constitution. 6 Thus, I
believe the interest of the state is sufficiently strong to justify the imposition of the minimal burden on respondents'
ability freely to exercise their religious beliefs. See United
States v. Lee,-- U. S. --(No. 80--767)
On these facts, therefore, I cannot find that the application
of the regulation to prevent Cornerstone from holding religious worship services in university facilities violates the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. I would not hold as the
majority does that if a university permits students and others
to use its property for secular purposes, it must also furnish
facilities to religious groups for the purposes of worship and
the practice of their religion. Accordingly, I would reverse
the judgement of the Court of Appeals.
5
Respondents also complain that the university action has made their
religious message less attractive by suggesting that it is not appropriate
fare for the college campus. I give no weight to this because it is indistinguisable from an argument that respondents are entitled to the appearance of an endorsement of their beliefs and practices from the
university.
6
Since 1820, the Missouri Constitution has contained provisions requiring a separation of church and state. The Missouri Supreme Court has
held that the state constituional provisions are "not only more explict but
more restrictive than the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution." Paster v. Tussey, 512 S. W. 2d 97 (1974).

November 6, 1qa1

80-689 Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Sandra:
Thank you for your join, and also for your
suggestions.
In the second draft that t am circulatinq today, I
have included - I believe - the substance of your thoughts.

Sincerely,

,Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

,jnvrttttt <!Jottrf cf t4t 'Juittb' ,jtatt.&'

'Jla#ftingtcu. ~. <It. 2llbi~"
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

November 7, 1981

No. 80-689

Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Lewis,
The revised draft of the referenced case
incorporates various amendments which are completely
satisfactory as far as I am concerned, and which improve
an already excellent opinion.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

,ju.puntt ~omt of t4t ~~ ,jbdtg

JfasJringhtn. ~.

~· 20~~~

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

November 7, 1981
Re:

o. 80-689 - Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Lewis:
I agree with virtually everything in the draft but, I have
trouble with your conclusion in Part IIIB, that we need not
decide whether the relevant provisions of the Missouri
Constitution constitute a compel ing state interest outweighing
an abridgment of the First Amendment rights to free speech and
association. You reach this conclusion by sugqestinq that the
regulation here is overbroad, since it proh ' bits religious
"teaching" as wel.l as religious "worship." Religious teaching is
a form of "worship" and there is no explanat'on, however, why
religious teaching should receive greater First Amendment
protection than religious worship, or why infringement of the
latter is more easiJy iustif'ed by the state constitutional
provisions relied on by petitioners . Are not your distinctions
rather close to those you correctly criticize the dissent for
making, see page 5 n.7.
I would feel more comfortable with a straightforward
conclusion that Missouri's interest in maintaining the separation
of church and state, to the extent it is even impJicated here,
cannot serve as the iustification for significant infringement of
the First Amendment freedoms ' n question .

Justice Powell

r~

-----

November 9, 1981
TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

DICK FALLON

RE:

The Chief Justice's Response to Widmar

If I understand his memorandum correctly, the Chief Justice
has advanced a preference very similar to that expressed by
Justice Rehnquist: He would like to see the rejection of the
University's interest under the State constitution put directly
on Supremacy grounds, without resort to an overbreadth analysis.
He also makes the nice point that the "overbreadth" analysis
assumes a distinction between "religious worship" and "religious
teaching"--a distinction that the opinion attacks in its response
to the dissent.

I think that the language of the opinion could

be re-cast in order to avoid any appearance of internal
inconsistency.

But it may also be worth considering some

to accommodate the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist.
In offering an earlier recommondation against accommodating
Justice Rehnquist, I was animated by two concerns.

First, I

thought it preferable to preserve the possiblity of

"balancing"~

I would be reluctant to hold that a State constitutional
interest--no matter how strong--could never outweigh a federal

constitutional interest--no matter how marginally implicated--in
a particular case.

Second, I thought it desirable to keep this

decision on the narrowest possible ground, without needing to
construe the Missouri constitution.
Based on further reflection, I believe that both concerns
could be satisfied by substitution of some careful language,
along the lines of the following, beginning at the top of page
12.

(I repeat one sentence from page 12, in order to show the

continuity):

It is also unnecessary for us to decide whether, under the
Supremacy Clause, a state interest, derived from its own
constitution, could ever outweigh free speeech interests
protected by the First Amendment.
case before us.
First Amendment

~~~ are

constitutional solicitude.

We limit our holding to the

entitled to

t~

Our cases require the most exacting

scrutiny in cases in which a State undertakes to regulate speech
on the basis of its content.
455 (1980)

~

See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.

Police Dept. v. Moseley, 408

u.s.

92 (1972).

In this

constitutional context, we are unable to recognize the State
interest asserted here--an interest in achieving greater
separation of church and State than is already ensured under the
Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution--as sufficiently
"compelling" to justify content-based discrimination against
religious speech.

-If you think it worthwhile to pursue changes along these
lines, you might want to consider raising the matter first with
Justice O'Connor, who had also expressed concerns--though very
different ones--about this section of the opinion.

She was eager

to avoid making any unnecessary law in this very difficult area.
Because of the narrowness of the language I have suggested, I
think it quite possible that she would be willing to go along.
would be happy to sound her clerk--and possibly Justice
Blackmun's as well--if you would like me to do so.

In

conclusion, I would add only that I do not mean in this
memorandum to "promote" the changes I have mentioned.

I am

essentially satisfied with the opinion as it stands.

On the

other hand, I appreciate the importance of getting a Court.
I find the suggested language substantively unobjectionable.

And

I

.hJtuutt ~ourl ltf tlf~ ~nitt~ .jtat.tg
._Mqhtgtott. !l. ~· 2llp'!~
CHAMBERS O F

November

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re: No. 80-689 - Widmar v . Vincent
Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your recirculation of November 6.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

, 1981

.jnpumt <q:~ d tqt ~tb ,jtatts
jiufringhm. ~. <¢. 2ll.;t'1~ .
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

November 9, 1981
Re:

No. 80-689

Widmar

v.

Vincent

Dear Lewis:
Thank you for responding to the note I sent you on
the bench asking whether you might see fit to change some
of your emphasis on "overbreadth." Your response that
you believe such an analysis to be the narrowest way of
disposing of the University's State Constitution claim
does not, at least at the present time, persuade me.
Because I am uneasy about any extension of the overbreadth
doctrine, I think for the present I will simply see how
the matter shakes down.
Sincerely, ~

1

Justice Powell

-~~~---~------------:;;QJu:pT~U~\:pJ:u:n:

u rqr

._as!ringfott. ~·

~:n:u:nr

cg.

;;t9!CIU"

20c?'~.;l

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR .

November 9, 1981

····: ··:.. :~

80-689 Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Bill, Harry and Sandra:
Both Bill Rehnquist and the Chief have been
concerned about what they perceive to be the "emphasis" in
Part III-B of my opinion on "overbreadth" analysis. Bill
has advised me today that at least for the present, he
cannot join the opinion.
I would like to accommodate Bill and the Chief.
Indeed, I may need one of them for a Court. I enclose a
draft of language to be added on p. 12, if this meets with
your approval.
I do not think this addition would affect in any
material way either the holding or basic analysis of the
opinion.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
Justice Blackmun
Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss

Proposed Substitute Language for the ' Text in
Widmar v. Vincent, No. 80-689, beg~nning at the top of page 12:

The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general policy
of accommodating student groups, applied equally to those wishing
; to gather · to engage in religious and non-religious speech, would
offend the State Constitution.

We need not, however, determine

how the Missouri courts would decide this issue.

It is also

unnecessary for us to decide whether, under the Supremacy Clause,
a state interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever
outweigh free speeech interests protected by the First Amendment.
We limit our holding to the case before us.
First Amendment rights are entitled to special
constitutional solicitude.

Our cases require the most exacting

scrutiny in cases in which a State undertakes to regulate speech
on the basis of its content.

See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447

455 (1980): Police Dept. v. Moseley, 408

u.s.

92 (1972).

u.s.

In this

constitutional context, we are unable to recognize the State
interest asserted here--an interest in achieving greater
separation of church and State than is already ensured under the
Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution--as sufficiently
"compelling" to justify content-based discrimination against
religious speech.

November 9, 1981

80-689 Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Bill, Harry and Sandra:
Both Bill Rehnquist and the Chief have been
concerned about what they perceive to be the "emphasis" in
Part III-B of my opinion on "overbreadth" analvC3is. Bill
has advised me today that at least for the present, he
cannot join the opinion.
I would like to accommodate Bill and the Chief.
Indeed, I may need one of them for a rourt. I enclose a
draft of language to be added on p. 12, if this meets with
your approval.
I do not think thir:.; addition would affect in any
material way either the holding or basic analysis of the
opinion.

Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
Justice Blackmun
Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss

~uvrtm.t

Qfltltd cf tqt ~ittb ~taft.s

'Jht,glt'btgton, ~. <If.

2.llgt~~

CHAMBERS OF

)

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

November 10, 1981

No. 80-689

Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Lewis,
The proposed new language to be added on
page 12 of your draft in the referenced case meets with
my approval.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

cc:

Justice Brennan
Justice Blackmun

.§u:prtmt <!Jttu.rt ttf tqt 'J!lnit.t~ .§twa

'maaqingtttn. ;!8. <!J.

2ll~J!~

CHAMBERS OF

/

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

November 12, 1981

Re:

No. 80-689 - Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

~

T.M.

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

lfp/ss 11/13/81

Rider A, Widmar

WIDA SALLY-POW
Add a new footnote 9A at the end of the first paragraph on
page 8:

9A.

It is, of course,

sometimes necessary to

distinguish between "religious" and "non-religious" speech,
but not where the state has created a public forum for
general use.

The dissent cites

~

Stone v. Graham,
~

U.S.

, (November 17, 1980) I

distinction.

~~ an

example of this

The state had posted the Ten Commandments on

the walls of grade school classrooms, implying state
approval of the Commandments' religious basis.

The

dissent's hypotheticals of "class[es] entitled 'Sunday Mass'
and 'The History of the Catholic Church'" are irrelevant to
this case.

The dissent blurs the critical distinction

between a state university itself acting to further a

2.

religion or its establishment, and the case before us where
the university itself - having established an open forum for
student groups - acts to deny speech therein by otherwise
qualified student religious groups.

Widmar RIDER
This is a proposed footnote 9A, to be added at the end of
the first paragraph on page 8.

It is intended to answer the

second draft of Justice White's dissent.

we do not deny, as the dissent suggests we do, see dissenting
opinion, post, at 4-5, that these cases sometimes require the
State to distinguish between "religious" and "non-religious"
speech.

Clearly we relied on such a distinction in last Term's

decision in Stone v. Graham,

U.S.

(November 17, 1980),

in which we held that the State could not post the Ten
Commandments on the wall of a gradeschool classroom.

Because

such posting might imply state approval of the Commandments'
religious basis, the challenged policy offended the Establishment
Clause.

The dissent offers a contrary account of Stone.

It

would apparently explain the decision be reference to a
distinction between "religious speech" and "religious worship"--a
distinction that it terms necessary if the Court is not to
authorize the University to offer a class entitled "Sunday Mass."
See dissenting opinion, post, at 5.

We find this distinction as

unnecessary as it is generally unhelpful, see note 7, supra.
Establishment Clause would of course bar such a class if it

The

connoted state sponsorship of religion or otherwise implied
approval of the Mass's religious content.

No distinction between

"speech" and "worship" is needed to explain why this is so.

The

Establishment Clause bars state action--in the form of speech as
much as any other--that is intended to advance religion.

It does

not require an inquiry into when speech constitutes worship.

The Establishment Clause requires the State to distinguish
between speech, undertaken or approved by the State, that
supports an Establishment of Religion and speech, undertaken
or approved by the state, that does not support an Establishment
of Religion.

This distinction is required by the plain textBx

of the Constitution .

It is followed in our cases.

The dissent

attempts to use this distinction , which is constitutionally
required , as

~

the basis for a distinction between
II

~ ligious

\l

'' speech" and religious worship.

It is our position that this

latter distinction lacks a foundation in either the eonstitution
;:..

or in our cases , and that it is judicially unmanageable

----,....--------
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CHAMBERS OF

November 16, 1981

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 80-689 - Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Lev1is:
This is in response to your note of November 9 with its proposed draft of language to be added on page 12 of your opinion for
this case.
Thurgood has now joined you, so you have a Court.
Of course,
if you can accommodate both Bill Rehnquist and the Chief, you will
have a larger Court.
I must confess , however, that your proposed new language
leaves me mildly uncomfortable.
I suspect this is because it
serves to emphasize even more a difficulty I had with your
original opinion but which I did not express -- that the opinion
never really acknowledges the existence of respondents' Free
Exercise interest.
Its entire emphasis has been, and continues to
be, on Free Spee ch interests.
In an effort not to be merely obstructionist, I could go along
if the second paragraph of your proposed additio n were changed to
read as follows:
On one hand, respondents' First Amendment rights are
entitled to special constitutional solicitude .
Our cases
have required the most exacting scrutiny in cases in which
a State undertakes to regulate speech on the basis of its
content.
See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980);
Police Dept. v. Moseley , 408 U.S. 92 (1972). On the other
hand, the State interest asserted here -- in achieving
greater separation of church and Sta~e than ~ en
sured under the Establishment Clause of th Me deral ~C6 ns
·on -- is inherently limited by the Free Exercise
Clause
In this constitutional context, we are unabl
to recognize
interes as suf 1c1ently "compelling " to
justify conten -based discrimination against respondents'
religious speech .
I would hope that this change would be acceptable to the Chief
and to Bill Rehnquist .
If it is, you have a substantial Court.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
Justice O'Connor

l...,
\

wt-1

I ..

J~

~

Proposed Substitute Language for the Text in
Widmar v. Vincent, No. 80-689, beginning at the top of page 12:

The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general policy
of accommodating student groups, applied equally to those wishing
to gather to engage in religious and non-religious speech, would
offend the State Constitution.

We need not, however, determine

how the Missouri courts would decide this issue.

It is also

unnecessary for us to decide whether, under the Supremacy Clause,
a state interest, derived from

it~

own constitution, could ever

outweigh free speeech interests protected by the First Amendment.
We limit our holding to the case before us.

Our cases
which a State
See,
455 (1980); Police Dept. v. Mosele

;'-'--~~

u.s.

v. Brown, 447 U.S.

92 (1972).

In this

to recognize the State
achieving greater
already ensured under the
Establishment

of the Federal
justify

sufficiently
against

l-/e re_

TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

DICK FALLON

RE:

Widmar v. Vincent

Justice Blackmun has now offered a draft of "acceptable"
language for Part IIIB of the opinion (page 12).

It is attached,

together with a copy of the language circulated by this Chambers.
I would recommend only two small changes in Justice Blackmnu's
draft, both of which I have marked onto the attached copy. The
first reiterates the Free Speech element of the case in
conjunction with the Free Exercise reference that Justice
Blackmun requests.

I think this change necessary to prevent the

opinion from becoming "schizophrenic."

Written essentially on a

"free speech" basis, it can sensibly add, but not substitute, a
"free exercise" reference at the very end.

The second suggested

change is entirely stylistic.

Also attached is a redrafted Rider, answering the dissent.
It is intended for insertion at the end of the first paragraph on
page 8.

This redrafted Rider essentially "tracks" what you

drafted in response to my original suggestion.

Add a new footnote 9A at the end of the first paragraph on page
8:

9A.

As the dissent argues, it is sometimes necessary to

distinguish between "religious" and "nonreligious" speech.
e.g., Stone v. Graham,

u.s.

(November 17, 1980).

See,
But

our cases have never required the State to distinguish between
religious and nonreligious speech by private speakers in a public
forum.

The dissent's hypotheticals of classes entitled "Sunday

Mass" and "The History of the Catholic Church" are irrelevant to
this case.

By relying on them, the dissent blurs the critical

distinction between a state university itself acting to further a
religion or its establishment, and the case before us, in which
the university has created a public forum for use by private
speakers.

.hFtutt Qfcurl ~ t4~ ~nitt~ ~htt.tg
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CHAMBE:RS OF

November 16, 1981

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 80-689 - Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Lewis:
This is in response to your note of November 9 with its proposed draft of language to be added on page 12 of your opinion for
this case.
Thurgood has now joined you, so you have a Court. Of course,
if you can accommodate both Bill Rehnquist and the Chief, you will
have a larger Court.
I must confess, however, that your proposed new language
leaves me mildly uncomfortable.
I suspect this is because it
serves to emphasize even more a difficulty I had with your
original opinion but which I did not express -- that the opinion
never really acknowledges the existence of respondents' Free
Exercise interest. Its entire emphasis has been, and continues to
be, on Free Speech interests.
In an effort not to be merely obstructionist, I could go along
if the second paragraph of your proposed addition were changed to
read as follows:
On one hand, respondents' First Amendment rights are
entitled to special constitutional solicitude. Our cases
have required the most exacting scrutiny in cases in which
a State undertakes to regulate speech on the basis of its
content.
See,~, Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455
(1980);
Police Dept. v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). On the other
hand, the State interest asserted here -- in achieving
greater separation of church and State than is already ensured under the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution -- is inherently limited by the Free Exercise
ause
In this constitutional context, we are unable
to recognize ~ 1n eres as su 1c1en y compelling" to
justify content-based discrimination against respondents'
religious speech.
I would hope that this change would be acceptable to the Chief
and to Bill Rehnquist. If it is, you have a substantial Court.
Sincerely,
Justice Powell
cc:

Justice Brennan
Justice O'Connor
--~~------------

---·---------.....,

--·--------·-------------~~

QI!lltrl of tqt ,-nitt~ .itatig
._rudtinghtn. ~. <!}. 2llc?,.~

,iu.pr.nnt

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE

November 16, 1981

Re:

No. 80-689 - Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Lewis:
In light of the problems in the Princeton case, does
the second sentence, first full paragraph on page 5, need
something to "save" the Princeton point? You might wish
to add something like "with respect to persons having a right
to be on university premises," or words to that effect.
Regards,

Justice Powell

.Sn:prmtt C!Janrlaf tfrt ~b .Statt.s
:Jifufri:nghnt. ~. C!J. 2llbi'!~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w.. . J .

BRENNAN, JR.

RE:

November 17, 1981

No. 80-689 Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Lewis:
I have already joined you in the above and of course
continue to. May I suggest one thought about your recirculation of November 17? At page 12, fourth and third
lines from the bottom, would you mind changing 11 inhereiJ,llY
1imited 11 to 11 1imited here 11 ?
Sincerely,

Ju\_

Justice Powell

November 17, 1981

80-689 Widmar v. Vincent

Dear Chief and Bill:
I have tried, in my 3rd draft circulated herewith,
to meet your concerns with respect to reliance on
overbreadth. See page 12.
I have cleared the new language with several of
the Justices who had joined it earlier.

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss

This

case

presents

the

question

whether

a

University,

which has made its facilities available for the activities of
all other registered student groups, may close the facilities
to

registered

student

groups wishing

to

engage

in

religious

worship and religious discussion.

~/Js-~~~w~f-. ~~~~

~f'~~?L/-~, .1/'U~~~~~
~~a-~~~~-~~~
~~~~/vvd-''
I

2.
Analytical Approach of the Memorandum
Reversing the district court, the Eighth Circuit answered
this question in the negative.
could

not

speech.

justify

its

The University,

discriminatory

it concluded,

treatment

of

religious

The reasoning of the Court of Appeals impresses me as

thoroughly
written

in

persuasive.
somewhat

For

this

unusual

reason,

form.

In

this
the

summarize the court of appeals' opinion.

memorandum

first

is

section

I

But I also also try

to clarify the court's implicit assumptions and to defend them
against alternative analytical approaches.

This seemed to me

to be the approach most likely to avoid repetitiveness.
second

section

of

the

memorandum

is

then

The

devoted

consideration of the arguments of the parties.

to

Arguments are

first explored, then critiqued.
In

view

of

the

approach

that

I

have

taken,

I

should

describe at the outset the two ways in which this case can be
viewed.
(1)
case.
so,

The Court

of Appeals

saw

this

as

a

"public

The University had created a public forum.
it

could

content,

not

without

a

exclude

speech,

compelling

based

justification.

provide none on the facts of this case.
become

clear,

I

think

that

on

the

facts

forum"

Having done

its
The

religious
State

can

For reasons that will
make

this

the

sounder

approach.
(2) The University sees this as a "Religion Clauses" case.
On one side lies the "Free Exercise"
religious

groups;

on

the

other

,,,

interest of the student
side

lies

the

State 1 s

~

"Establishment Clause"
the case
could

interest

is seen this way,

practice

"Establishment

their
Clause"

in

avoiding

entanglement.

.

If

'

it is important that the students

religion
interest

elsewhere.
may

therefore

The
be

State's
the

more

weighty.

I.

THE REASONING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:

EQUAL ACCESS TO A

PUBLIC FORUM
The Eighth Circuit reasoned from the premise that the
University

of

Missouri

had

created

a

limited

public

forum.

This may have been a voluntary step, which the University bore
no obligation to take. 1

In taking it, however, the University

1 It is the University's policy toyermit reco~nized
student groups to use the stuaent center and certa1n other
facilities for their meeE1ngs, rectures, programs, and other
events. Each student is required to pay an activity fee--$41 per
semester during 1978-1979--to defray maintenance and janitorial
costs. From 1973-1977, the appellant Cornerstone conducted
regular weekly meetings within Un1vers1ty facilfties. It was and
remains a registered student organization. In 1977, however, the
University halted Cornerstone's use of University buildings as ~the site for its meetings. It did so pursuant to University
~~~~
R~ation 4.0314.0107, which provides in pertinent part: "No
~--.
Univeristy buildings - or grounds (except chapels as herein
provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or
religious teaching by either student or nonstudent groups." The
Regulation explained that "The general prohibition against use of
University buildings and grounds for religious worship or
religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of the
Board of Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State."
Without explanation of the constitutional justification for
the distinction, the Regulation continued that "No regulations
shall be interpreted to foro1d tne offereng of prayer or other
appropriate recognition of religion at public functions held in
University facilities."
The next regulation provided that
"Regular chapels established ~n1v~s1ty grounds may be used
for religious services ..•• " Reg. 4.0314.0108.

'*·
assumed

the

particular

burden

kind

of

U.S.L.W. 4756, 4758
U.S.

92, 95-96

of

justifying

speech.

See,

the

e.g.,

exclusion
Carey

v.

of

Brown,

any
48

(1980), quoting Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408

(1972)

("Once a forum is opened up to assembly

or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others
from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to
say.
on

Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based

content

alone,

content alone.").

and may

not

be

justified

by

reference

to

There is no doubt that religious speech is

protected by the First Amendment. 2

-In -~-e-r--t-o--m-a-~ religious

speech

for

exclusion,

the

State must therefore advance some important if not compelling
interest. See, e.g., Carey, supra, 48 U.S.L.W. at 4858
compelling

~ealy

interest could

v. James, 408

u.s.

justify content-based

169, 184

(1972)

~

(only a

distinction)~

("heavy burden" rests

on college to justify denial of facilities to SDS) .3

2 The court cited Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 u.s. 67
(1953) (city may not exclude certa1n kinds of religious speech
fro~'ts parks) and Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
This ourt implicitly reiterated this principle only last Term.
See Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
iA
Inc., 49 USLW 4762, 4764 (1981) ("The State does not dispute that IYf"-"~
the oral and written dissemination of the Krishnas' religious
views and doctrines ~ protec t ed 6 tne F irst
Amendment.") (citations omitted).
3Justice White's proposed dissent from a denial of cert in
this case, in which you had planned to concur, argued that "no
~
decision of this Court has explicitly determined that the
compelling state interest test, as opposed to some lesser
standard, is appropriate in a case involving competing First
Amendment values." The "competing value" that he had in mind was
the State's interest in avoiding "entanglement" of the sort
contemplated by the Establishment clause. Strictly speaking,
Footnote continued on next page.

!::>.

Here

the State claims a compelling

interest

----~--

..,_.

entnglement with religion.

in avoiding

Provision of State facilities as a

place of worship, the State argues, would entail financial and
other

support of

kind

that

u.s.

672

It was financial

the Court proscribed
(1971).

aid to a

religion.

in Tilton v.

Although the Tilton

sec tar ian institution,

support of
Richardson,

used

provided
for

years.

that

the State argues that it was

federally-subsidized

sec tar ian or

religious

403

Court upheld financial

careful to circumscribe the license that it granted.
had

this

Congress

buildings must

worship

for

a

not

be

period of

20

The Court held that this was not enough.

"If, at the

end of 20 years, the building is, for example, converted into a
chapel

or

otherwise

used

to

promote

religious

uses,

the

original federal grant will in part have the [constitutionally
t
c

impermissible]

effect

of

advancing

religion."

Tilton,

the

State argues, thus stands for the proposition that State funds

Justice White would appear to be correct that this Court has not
explicitly stated the standard to be applied.
But it is not
apparent that this is a legally powerful fact.
Justice White's draft appeared to concede that the
university had created a public forum. See Draft Dissent at 3
n.2. And his opinion in Heffron, supra, clearly recognized that
religious speech is entitled to First Amendment protection. This
seems to me to be conclusive. The cases establish that only a
compelling state interest will justify a content-basfid
restriction on free speech in a public forum. Cf. vHeffron, 49
USLW at 4764 ("A major criterion of a valied time, place, and
manner restriction is that the restriction 'may not be based upon
either the content or the subject matter of the speech.'"). If
so, the real question in the case is: At what point--if any--does
the State's interest in avoiding entanglement with religion
become sufficiently compelling to exclude religious speech from a
public forum?

b.

may

not

be

used

to

provide

buildings

for

use

by

religious

organizations.
The District Court
But

the

Eighth

had

Circuit

found

held

Ti 1 ton

that

it

to

was

be

controlling.
Tilton

not.

had

contemplated the possibility that a sectarian institution might
actually

convert

federally

funded

buildings

into

chapels

otherwise stamp them with the imprimatur of religion.
had

actually

upheld

the

or

The case

validity of federal building grants,

subject only to the condition that the buildings not be used
primarily

for

religious

worship.

Tilton

significantly different on its facts.
Not

being

contemplated
three-part

governed

in

this

test,

by

case

reiterated

It did not control.

Tilton,

must
by

be

therefore

was

the

State

assessed

this

Court

assistance

under
as

a

settled

recently

as

~

Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan,
444

u.s.

646, 653 (1980). "First, the [governmental regulation]

must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or

primary

inhibits
foster

1

effect

religion

must

***·,

be

one

that

finally,

the

neither

advances

[regulation]

must

not
not

an excessive government entanglement with religion.

Lemon v. Kurtzman,

403

u.s.

602, 612-613

1

"

(1971), quoting Walz

v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
In this case two prongs of
problematic.

The

district

the test were admittedly not

court

had

held

that

a

policy

permitting religious speech in University facilities would
have a neutral purpose and
religion.

(1)

(3) would avoid "entanglement" with

The district court had concluded, however, that such

I •

a policy would fail the test's second prong: that it would
'

have the "primary effect" of advancing religion.

(2)

The court of

appeals therefore addressed itself mainly to this prong of the
test.

It reasoned as follows:
"We

cannot

agree •.. that

primary effect of
~ ,the

~·- '

primary

n ' secular

purpose--to

~ awareness

~

v-

~·~

of

simply

a

policy

would

have

-----------------------Rather, it would

advancing

effect

such

religion.

advancing

develop

the

students'

students

to

put

have

University's

admitted

'social

cultural

and

as well as their intellectual curiosity.'

permit

the

their

religious

It would
ideas

and

practices in competition with the ideas and practices of other

~'~roups,

religious

~;AA/ university,

~~goals
for

its

or

secular.

administration

It

would

or

its

no more commit
faculty

to

the

religious

than they are now committed to the goals of the Students

a

Democratic

Society,

the

Young

Socialist Alliance,

the

Young Democrats of the Women's Union."
This paragraph ably summarizes the reasoning of the Eighth
Circuit.
with

It also illuminates the Eighth Circuit's disagreement

the

essential
Court.

district
point

of

court;

and

it

disagreement

does

much

among

the

to

clarify

parties

in

the
this

As framed by the Eighth Circuit, the question was one

of "equal access."
the University

had

The court had reasoned from the outset that
created

a

forum. 4

------

public

Under

standard

4 This reasoning provides an implict answer to the argument/
that the "primary effect" of opening the buildings would be to
advance religion. The "open forum" policy was adopted not to
promote religion, but to encourage student fellowship and the
Footnote continued on next page.

~
~

o.
First Amendment analysis, the burden therefore rested on those
who

wished

to

treat

religious

'

speech

as

constitutionally

exceptional.
The district court, by contrast, began from a "Religion
Clauses"

perspective.

analyzed

as

between

the

a

In

view,

conflict--requiring

competing

Establishment

its

Clauses.

court assumed a

interests
Expressed

the
a

of

case

balancing

needed

to

be

resolution--

the

Free

Exercise

another

way,

the

and

district

special difficulty about providing facilities

to a religious group, and its analysis flowed from that worry.
In my judgment the Eighth Circuit adopted much the better
mode

of

analysis.

In

the first place,

its analysis--unlike

that of the district court--attaches significance to the fact
that

the

censorship

State
is

has

created

presumptively

a

public

forum

proscribed.

in
When

which
the

content
case

free exchange of ideas.
It is the effect of this entire policy
that must be assessed, not the extension of this policy to
religious groups and speakers. Once the forum was opened,
religious speakers could not be excluded due to the content of
their speech. But the primary effect of creating the forum was
not to promote religion, any more than it was to promote the
views of other speakers who might utilize the forum that the
University provided.
Because a 2ublic forum already exists, this case is
fundamentally un1r1ke Srandon v. Boara of· Education, 635 F.2d 971
(CA2 1980) and other cases in which schools have denied the
requests of student groups to provide a forum in order to permit
them to practice their rights under the Free Exercise clause.
That is a different case--the one imagined by Justice White in
which the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses are arguably
brought into direct conflict. Here, 90 sgecial Erivileges ~re
sou ht for religious speakers under the Free Exercise clause.
Tne rgume
1s
re 1gious speakers may not be denied that
which is already available to speakers of all other kinds.

is

.

':J •

analyzed

as

a

conflict

of

Free

Exercise

-

and

Establishment

'

concerns, the separate First Amendment concern for avoidance of
content-based restrictions simply falls out of the picture.
Yet

this

factor

is

comparison with some of
has been analogized.
a

crucial,

the cases

as

can

be

seen

to which this one

from

a

(Widmar)

For example, in his proposed dissent from

denial of cert, Justice White argued that "lower state and

federal courts have reached divergent results involving similar
claims

by

religious

educational

t~

'

for

·
p:

tl

va.

He

state

cited

rules

Brandon

involving

v.

Board

of

1971)

as

cases

in

which

courts

had

upheld

refusals to permit the use of public school facilities

religious

tpt:'~~imed
~

w.

(SD

~
· ~ ~.AJ: ~ools'
~~- " y{/

~~

institutions."

against

Education, supra, and Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp.

~
~ 1263

~

groups

a

purposes.

Free

But

Exercise

those

right

cases--in

to

have

the

which
school

students
open

its

facilities to them, though not necessarily to other groups--are

~
•

significantly different from this one. In Brandon and Hunt the
schools

had

not

created public

forums.

The

schools had not

chosen to provide their facilities to independently organized
student
the

groups.

schools

Against

to

take

this

an

background,

affirmative

the

step on

students asked
behalf

of

their

organizations alone.

When such a demand is made--and justified

by

Free

an

appeal

Establishment
special

to

concerns

benefits

their religion.
recognized

in

from

Exercise

does
the

rights--a

arise.

State,

Religious

so

that

But that is not this case.
his

opinion

in Brandon,

they

tension
speakers
can

with
ask

practice

As Judge Kaufman

635 F.2d

at

980,

the

10.
student

religious

benefits

accorded

discrimination
meetings.
his

group

here

to

all

based

on

sought
other

what

merely

student

they

wished

to

share

in

the

groups--to

avoid

to

their

say

at

Judge Kaufman thus had no difficulty in reconciling

Brandon

decision

with

the

result
~

facilities of a university :Rave
'public forum,'

in

this

case:

"The

been identifed as a

where religious speech and association cannot

be prohibited."

id.

That was not so in the case of the high

school classroom, and the difference was dispositive.
There is a second reason why the "public forum" analysis

-

----

should be preferred to the "Religion Clauses" approach of the
district

court.

Unless

it

is

assumed

prima

facie

that

religious groups and religious speech are entitled to the same
protection

as

other

speech,

every

government

action

that

affects a religious organization--no matter how remotely--must
be

suspect

.

example

of

under
a

the

Establishment

public park,

~--------~--

Consider

Clause.

in which sundry orators

speak from the stumps of State-owned trees.

the

routinely

Could the State

exclude only those speakers who wished to speak on religious
topics?
If
religious

Indeed, must it do so, under the Establishment Clause?
the

burden

speakers--if

is
the

to

justify

a

policy

assumed norm

is one

of

allowing

in which

the

right to speak belongs to everyone but religious speakers-- it
is

clear

that

the effect of

extending

the policy to include

religious speech will always be to advance religion.

This is

why Professor Tribe describes as "metaphysical" the effort to
distinguish and apply the "primary effect," see Regan, supra,

11.

44 U.S.

at 6 53 and the "direct and immediate effect" standard

u.s.

756, 783

American Constitutional

Law 840

of Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413
n.39

(1973).

See

Yet

(1978).

L.

Tribe,

virtually

no

one--apparently

not

even

the

University of Missouri--would defend the constitutionality of
excluding religious speech from the streets and parks.
In

Widmar,

for

example,

the

University

struggles

to

distinguish O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931 (CADC 1979). In that
case

the

court

considered

a

challenge

to

the

use

of

the

National Mall for the celebration of Mass by Pope John Paul II.
Noting

that

"government
and

the
to make

needs,"

"equal

Free

Exercise

some

Clause

actually

accomodation to religious

Leventhal's thoughtful opinion held that
---------'------..
to a public facility generally open to the

access

In attempting

a

sometimes
public

relevance

public

be

Id. at 935.

to distinguish O'Hair, the University

constitutional
and

realities

Judge

public" represented the only workable principle.

park

compels

to the distinction between a

building.

differences

streets

and

attaches

It

between

parks.

is
a

These

true

public
outdoor

that

public

there

building

may

and

facilities

the
have

"immemorially been held in trust for use by the public and ...
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens,

and discussing public questions."

supra, 49 USLW at 4765, quoting Hague v. CIO, 307
(1939).
forum

But

have

restrictions

traditionally

based on
rested

on

u.s.

the nature of
the

"State's

Heffron,
496, 515

the public
interest

in

protecting the safety and convenience of persons using a public

12.
forum," Heffron, supra, 49 USLW at 4765, not on an interest in
censoring the content of what is said, see Carey, supra, 48
USLW

at

speaking

95-96

("Once

a

by some groups,

forum

is

opened

up to

assembly or

government may not prohibit others

from assembling or speaking on the basis fo what they intend to
say.

Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based

on content alone, and they may not be justified by reference to
content alone.") .5
Based on the foregoing arguments, I would conclude that
the provision of equal access to religious speakers--at least
in the absence of powerful evidence of State intent to advance
religion--does

not

offend

the

Establishment

Clause

thus

fails

compelling constitutional

Establishment
to

interest

justify
in denying

Clause.

the

The

claim of

this

a

benefit--

which is available to all others--to those who would use it for
religious speech.6

5The University also seems to advance a second argument
for distinguishing between public parks on the one hand and
public buildings on the other. The use of a building is
different, the University says, because of the greater financial
cost. This too is unpersuasive. It may generally cost more to
provide access to a building than access to parkland, but this is
only a contingent accident. In O'Hair the government spent more
than $128,000 for services rendered out-of-doors during the papal
mass.
6cf. Heffron, supra ("These nonreligious organizations
seeking support for their activities are entitled to rights equal
to those of religious groups to enter a public forum and spread
their views ..•• If Rule 6.05 is an invalid restriction on the
activities of [the Krishnas], it is no more valid with respect to
the other social, political or charitable organizations •.•• ").

13.
Three

other

arguments

for

upholding

the

University's

restrictive rule are not treated so well in the opinion of the

____.,

Eighth Circuit.

~~

·~·

First,

(academic

Nonetheless, they merit serious discussion.

the

freedom

entitles

~? establishing its own rules.

fYV

impressionable

argues

University

minds

it

that

the

tradition

of

latitude

in

special

to

Further, this Court has noted that

should

not

be

encouraged

State's imprimatur on religious activities.

to

see

the

See, e.g., Roemer

v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 750, 764

(1976).

But

these arguments are two-edged in the context of this case.

It

is the University's mission to provide a free market of ideas,
in which all points of view are included.

If there is anywhere

where content-censorship is abhorrent, it is in the context of
a University.
State's

This is also an answer to the concern about the

imprimatur.

enough

to

benefit

Unlike

children

College
from

students

exposure

in primary

to

and

are

a

even

presumably

broad

range of

secondary

mature
ideas.

schools,

they

should be able to see that the University does not sanction the
ideas

of

all

those

who

use

its

facilities--not

those

of

a

religious group any more than those of the SDS.
The

second

argument

is

based

on State

law.

Dissenting

from a denial of a petition for rehearing en bane, two judges
argued

that

compelling
speech.
shall

the

interest

The
ever

Missouri

be

in

Missouri
taken

State

denying

State

constitution
from

the

Constitution
support

provides

public

created
to

that

treasury,

a

religious
"no

money

directly

indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination."

or

Art.

14.

I,

7.

§

courts

According
have

to the dissenting opinion,

long

restrictive

interpreted

than

the

first

these

"The Missouri

provisions

amendment

to

the

to

be

United

more
States

constitution in prohibiting expenditures of public funds
manner

tending to erode an absolute separation of church and

state."
in

in a

Moreover, the challenged

terms

that

University

"The

general

buildings

and

University regulation stated
prohibition

grounds

for

against

religious

use

of

worship

or

religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of the
Board

of

Curators,

by

the

Constitution

and

laws

of

the

State •..• "
There
argument.

are

various

difficulties

evaluating

in

this

First, it is far from clear how the Missouri courts

would apply the Missouri constitution in this case.

The State

itself is not a party to the case; the Attorney General has not
filed

an

Court's

amicus

most

tuition
including

brief.

recent

grants

relevant

to

those

students

with

University v. Rogers,
1029
that

(1976).
an

the

decision

upheld

attending

sectarian

Missouri
a

Supreme

program

of

private

colleges,

affiliations.

American

538 S.W.2d 711,

cert.

denied,

429

u.s.

Based on this opinion, it is at least uncertain

"equal

constitution.

Moreover,

access"

On

the

policy

other

hand,

would
the

offend

Rogers

the

state

opinion

rests

heavily on the notion that the grants go to the students, not
the

colleges.

And

it

also

argues

for

deference

to

the

legislature, while reaffirming earlier opinions that do strike

15.
legislation

down

that

would

offend

not

the

federal

constitution.
Leaving the question of what the law of Missouri is, there
~ ~

is a related question whether a Missouri policy of separation,

~stricter

~r

qualify

than
as

the

a

compelling

balancing test.
F.Supp.
the

376,

instances.

constitutional

state

interest

requirement,
in

a

could

constitutional

In Leutkemeyer, et al. v. Kaufmann, et al, 364

386

district

federal

(W.D. Mo. 1973), aff'd, 419 U.S. 888

court

held

that

it

could,

but

only

in

(1974),
certain

The Eighth Circuit treated these concerns only in a

footnote, No. 7, which must be regarded as ambiguous.

But the

footnote appears to hold that the State interest in separation
is not compelling in the factual setting of this case, and that
it does not seem to have been regarded as compelling even by
the University itself.

As the court noted, "The regulation at

issue specifically states that the ban on the use of University
facilities

for

interpreted

religious

'to

forbid

worship
the

or

teaching

offering

of

is

prayer

not
or

to

be

other

appropriate recognition at public functions held in University
facilities.'"

A further

University

regulation

provides

that

"Regular chapels established on University grounds may be used
for

religious services but not for

regular recurring services

of

any

and

groups.

Special

rules

procedures

shall

be

established for each such chapel by the Chancellor."
These regulations belie the claim that the University sees

!

a compelling State interest in maintaining the kind of "strict"
separation of church and State that

it purports to defend in

16.
this Court.

Cf. Carey, supra,

over-inclusiveness
that

it

can

interest) .

and

be

under-inclusiveness

justified

Under

48 U.S.L.W. at 4758

the

by

reference

circumstances,

it

(statute's

undermines
to

claim

asserted

seems

State

preferable

to

avoid the hard questions of Missouri and federal constitutional
~
law that would otherwise arise. Accordingly, I would hold that
the

regulation in issue is under inclusive;

effectively

serve

the

alleged

State

that it does not

interest

in

rigid

separation of church and state; and that it therefore cannot be
justified on that basis.
Alternatively,
follows:
Court

It

would

is

at

hold

extension

of

worship.

Even

I

believe that the
least

that

equal
if

it

unclear

the

state

protection
did,

compelling in this case.

that

the

issue could be met as
the Missouri

constitution

to
state

religious
interest

Supreme

forbids

the

teaching

and

would

not

be

The extent of state support would be

de minimis; there would be no "entanglement"; there would be no
imprimatur of State approval here--or at any rate substantially
less

than

than

occurs

through

the maintenance

of

University

chapels and the saying of prayers at public ceremonies.
I

tt;. '-s

5' ~

The other argument deserving consideration would attempt

~istinguish

L

between religious speech and religious worship. 7

7 Judge Kauffman invoked this distinction in his opinion in
Brandon, supra. Specifically, he suggested that it was
constitutionally significant that the high school students sought
use of a classroom for purposes of religious worship, rather than
speech about religious topics. See 635 F.2d at 978.

17.

(The University regulation here at issue purported to exclude
"religious
religious

worship
"speech"

protection;

express

religious

would

religious

Establishment
intuitive

or

Clause.

the

traditional
could

This

plausibility.

both

enjoy

worship

On

On

teaching."}

be

this

First

excluded

Amendment
under

distinction

possesses

surface,

might

the

constitutional

respect

it
for

view,

the
some

appear

speech

and

to
the

constitutional wariness of entanglement with particular forms
of

worship.

government
"worship." 8

in

fails.

such

a

the

task

of

distinction
defining

would

what

was

involve

the

and

not

was

"The administration of such a test would [itself]

impermisibly
Andrus,

But

entangle

supra,

government

613 F.2d at 936.

and

religion."

O'Hair

This proposed solution thus

Surely the Constitution does not require the State to

make choices that entangle it with religion in this way.

II.

v.

OTHER ARGUMENTS: THE BRIEFS

A. Petitioners
1. Arguments

8 In Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 u.s. 67, 70 (1953}, the
Court struck down an ordinance that would have required a
distinction between religious services that were and those that
were not permissible in a public park. The Court held:
"It is no business of courts to say that what is a religious
practice or activity for one group is not religion under the
protection of the First Amendment ••.• To call the words which one
minister speaks to his congregation a sermon, immune from
regulation, and the words of another minister an address, subject
to regultion, is merely an indirect way of preferring one
religion over another."

18.

Appearing in this Court as the petitioner, the University
of

Missouri

contends

most

permitting

that

adamantly

religious use of Univeristy facilities would have the "primary
effect" of advancing religion.
says,

forbids

any

religious impact."
arising

through

The "primary effect"

governmental

action

Brief at 17.

financial

with

a

test,

it

"substantial

Here it sees such an impact

support

and

an

"aura

of

implied

approval."
Petitioners

also

advance

a

subtle

and

sophisticated

~~------------------------

The constitution, they assert,
recognizes
constitutional concerns

"religion."

implicating religion must be assessed

in the context of the "Establishment Clause."

It is important

to begin any analysis from this perspective.
begin

with

a

free-speech,
based

distinctions
justification.

But

on

It is mistaken to

public-forum

model,

bear

heavy

content

a

in

which

burden

of

To do so inevitably assigns the "Establishment

Clause" a secondary importance, where the constitution intended
it at least to have parity.
Petitioners also claim that Missouri has a special state
interest

in

religion.
traditional

barring

public

They argue,
public

expenditures

finally,

forum;

for

the

benefit

of

that the University is not a

application

of

that

concept

is

therefore inappropriate.
A strong

amicus

brief

by

the

B'Nai

B'rith

in

essence

reasserts the claim that "religious speech" is not "speech" in

19.
the

usual sense.

into

three

categories:

permissible.
Here,

Government

interaction with

the proscribed,

religion falls

the mandated,

See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664

no one's

rights

been violated.

to

the

The claim,

free

exercise of

and the
(1970).

religion have

instead, is that the government is

obliged to take affirmative steps in the aid of religion.

(It

is assumed throughout that no free-speech right of equal access
to a public forum is

implicated~

this is another way of saying

that

"religion"

are

"speech"

and

separate

constitutional

Analysis can stop at this point.

concepts.)

No affirmative

reason exists why aid must be provided. Even assuming that some
reason

does

exist,

the

State's

interest

in

maintaining

separation would override it.
The

American

essentially ,·"an
Amendement

Jewish

Congress

"Establishment

requires

sectarian speech.

a

also

argues

Clause"

that

case.

this

The

is

First

distinction between sectarian and non-

Free speech doctrines do not apply to the

former in the way that they do to the latter.

2. Analysis
Petitioners' most powerful argument is,

-----------

"religious

in essence, that
~

speech"

is

not

"speech."

In

justification

they

point to the structure of the constitution, which at least in
some

sections--notably

religion

as

a

concern

the

Establishment

distinct

from

Clause--treats

others.

To

regard

"religious speech" as "speech," they reason, is to ignore this
implicit

distinction~

worse,

it

is

to

risk

the

very

20.
entanglement with

religion th t

the Establishment Clause was

intended to prevent.
There are two object'ons to this argument.
linguistic:
"speech.
@

could

It

is

" ~ou:d

it

odd

not

to

treat

The first is

"religious

speech"

as

a municipality forbid prayer in a public park?

ban conversations

about

religious

under some circumstances it could.

subjects? Perhaps

If so, however, it should

surely have to meet a heavy burden of justification, not merely
explain that it was withholding support for religion.
The second objection is practical.
make

the

distinction

between

Government could not
~ch"

"religious

----

and

"non-

--

religious speech" without involving itself deeply in religious
questions.

There would be repeated arguments over definitions.

The

suggested

line

entanglement

in

would

therefore

religion--the

lead

very

to

increased
that

result

the

Establishment Clause was meant to foreclose.
B. Respondents
1. Arguments
Respondents

argue

that

the

speech on the basis of content.
forum

does

not

violate

the

government

cannot

regulate

Equality of access to a public

Establishment Clause.

The

State

does not place its imprimatur on religious speech in a public
forum.

It fosters a climate of lively intellectual exchange,

in which the State has a neutral interest.
Amici argue that the University is inherently infused with
First Amendment concerns about the vitality of free exchange in
ideas.

The

State

interest

in

limiting

speech

is

virtually

qs

21.

nonexistent
State

has

matter.

there.

This

exposed

case

elementary

is

unlike

school

children

in which
to

the

religious

The State imprimatur is absent here; the elements of

voluntarism and maturity are greater.
speech

cases

and

public

expression.

forum

cases

Many of the classic free
have

involved

religious

Maintenance of an open and accessible public forum

is not an establishment of religion.
The
they,

regents

of

the

University

of

California

note

that

and presumably many other college administrations, open

their buildings equally to religious and non-religious speech.
They argue that their policy does not offend the Establishment
Clause.
2.

Analysis

Respondents and amici characterize this as a free-speech,
public-forum

case.

Establishment
California

Petitioners

Clause

regents

between the two.

case.

to

view

This
this

see

it

brings
Court

as
the
as

essentially

an

University

of

facing

a

choice

For the reasons stated above, I would analyze
I I

this case within a public-forum model.
out,

however,

analyses.
forum.
When

It should be pointed

that different cases would call for different

The State is under no obligation to create a public

It need not open every public building to public use.
it moves,

weighty

however,

justification,

it must move

even-handedly.

the State may not differentiate among

~ speeches or speakers on the basis of content.

III.

SUMMARY

Absent

22.

1.

This

case

is

different

from one

in which

religious

speakers ask the State to provide them with special benefits
~

needed if they are to "exercise" their religion.

The question

here involves discrimination against religious speech.

Having

voluntarily created a public forum, the University of Missouri
could

not

exclude

religious

speech

without

demonstrating

a

compelling justification for its attempt at content regulation.
2.

The Establishment Clause does not forbid the State to

' J grant religious

speakers equal access

to a

p~blic forum.

It

therefore fails to provide a justification for the University's
regulation.
3.

The State's interest in avoiding entanglement,

which

is broadly defined by the State constitution also, also fails
to

justify

the

regulation

attempted here.

The regulation was

impermissibly underinclusive: the University permits prayers at
its

public

functions

and

it

maintains

chapels

for

use

by

religious congregations.
4.

The decision of the Court of Appeals should therefore

be affirmed.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80--689

GARY E. WIDMAR, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. CLARK
VINCENT, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[October - , 1981]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the court.
This case presents the question whether a state university,
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities
of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a registered student group desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and religious discussion.
I
It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri atKansas City 1 to encourage the activities of student organizations. The University officially recognizes over 100 student
groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the
meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an activity fee of $41 per semester (1978-1979) to help defray the
costs to the University.
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to
conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 1977, howThe University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four campuses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri.
2
Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from
various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in
1977, "perhaps twenty students . . . participate actively in Cornerstone
and form the backbone of the campus organization." Affidavit of Florian
1
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ever, the University informed the group that it could no
longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was
based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in
1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or
grounds "for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching." 3
Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone,
brought suit to challenge the regulation in Federal District

-

Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911
(WD Mo. 1979).
Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms
and in the student center. These meeting were open to the public and attracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included
prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and
experiences.
3
The pertinent regulations provide as follows:
"4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohibition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship
or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any
other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offering of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions
held in University facilities ....
"4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be
used for religious services but not for recurring services of any groups.
Special rules and procedures shall be established for each chapel by the
Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to
any religious group."
There is no chapel on the campus of the University of Missouri at Kansas
City. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approximately 125 miles east of UMKC.
Before 1977 University officials were unaware of the religious character
of Cornerstone's meetings. The District Court found that University officials had never "authorized a student organization to utilize a University
facility for a meeting when they had full knowledge that the purposes of
the meeting include[d] religious worship or religious teaching." Chess v.
Widmar, supra, at 910.
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Court for the Western District of Missouri. 4 They alleged
that the University's discrimination against religious activity
and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States.
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar,
480 F. Supp. 907 (WD Mo. 1979). It found the regulation not
only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of
the Federal Constitution. Id., at 916. Under Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the
State could not provide facilities for religious use without giving prohibited support to an institution of religion. I d., at
915-916. The District Court rejected the argument that the
University could not discriminate against religious speech on
the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to
less protection than other types of expression. I d., at 918.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (CA8 1980). Rejecting the
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regulation as a content-based discrimination against religious
speech, for which it could find no compelling justification. I d.,
at 1315-1320. The Establishment Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities are open to groups and
speakers of all kinds. According to the Court of Appeals,
the "primary effect" of such a policy would not be to advance
religion, but rather to further the neutral purpose of developing students' "'social and cultural awareness as well as [their]
• Clark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess, the named plaintiff
in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated
the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the University's Board
of Curators.
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intellectual curiosity."' Id., at 1317 (quoting from the University bulletin's description of the student activities program, reprinted in id., at 1312, n. 1).
Essentially for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals,
we now affirm.
II

Through its policy of accommodating the meetings of registered student groups, the University has created for its students a quasi-public forum. 5 Having done so, the University assumed an obligation to justify its discriminations and
exclusions under applicable constitutional norms. The Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a
public forum, even if it was not required to create the forum
in the first place. See, e. g., City of M adision Joint School
District v. Wisconsin Public Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167, 175 and n. 8. (1976) (although a State
may conduct business in private session, "where the State
has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement," exclusions bear a heavy burden of justification); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 555-559 (1975) (because municipal theater was a public forum, city could not
exclude a production without satisfying constitutional safeguards applicable to prior restraints).
The University's institutional mission, which it describes
as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for
5
The concept of a "public forum" rests on the recognition, first expressed in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939), that
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places
has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights,
and liberties of citizens."
See also Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
u. s. 536 (1965).
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Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitutional scrutiny. 6 Our cases leave no doubt that the First
Amendment rights of speech and association reach state university campuses with undiminished force. See, e. g., Healy
v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 487 (1960).
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated against
groups and speakers based on their desire to engage in religious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech
and association protected by the First Amendment. See,
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).
This Court has recognized that the campus of a public university possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum. "The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of
ideas."' Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, the capacity of a group or individual "to participate in the intellectual give and
take of campus debate ... [would be] limited by denial of access to the customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students." !d., at 181-182. We have therefore held that
students enjoy First Amendment rights of speech and association on the
campus, and that the "denial [to particular groups] of use of campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to the
level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint. !d., at 181,
6

184.

On the other hand, First Amendment rights must of course be analyzed
"in light of the special characteristics of the school environment." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969).
A university differs in significant respects from public forums such as
streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied its authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of
its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a campus
must make all of its facilities equally available to students and nonstudents
alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its grounds or
buildings.

0$068~DICK-28-0CT-81

80-689-0PINION

6

WIDMAR

v.

VINCENT

In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a public
forum based on the religious content of a group's intended
speech, the University must therefore satisfy the standard of
review appropriate to content-based exclusions. It must
show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 461, 464--465
(1980). 7

III
In this case the University claims a compelling interest in
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives
this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the
Federal and Missouri Constitutions.
A

The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to
other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of
the Constitution of the United States. 8 We agree that the
University has a compelling interest in complying with its
constitutional obligations. But we disagree with its conclusion that an "equal access" policy would be incompatible with
this Court's Establishment Clause cases. Those cases hold
that a policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can
'See also Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 184 (1972):
"It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial of recognition
was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range
of associational activities described above. While a college has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which ... may justify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the
appropriateness of that action."
8
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .
. . ." U. S. Const., Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).
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pass a three-pronged test: "First, the [governmental policy]
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the [policy] must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971). See also Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 773
(1973).
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an
open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against religious speech, would have a secular purpose 9 and would avoid
entanglement with religion. 10 But the District Court con9
The University's secular purpose is to provide a forum in which students can exchange ideas. It does not undermine this purpose that some
groups will use the forum to engage in religious speech. We do not understand petitioners to argue that a State could-much less that it must-exclude religious speech from the streets or from the parks that it maintains
as public forums. Yet the State's purpose remains as secular when the
forum is a room within a government building, see City of Madison Joint
School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 429
U. S. 167 (1976) (meeting room); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546 (1975) (municipal theatre), as when it involves the
streets or the parks, see Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972)
(outdoor picketing); Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496 (1939) (streets and other
public places).
This case is therefore quite different from those in which this Court has
invalidated statutes permitting school facilities to be used for instruction
by religious groups, but not by others. See McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). The Establishment Clause does not require,
but actually forbids, State hostility toward religion. See Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 312 (1952).
10
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk
greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of "religious
worship and religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1318.
Initially, the University would need to determine which words and
activites fall within "religious worship and religious teaching." This alone
could prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs
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eluded, and the University argues here, that allowing religious groups to share the limited public forum would have the
"primary effect" of advancing religion. 11
The University's argument misconceives the nature of this
case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious
forum would violate the Establishment Clause.'2 The Unimeet the constitutional definition of religion." O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.
2d 931, 936 (CADC 1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-16 (1978). There would also be a continuing need to
monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule.
11
In finding that an "equal access" policy would have the primary effect
of advancing religion, the District Court relied primarily on the decision of
this Court in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this
Court upheld the grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges
for secular purposes. Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20
years, the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of
20 years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise
used to promote religious interests the original federal grant will in part
have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion."
I d., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposition that State funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used
by religious organizations.
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the
Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally
funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the imprimatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the
State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other discussions. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of
religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See,
e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101
S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).
12
This case is different from the cases in which religious groups claim
that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of
Educ., 635 F. 2d 971, 975-976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-1396;
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (SD W. Va. 1971).
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, andrespondents' claim to use that forum does not-as in Brandon or Hunt-rest
solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents'
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versity has opened its facilities to student groups, and the
question is whether it can now exclude groups because of the
content of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169
(1972). In this context we are unpersuaded that the primary
effect of the public forum, open to all forms of discourse,
would be to advance religion.
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely
effects. It is possible-perhaps even foreseeable-that religious groups will benefit from access to University facilities.
But this Court has explained that a religious organization's
enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the
prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion.
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756,
771 (1973); see, e. g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426
U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1972);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961).
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open
forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of
our cases. Two factors are especially relevant.
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer
any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects or practices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a policy "would no more commit the University ... to religious
goals," than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students
for a Democratc Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or
any other group eligible to use its facilities. Chess v.
Widmar, supra, at 1317.'3
claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association,
and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the
case. It is for this reason that we have declined petitioners' invitation to
couch our discussion in terms of respondents' rights under the Free Exercise Clause.
13
University students are, of course, young adults. They are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that
the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v.
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Second, the forum is available to a broad class of non-religious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recognized student groups UMKC. The provision of benefits to so
broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular
effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 240-241
(1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra,
413 U. S., at 756, 781-782 and n. 38 (1973). If the Establishment Clause barred the extension of general benefits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by the police
and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk kept in repair." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U. S. 736, 747 (1976) (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public Education v.
Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 658, n. 6 (1980). 14 At least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we therefore agree with the Court
of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not be the
forum's "primary effect."
B

Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than
the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect State support for religion, 15 the University claims a compelling interest
in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri
Constitution. 16
The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general polRichardson, 403 U. S. 672, 685-686 (1971).
1
' This Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent argument that all aid
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair,
413 u. s. 734, 743 (1973).
15
See, e.g., American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W. 2d 711, 720, (Mo.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) (holding Missouri Constitution
requires stricter separation of church and state than does Federal Constitution); Harfst v. Hogen, 163 S.W. 2d 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1947) (en bane)
(same).
16
See Leutkemeyer v. Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (ED Mo. 1973), affd,
419 U. S. 88 (1974) (finding State has compelling interest in compliance
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icy of accommodating student groups, applied equally to
those wishing to gather to engage in religious and non-religious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need
not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would decide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide
whether, under the Supremacy Clause, 17 a state interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free
speech interests protected by the First Amendment. Even
if a State's interest were compelling, its regulations would
have to protect that interest without unnecessary abridgment of protected rights of speech and association. See,
e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 465 (1980); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 489 (1960). Measured against this
standard, the University's policy of discrimination against religious speech and association fails on grounds of
overinclusiveness.
The University regulation challenged in this case applies to
"religious teaching'' as well as "religious worship." It is
therefore substantially overbroad. We can imagine no compelling State interest-which would be congnizable under the
Supremacy Clause-in banning all types of religious "teaching'' in an otherwise-open forum, including, for example, informal conversational "instruction." As we have noted in
the past, "[b]road prophylactic rules in an area of free
expresion are fatal. Precision of regulation must be the
touchstone." Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 637 (1980), quoting NAACP v. Button,
371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963) (omitting citations).
IV

Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity
of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and
with its own constitution).
17
U. S. Const., Art. VI, § 2.
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manner regulations. 18 We also affirm the continuing validity of cases, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 188-189
(1972), that recognize a University's right to exclude even
First Amendment activities that violate reasonable campus
rules or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other
students to obtain an education.
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a
public forum, the University seeks to enforce a content-based
exclusion of religious speech. Its exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that the State should be content-neutrality, and the University is unable to justify this
violation under applicable constitutional standards.
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is,
Affirmed.

18

See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972).
("The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the
kinds of regulations to time, place, and manner that are reasonable.'").
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delivered the opinion of the court.
This case presents the question whether a state university,
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities
of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a registered student group desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and religious discussion.
JUSTICE PowELL

I
It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri at Kansas City 1 to encourage the activities of student organizations. The University officially recognizes over 100 student
groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the
meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an activity fee of $41 per semester (197~1979) to help defray the
costs to the University.
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to
conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 1977, howThe University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four campuses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri. J
2
Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from
various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in
1977, "perhaps twenty students .. . participate actively in Cornerstone
and form the backbone of the campus organization. " Affidavit of Florian
1
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ever, the University informed the group that it could no
longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was
based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in
1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or
grounds "for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching." 3
Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone,
brought suit to challenge the regulation in Federal District

~

/
~

Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911
(WD Mo. 1979). /\ Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms
and in the student center. These meeting were open to the public and attracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included
prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and
experiences.
3
The pertinent regulations provide as follows:
"4.0314.0107
o University buildings or grounds (except chapels as
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohibition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship
or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any
other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offering of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions
held in University facilities ....
"4.0314.0108
egular chapels established on University grounds may be
used for religious services but not for recurring services of any groups.
Special rules and procedures shall be established for each chapel by the
Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to
any religious group."
There is no chapel on the campus of the University of Missouri at Kansas
City. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approximately 125 miles east of UMKC.
Before 1977 University officials were unaware of the religious character
of Cornerstone's meetings. The District Court found that University officials had never "authorized a student organization to utilize a University
facility for a meeting when they had full knowledge that the purposes of
the meeting include[d] religious worship or religious teaching." Chess v.
Widmar, supra, at 910.
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Court for the Western District of Missouri. 4 They alleged
that the University's discrimination against religious activity
and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States.
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar,
480 F. Supp. 907 (WD Mo. 1979). It found the regulation not
only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of
the Federal Constitution. Id., at 916. Under Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the
State could not provide facilities for religious use without giving prohibited support to an institution of religion. I d., at
915-916. The District Court rejected the argument that the
University could not discriminate against religious speech on /
the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to t/
less protection than other types of expression. I d., at 918:J
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (CA8 1980). Rejecting the
.,/
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regu- /
'
lation as a content-based discrimination against religiouSII'_..~ The C.OCArt
speech, for which it could find no com ellin · ification.
hdol +L.rO\.+ +l-,e
at 1315-1320.
sta shment Clause does not bar a policy of e ual access, in which facilities are open to groups and
pea ers of a 1 n s. According to the Court of Appeals,
the "primary effect" of such a policy would not be to advance
religion, but rather to further the neutral purpose of developing students' "'social and cultural awareness as well as [their]
' Clark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess, the named plaintiff
in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated
the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the University's Board
of Curators.

0$0689-DICK-28-0CT-81

80-689-0PINION
4

WIDMAR

v.

VINCENT

intellectual curiosity."' !d., at 1317 (quoting from the University bulletin's description of the student activities program, reprinted in id., at 1312, n. 1).
Essentially for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals,
the University has created a
we now affirm. - forum generally~pen for use by
II
-+l,~i
student groups.
Through its policy of accommodating. , . meetings.>~~~·;s;;~..:...------
ti:r:QQ it1alQQRt g::r:ea~s, tfl:e UH:h'ePsity :Ras ePeatee i'el' its sto""'.QeH:ts a EtHasi f)1alBlie FeP\ifH:.,... Having done so, the University assumed an obligation to justify its discriminations and
exclusions under applicable constitutional norms. The Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a
,/'
public forum~ even if it was not required to create the £
in the first place. See, e. g., City of Madis"on Joint School
District v. Wisconsin Public Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167, 175 and n. 8. (1976) (although a State
may conduct business in private session, "where the State
has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement," exclusions bear a heavy burden of justification); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 555-559 (1975) (because municipal theater was a public forum, city could not
exclude a production without satisfying constitutional safeguards applicable to prior restraints).
The University's institutional mission, which it describes
as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for

S. ----------------------------~
is Court has recognized that the campus of a public university possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum. "The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of
ideas."' Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, the capacity of a group or individual "to participate in the intellectual give and
take of campus debate ... [would be] limited by denial of access to the customary media for communicating with the administration faculty members, and ot?er s~udents." Id., at ~81-182. We[hav~ ther~fo~held that
students enJOY First Amendment nghts of speech and associatiOn on the
campus, and that the "denial [to particular groups] of use of campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to the
level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint. Id., at 181,
184.
--..1-

~The concept of a "public forum" rests on the recognition, first expressed in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939), that
''Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places
has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights,
and liberties of citizens."
See also Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
u. s. 536 (1965).

( f="~D.J-~ ~f;~a,.~J

e>"'l

flo.,~

S)
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does not exempt its actions from constitu- -....I-o-n.a.,.-sc-ru
--,..I,_n....;y"""
. Our cases leave no doubt that the First
Amendment rights of speech and association :r-~!&-t~~lflll~

\tePsity etl:mfHisee with 1:l:Haimiftishea feFee. See, e. g., Healy
v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 487 (1960).
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated against
groups and speakers based on their desire to engage in religious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech
and association protected by the First Amendment. See,
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).

I

I

'I

Although a univers~ty may create a forum with, /
rna n y of the aseo&E~a~e!'t'Et'fre~'!:i:-la!l"~r-ee-tl:1!e!t'ln~re~~~e~ss-,gg.,f;if;...:.'~·p~ta~8~1~iee-ii~E!-'fy;r.
see note s supra , our cases have recognized that
11

• • • • • r i l l i•F irst Amendment rights must
be analyzed
"in light of the special characteristics of the school environment." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969).
A university differs in significant respects from public forums such as
streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied its authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of
its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a campus
must make all of its facilities equally available to students and nonstudents
alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its grounds or
buil ·

I
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In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a public
forum based on the religious content of a group's intended
speech, the University must therefore satisfy the standard of
review appropriate to content-based exclusions. It must
show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end. l\_See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 461, 464-465
(1980). 7

/).

------~.e.D

III
In this case the University claims a compelling interest in
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives
this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the
Federal and Missouri Constitutions.

A
The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to
other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of
the Constitution of the United States. 8 We agree that the
University has a compelling interest in complying with its
constitutional obligations. But we disagree with its conclusion that an "equal access" policy would be incompatible with
this Court's Establishment Clause cases. Those cases hold
that a policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can
7

See also Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 184 (1972):
"It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial of recognition
was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range
of associational activities described above. While a college has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which . . . may justify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the
appropriateness of that action."
8
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .
. . . " U. S. Const., Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).

~.

r-

Committee for Public Education v.
Regan ,' 444 U.S. 646, 653 (1980) ,
.Boerner v. Maryland Public Work~Bd. ,

0$0689-DICK-28-0CT-81
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pass a three-pronged test: "First, the [governmental policy]
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the [policy] must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971). See ~~""""..,--
?M~~~~ j01 Public EJ;ucativn v. NtJq rtist, 418 U. S. 'i'56, 118
-fl9'i9).

In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an
open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against religious speech, would have a secular purpose 9 and would avoid
entanglement with religion. 10 But the District Court con-

It is the avowed purpose of UMKC to provide a forum in
which students can exchange ideas .

The University argues that

use of the forum for religious speech would undermine this
secular aim .

But by creating a forum t he University does not

thereby endorse or promote any of the particular ideas aired
there .

~~~ L

Undoubtedly many ideas are

a '~ AQ ~ in

the forum with

which the University desires no association .
Because this case involves a forum already made
generally ' available to student groups , it differs from those
cases in which this Court has invalidated statutes permitting
school facilities to be used for instruction by religious groups ,

~but
333

not by others .

u.s .

203 (1948) .

See , e\g .,

T"

McColl um v . Board of Education ,

In those cases the school

~~~,-

may~ sai ~ to

sponsor the views of the speaker .
10

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk
greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of "religious
worship and religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1318.
Initially, the University would need to determine which words and
activites fall within "religious worship and religious tea~ing." This alone
could prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs
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eluded, and the University argues here, that allowing religious groups to share the limited public forum would have the
"primary effect" of advancing religion. 11
The University's argument misconceives the nature of this
case. The question is not whether the creation of a reli ·
forum would violate the Establishment Clause.
e Unimeet the constitutional definition of religion." O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.
2d 931, 936 (CADC 1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-16 (1978). There would also be a continuing need to
monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule.
11
In finding that an "equal access" polic~ bave the ~ma ry effect
of advancing religion, the District Co~d primarily on .; · · ·
i
• • • • • Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this
Court upheld the grant of federal finan i assistance to sectarian colleges
t ough Congress had provi e
a e era y su for secular purposes.,
sidized buildings coul not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20
years, the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of
20 years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise
used to promote religious interests the original federal grant will in part
have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion."
I d., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposition that State funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used
by religious organizations.
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the
Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally
funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the imprimatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the
State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other discussions. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of
religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See,
e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101
S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).
12
This case is different from the cases in which religious groups claim
that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of
Educ., 635 F. 2d 971, 975-976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 8~1396;
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (SD W. Va. 1971).
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, andrespondents' claim to use that forum does not-as in Brandon or Hunt-rest
solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents'

•"
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versity has opened its facilities to student groups, and the
question is whether it can now exclude groups because of the
' • ~~ of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169
, \_.!.7'"
(1A~72~ In this context we are unpersuaded that the primary
effect of the public forum, open to all forms of discourse,
would be to advance religion.
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely
effects. It is possible-perhaps even foreseeable-that religious groups will benefit from access to University facilities.
But this Court has explained that a religious organization's
enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the
prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion.
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756,
771 (1973); see, e. g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426
U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1972);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961).
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open
forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of
our cases. Two factors are especially relevant.
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer
any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects or practices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a policy "would no more commit the University ... to religious
goals," than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students
\i)for a Uemocra\t Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or
any other group eligible to use its facilities. Chess v.
Widmar, supra, at 1317. '3
claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association,
and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the
case. li ifl fep 'hie r eal!On !JhM ·,\ e he oe eleclineel !'tlii1iBR91'8' iJwi!Je4!ien !Je ,_.JL--

eetteft oat disce~ssioR iR t&PJR8 sf I es}'etuient:i'
eiee Olattee• ..,___

ri~Rts

under the FFee E1te1 •

13
University students are, of course, young adults. They are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that
the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v.
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Second, the forum is available to a broad class of non-reli~ous as well as reli ·
speakers; there are over 100 recogmze s u ent groups UMKC. The provision of benefits to so
broad a spectrum o groups is an important index of secular
effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 240-241
(1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra,
413 U. S., at 756, 781-782 and n. 38 (1973). If the Establishment Clause barred the extension of general benefits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by the police
and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk kept in repair." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U. S. 736, 747 (1976) (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public Education v.
Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 658, n. 6 (1980). 14 At least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious ou will domiagree with the Court
nate UMKC's open forum, we
of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not be the
forum's "primary effect."
B

Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than
the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect State support for religion, 15 the University claims a compelling interest
in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri
Constitution. 16
The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general polRichardson, 403 U. S. 672, 685-686 (1971).
14
This Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent argument that all aid
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair,
413 u. s. 734, 743 (1973).
15
See, ~.b., American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W. 2d 711, 720, (Mo.) (en
bane), ceJ. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) (holding Missouri Constitution
requires stricter separation of church and state than does Federal Constitution); Harfst v. Hogen, 163 S.W. 2d 609, 613--014 (Mo. 1947) (en bane)
(same).
16
See Leutkemeyer v. Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (ED Mo. 1973), affd,
419 U. S. 88 (1974) (finding State has compelling interest in compliance
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icy of accommodating student groups, applied equally to
those wishing to gather to engage in religious and non-religious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need
not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would decide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide
whether, under the Supremacy Clause, 17 a state interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free
speech interests protected by the First Amendment. Even
if a State's interest were compelling, its regulations would
have to protect that interest without unnecessary abridgment of protected rights of speech and association. See,
e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 465 (1980); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 489 (1960). Measured against this
standard, the University's policy of discrimination against religious speech and association fails on grounds of
overinclusiveness.
The University regulation challenged in this case applies to
"religious teaching'' as well as "religious worship." It is
therefore substantially overbroad. We ca.~
n.:,im
~
a~
·n!S
e~~~
pelling State interest-which would be co gmzable under the
Supremacy Clause-in banning all types of religious "teaching'' in an otherwise-open forum, including, for example, informal conversational "instruction." As we have noted in
the past, "[b]road prophylactic rules in an area of free
expresion are fatal. Precision of regulation must be the
touchstone." Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 637 (1980), quoting NAACP v. Button,
371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963) (omitting citations).
IV
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity
of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and
with its own constitution).
17
U. S. Const. , Art. VI, § 2.

/

.

~lokw-~

Nor do we a~stion the right of the University to make academic
· dgments)~Q blE -4lew to allocate scarce resources--"to determine for
itself on academic grounds who may teach what may be
0$0689-DICK-28-0CT-8
taught how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted
to study." Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 , 263
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurr~ g in the judgment) ;
e£-
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~anner regulatwns. 18 ·n~ amrm the contmumg valid1ty of cases, e. g., Healy v. la\nes, 408 U. S. 169, 188-189
(1972), that recognize a University's right to exclude even
First Amendment activities that violate reasonable campus
rules or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other
students to obtain an education.
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a
public forum, the University seeks to enforce a content-based
exclusion of religious speech. Its exclusionary polic vi ou be conl
e fundamental principle that
tent-neutra , and the University is unable to justify this
violation under applicable constitutional standards.
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is,
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Affirmed.
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8
' See, e)g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972).
("The nat&-e of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictatp-the
•
kinds of regulations to time, place, and manner that are reasonable,(' "). ( q Uot ~ng

The Constitution on the Campq s,'22 Vand. L. Rev.
102 ' 1042 (1969).

Wri~ht,

.

--..>tC ,..,(\

.u _

,..-.,~

.fv~

~

-

Page proof of syUabus as
approved.
Lineup included.
Lineup still to be
added. Please send
lineup to me
when available . .

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See
United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus

WIDMAR ET AL. v. VINCENT ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 80-689.

Argued October 6, 1981-Decided December--, 1981

The University of Missouri at Kansas City, a state university, makes its
facilities generally available for the activities of registered student
groups. A registered student religious group that had previously received permission to conduct its meetings in University facilities was informed that it could no longer do so because of a University regulation
prohibiting the use of University buildings or grounds "for purposes of
religious worship or religious teaching." Members of the group then
brought suit in Federal District Court, alleging that the regulation violated, inter alia, their rights to free exercise of religion and freedom of
speech under the First Amendment. The District Court upheld the
regulation as being not only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed,
viewing the regulation as a content-based discrimination against religious speech, for which it could find no compelling justification, and holding that the Establishment Clause does not bar a policy of equal access,
in which facilities are open to groups and speakers of all kind.
Held: The University's exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a state regulation of speech should be content-neutral.
Pp. 4-13.
(a) Having created a forum generally open for use by student groups,
the University, in order to justify discriminatory exclusion from such
forum based on the religious content of a group's intended speech, must
satisfy the standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions;
i. e., it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.
Pp. 4-7.
(b) Although the University's interest in complying with its constitutional obligations under the Establishment Clause may be characterized
as compelling, an "equal access" policy would not be incompatable with
that Clause. A policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can
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pass the following three-pronged test: (1) It has a secular legislative purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect would be neither to advance nor
to inhibit religion; and (3) it does not foster "an excessive government
entanglement with religion." Here, it is conceded that an "equal access" policy would meet the first and third prongs of the test. In the
context of this case and in the absence of any evidence that religious
groups will dominate the University's forum, the advancement of religion would not be the forum's "primary effect." An "equal access" policy would therefore satisfy the test's second prong as well. Pp. 7-11.
(c) The State's interest in achieving greater separation of church and
State than is already ensured under the Establishment Clause is not sufficiently "compelling" to justify content-based discrimination against religious speech of the student group in question. Pp. 11-13.
635 F. 2d 1310, affirmed.
PowELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BuRGER, C. J.,
and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ.,
joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-689

GARY E. WIDMAR, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. CLARK
VINCENT, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[October - , 1981]

JUSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the court.
This case presents the question whether a state university,
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities
of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a registered student group desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and religious discussfon.
I

It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri at Kansas City 1 to encourage the activities of student organizations. The University officially recognizes over 100 student
groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the
meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an activity fee of $41 per semester (197~1979) to help defray the
costs to the University.
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to
conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 1977, how' The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four campuses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri.
' Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from
va..."ious denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in
1977, "perhaps twenty students ... participate actively in Cornerstone
and form the backbone of the campus organization." Affidavit of Florian
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ever, the University informed the group that it could no
longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was
based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in
1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or
grounds "for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching." 3
Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone,
brought suit to challenge the regulation in Federal District
Court for the Western District of Missouri. 4 They alleged
Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911
(WD Mo. 1979). Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms
and in the student center. These meeting were open to the public and attracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included
prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and
experiences.
8
The pertinent regulations provide as follows:
"4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohibition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship
or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any
other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offering of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions
held in University facilities ....
"4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be
used for religious services but not for recurring services of any groups.
Special rules and procedures shall be established for each chapel by the
Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to
any religious group."
There is no chapel on the campus of the University of Missouri at Kansas
City. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approximately 125 miles east of UMKC.
Before 1977 University officials were unaware of the religious character
of Cornerstone's meetings. The District Court found that University officials had never "authorized a student organization to utilize a University
facility for a meeting when they had full knowledge that the purposes of
the meeting include[d] religious worship or religious teaching." Chess v.
Widmar, supra, at 910.
'Clark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess, the named plaintiff
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that the University's discrimination against religious activity
and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States.
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar,
480 F. Supp. 907 (WD Mo. 1979). It found the regulation not
only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of
the Federal Constitution. Id., at 916. Under Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the
State could not provide facilities for religious use without giving prohibited support to an institution of religion. I d., at
915-916. The District Court rejected the argument that the
University could not discriminate against religious speech on
the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to
less protection than other types of expression. Id., at 918.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F . 2d 1310 (CA8 1980). Rejecting the
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regulation as a content-based discrimination against religious
speech, for which it could find no compelling justification.
Id. , at 1315-1320. The Court held that the Establishment
Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities
are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. ld., at 1317.
According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of
such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to
further the neutral purpose of developing students' "'social
and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curiosity."' ld., at 1317 (quoting from the University bulletin's
in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated
the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC , and the University's Board
of Curators.
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description of the student activities program, reprinted in
id., at 1312, n. 1).
Essentially for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals,
we now affirm.
II
Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the
University has created a forum generally open for use by student groups. 5 Having done so, the University assumed an
obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under
applicable constitutional norms. The Constitution forbids a
State to enforce certain exclusions from a public forum, 6 even
• This Court has recognized that the campus of a public university possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum. "The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of
ideas."' Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, the capacity of a group or individual "to participate in the intellectual give and
take of campus debate ... [would be] limited by denial of access to the customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students." Id., at 181-182. We therefore have held that
students enjoy First Amendment rights of speech and association on the
campus, and that the "denial [to particular groups] of use of campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to the
level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint. Id., at 181,
184.
6
The concept of a "public forum" rests on the recognition, first expressed in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939), that
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places
has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights,
and liberties of citizens."
See also Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
u. s. 536 (1965).
Although a university may create a forum with many of the characteristics of streets and public places, see n. 5, supra, our cases have recognized
that First Amendment rights must be analyzed "in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment." Tinker v. Des Moines lnde-
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if it was not required to create the forum in the first place.
See, e. g., City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167,
175 and n. 8. (1976) (although a State may conduct business in
private session, "where the State has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement," exclusions bear a heavy burden of
justification); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420
U. S. 546, 555-559 (1975) (because municipal theater was a
public forum, city could not exclude a production without satisfying constitutional safeguards applicable to pnor
restraints).
The University's institutional mission, which it describes
as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for
Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitutional scrutiny. Our cases leave no doubt that the First
Amendment rights of speech and association extend to the
campuses of state universities. See, e. g., Healy v. James,
408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 u. s. 479, 487 (1960).
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated against
groups and speakers based on their desire to engage in religious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech
and association protected by the First Amendment. See,
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).
pendent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). We continue to adhere
to that view. A university differs in significant respects from public forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's
mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied its authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon
the use of its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a
campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students and nonstudents alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its
grounds or buildings.
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In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a public
forum based on the religious content of a group's intended
speech, the University must therefore satisfy the standard of
review appropriate to content-based exclusions. It must
show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 461, 464-465
(1980). 7
III
In this case the University claims a compelling interest in
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives
this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the
Federal and Missouri Constitutions.
A

The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to
other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of
the Constitution of the United States. 8 We agree that the
University has a compelling interest in complying with its
constitutional obligations. But we disagree with its conclusion that an "equal access" policy would be incompatible with
this Court's Establishment Clause cases. Those cases hold
that a policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can
pass a three-pronged test: "First, the [governmental policy]
See also Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 184 (1972):
"It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial of recognition
was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range
of associational activities described above. While a college has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which ... may justify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the
appropriateness of that action."
8
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .
. . ." U. S. Canst., Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).
7
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must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the [policy] must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' " Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971). See Committee
for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 653 (1980);
Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U. S. 736, 748
(1976).
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an
open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against religious speech, would have a secular purpose 9 and would avoid
entanglement with religion. 10 But the District Court concluded, and the University argues here, that allowing religious groups to share the limited public forum would have the
"primary effect" of advancing religion. 11
'It is the avowed purpose of UMKC to provide a forum in which students can exchange ideas. The University argues that use of the forum
for religious speech would undermine this secular aim. But by creating a
forum the University does not thereby endorse or promote any of the particular ideas aired there. Undoubtedly many views are advocated in the
forum with which the University desires no association.
Because this case involves a forum already made generally available to
student groups, it differs from those cases in which this Court has invalidated statutes permitting school facilities to be used for instruction by religious groups, but not by others. See, e. g., McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). In those cases the school may appear to
sponsor the views of the speaker.
10
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk
greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of "religious
worship and religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1318.
Initially, the University would need to determine which words and
activites fall within "religious worship and religious teaching." This alone
could prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs
meet the constitutional definition of religion." O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.
2d 931, 936 (CADC 1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-16 (1978). There would also be a continuing need to
monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule.
11
In finding that an "equal access" policy would have the primary effect
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The University's argument misconceives the nature of this
case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious
forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The University has opened its facilities to student groups, and the question is whether it can now exclude groups because of the content of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169
(1972). 12 In this context we are unpersuaded that the priof advancing religion, the District Court in this case relied primarily on
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this Court upheld
the grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges for secular
purposes, but circumscribed the terms of the grant to ensure its constitutionality. Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized
buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 years,
the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of 20
years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise
used to promote religious interests the original federal grant will in part
have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion."
Id., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposition that State funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used
by religious organizations.
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the
Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally
funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the imprimatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the
State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other discussions. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of
religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See,
e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness , Inc., 101
S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).
12
This case is different from the cases in which religious groups claim
that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of
Educ., 635 F . 2d 971, 975-976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 8(}..1396;
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (SD W. Va. 1971).
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, andrespondents' claim to use that forum does no~as in Brandon or Hunfr-rest
solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents'
claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association,
and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the
case.
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mary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of discourse, would be to advance religion.
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely
effects. It is possible-perhaps even foreseeable-that religious groups will benefit from access to University facilities.
But this Court has explained that a religious organization's
enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the
prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion.
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756,
771 (1973); see, e. g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426
U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1972);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961).
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open
forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of
our cases. Two factors are especially relevant.
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer
any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects or practices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a policy "would no more commit the University ... to religious
goals," than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students
for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or
any other group eligible to use its facilities. Chess v.
Widmar, supra, at 1317. 13
Second, the forum is available to a broad class of non-religious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recognized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to
so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229,
240-241 (1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,
supra, 413 U. S., at 756, 781-782 and n. 38 (1973). If the
Establishment Clause barred the extension of general bene13
University students are, of course, young adults·. They are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that
the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 68fr686 (1971).
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fits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by
the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk
kept in repair." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U. S. 736, 747
(1976) (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public
Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 658, n. 6 (1980). 14 At
least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious
groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not
be the forum's "primary effect."
B
Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than
the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect State support for religion, 15 the University claims a compelling interest
in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri
Constitution. 16
The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general policy of accommodating student' groups, applied equally to
those wishing to gather to engage in religious and non-religious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need
not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would decide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide
whether, under the Supremacy Clause, 17 a state interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free
14

This Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent argument that all aid
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair,
413 u. s. 734, 743 (1973).
16
See, e. g., American United v. Rogers, 538 S. W. 2d 711, 720, (Mo.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) (holding Missouri Constitution
requires stricter separation of church and state than does Federal Constitution); Harfst v. Hogen , 163 S.W. 2d 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1947) (en bane)
(same).
16
See Leutkemeyer v. Kaufman, 364 F . Supp. 376 (ED Mo. 1973), affd,
419 U. S. 88 (1974) (finding State has compelling interest in compliance
with its own constitution).
" U. S. Const., Art. VI, § 2.
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speech interests protected by the First Amendment. Even
if a State's interest were compelling, its regulations would
have to protect that interest without unnecessary abridgment of protected rights of speech and association. See,
e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 465 (1980); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 489 (1960). Measured against this
standard, the University's policy of discrimination against
religious speech and association· fails on grounds of overinclusiveness.
The University regulation challenged in this case applies to
"religious teaching'' as well as "religious worship." It is
therefore substantially overbroad. We can imagine no compelling State interest-which would be cognizable under the
Supremacy Clause-in banning all types of religious "teaching'' in an otherwise-open forum, including, for example, informal conversational "instruction." As we have noted in
the past, "[b]road prophylactic rules in an area of free
expresion are fatal. Precision of regulation must be the
touchstone." Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 637 (1980), quoting NAACP v. Button,
371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963) (omitting citations).
IV
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity
of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and
manner regulations. 18 Nor do we question the right of the
University to make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources-"to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study." Sweezy v. New
8
' See, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972).
("The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the
kinds of regulations to time, place, and manner that are reasonable.'").
(quoting Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027,
1042 (1969).
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Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment); see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312-313 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J.,
announcing the decision of the Court). Finally, we also affirm the continuing validity of cases, e. g., Healy v. James,
408 U. S. 169, 188-189 (1972), that recognize a University's
right to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate
reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the
opportunity of other students to obtain an education.
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a
public forum, the University seeks to enforce a content-based
exclusion of religious speech. Its exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a state regulation of
speech should be content-neutral, and the University is unable to justify this violation under applicable constitutional
standards.
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is,
Affirmed.
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VINCENT, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[October - , 1981]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the court.
This case presents the question whether a state university,
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities
of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a registered student group desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and religious discussion.
I
It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri atKansas City 1 to encourage the activities of student organizations. The University officially recognizes over 100 student
groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the
meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an activity fee of $41 per semester (1978-1979) to help defray the
costs to the University.
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to
conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 1977, how'The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four campuses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri.
2
Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from
various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in
1977, "perhaps twenty students ... participate actively in Cornerstone
and form the backbone of the campus organization." Affidavit of Florian
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ever, the University informed the group that it could no
longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was
based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in
1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or
grounds "for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching." 3
Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone,
brought suit to challenge the regulation in Federal District
Court for the Western District of Missouri. 4 They alleged
Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911
(WD Mo. 1979). Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms
and in the student center. These meeting were open to the public and attracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included
prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and
experiences.
3
The pertinent regulations provide as follows:
"4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohibition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship
or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any
other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offering of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions
held in University facilities ....
"4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be
used for religious services but not for recurring services of any groups.
Special rules and procedures shall be established for each chapel by the
Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to
any religious group."
There is no chapel on the campus of the University of Missouri at Kansas
City. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approximately 125 miles east of UMKC.
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that the University's discrimination against religious activity
and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States.
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar,
480 F. Supp. 907 (WD Mo. 1979). It found the regulation not
only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of
the Federal Constitution. Id., at 916. Under Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the
State could not provide facilities for religious use without giving prohibited support to an institution of religion. I d., at
915-916. The District Court rejected the argument that the
University could not discriminate against religious speech on
the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to
less protection than other types of expression. I d., at 918.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (CA8 1980). Rejecting the
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regulation as a content-based discrimination against religious
speech, for which it could find no compelling justification.
Id., at 1315-1320. The Court held that the Establishment
Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities
are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. I d., at 1317.
According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of
such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to
further the neutral purpose of developing students' "'social
and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curiosity."' Id., at 1317 (quoting from the University bulletin's
in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated
the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the University's Board
of Curators.
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description of the student activities program, reprinted in
id., at 1312, n. 1).
E~~entiaHy fap t:Re Peasons statid h~r the Court ef Appeals, .Sl.lwk now affirm.
:::
II
Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the
University has created a forum generally open for use by student groups. 5 Having done so, the University assumed an
obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under
applicable constitutional norms. The Constitution forbids a
State to enforce certain exclusions from a public forum, 6 even
• This Court has recognized that the campus of a public university possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum. "The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of
ideas.'" Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, the capacity of a group or individual "to participate in the intellectual give and
take of campus debate ... [would be] limited by denial of access to the customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students." ld., at 181-182. We therefore have held that
students enjoy First Amendment rights of speech and association on the
campus, and that the "denial [to particular groups] of use of campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to the
level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint. Id., at 181,
184.
6

The concept of a "public forum" rests on the recognition, first expressed in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939), that
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places
has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights,
and liberties of citizens."
See also Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379

u. s. 536 (1965).

Although a university may create a forum with many of the characteristics of streets and public places, see n. 5, supra, our cases have recognized
that First Amendment rights must be analyzed "in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment." Tinker v. Des Moines lnde-
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if it was not required to create the forum in the first place.
See, e. g., City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167,
175 and n. 8. (1976) (although a State may conduct business in
private session, "where the State has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement," exclusions bear a heavy burden of
justification); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420
U. S. 546, 555--559 (1975) (because municipal theater was a
public forum, city could not exclude a production without satisfying constitutional safeguards applicable to pnor
restraints).
The University's institutional mission, which it describes
as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for
Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitutional scrutiny. Our cases leave no doubt that the First
Amendment rights of speech and association extend to the
campuses of state universities. See, e. g., Healy v. James,
408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 u. s. 479, 487 (1960).
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated against
groups and speakers based on their desire to engage in religious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech
and association protected by the First Amendment. See,
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).~
pendent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). We continue to adhere
to that view. A university differs in significant respects from public forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's
mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied its authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon
the use of its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a
campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students and nonstudents alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its
grounds or buildings.

S.
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In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a public .-forum based on the religious content of a group's intended
speech, the University must therefore satisfy the standard of
review appropriate to content-based exclusions. It must
show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 461, 464-465
(1980). 7
III
In this case the University claims a compelling interest in
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives
this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the
Federal and Missouri Constitutions.

A
The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities
.
!f.
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to
other groups without violating the Establishment ause of
·~
the Constitution of the United States. 8
U-"•.J
w·.~ if$'
Co""f 1Y',..,
.
l=fflm_~H_'f;f-mt:nr.-etTJm.!peHir~w;e;~~9tMr-H~m~~F~tll=':tJ,:/ c0 "' s+; -1-r..t · 0 """"I o 1o l ·~qG9astltY:tloRal e6hgatiOIIS'!
- +t' .., s. """' '/ loc..
~a tfiat aa "equal access" peliey vteald be incumpatiOle With c.:"",..C\c. +~ ri a~ol a.S
t
t~is Cet1rt's Establishment Clause eases. Those cases hold c.o...., fell i ,..,~. .I.+ olo'~ ...,o
that a policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can -fool low, )\o"'cv~r., 'fi.,"t
pass a three-pronged test: "First, the [governmental policy] ~..., __''e'1CA. ... t ~u~~s"
.po l• c. y f-4>c&A.\ ol .IC)C.
•
1

fer:;#-'f ;..,
t: t

mco.....,~+i bit: w•+"l

See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972):
Co~,...J.
"It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial ofrecognitio
was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range
of associational activities described above. While a college has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which ... may justify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the
appropriateness of that action."
8
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .
. . ." U. S. Const., Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).
7

's

+1-t
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must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the [policy] must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971). See Committee
for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 653 (1980);
Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U. S. 736, 748
(1976).
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an
open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against religious speech, would have a secular purpose 9 and would avoid
entanglement with religion. 10 But the District Court concluded, and the University argues here, that allowing religious groups to share the limited public forum would have the
"primary effect" of advancing religion. 11
It is the avowed purpose of UMKC to provide a forum in which students can exchange ideas. The University argues that use of the forum
for religious speech would undermine this secular aim. But by creating a
forum the University does not thereby endorse or promote any of the particular ideas aired there. Undoubtedly many views are advocated in the
forum with which the University desires no association.
Because this case involves a forum already made generally available to
student groups, it differs from those cases in which this Court has invalidated statutes permitting school facilities to be used for instruction by religious groups, but not by others. See, e. g., McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). In those cases the school may appear to
sponsor the views of the speaker.
10
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk
greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of "religious
worship and religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1318.
Initially, the University would need to determine which words and
activites fall within "religious worship and religious teaching." This alone
could prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs
meet the constitutional definition of religion." O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.
2d 931, 936 (CADC 1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-16 (1978). There would also be a continuing need to
monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule.
11
In finding that an "equal access" policy would have the primary effect
9
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The University's argument misconceives the nature of this
case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious
forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The University has opened its facilities to student groups, and the question is whether it can now exclude groups because of the content of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169
(1972). 12 In this context we are unpersuaded that the priof advancing religion, the District Court in this case relied primarily on
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this Court upheld·-,.·
/ ' the grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges for secular
purposes, but circumscribed the terms of the grant to ensure its constitutionality. Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized
buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 years,
the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of 20
years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise
used to promote religious interests the original federal grant will in part
have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion."
Id., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposition that State funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used
by religious organizations.
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the
Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally
funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the imprimatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the
State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other discussions. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of
religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See,
e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101
S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).
12
This case is different from the cases in which religious groups claim
that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of
Educ., 635 F. 2d 971, 975-976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-1396;
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (SD W. Va. 1971).
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, andrespondents' claim to use that forum does not-as in Brandon or Hunt-rest
solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents'
claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association,
and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the
cas:J

~cordi~; we

need not inquire into the extent, if any, to ) ...

[..Oo ,_, +-

which Free Exercise interests are infringed by the challengedy
University regulation.

0

,~f,c.,~~)

Neither do we reach the difficult~

questions that would arise if State accommodation of Free~

-

Exercise and Free Speech rights should, in a particular case, _ ~

.

conflict with the prohibitions of the Establishment

. · ........v

Clause.~ ~
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mary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of discourse, would be to advance religion.
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely
effects. It is possible-perhaps even foreseeable-that religious groups will benefit from access to University facilities.
But this Court has explained that a religious organization's
enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the
prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion.
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756,
771 (1973); see, e. g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426
U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1972);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961).
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open
forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of
our cases. Two factors are especially relevant.
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer
any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects or practices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a policy "would no more commit the University ... to religious
goals," than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students
for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or
any other group eligible to use its facilities. Chess v.
Widmar, supra, at 1317. 13
----.
____.; Second, the forum is available to a broad class of non-religious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recognized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to
so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229,
240-241 (1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,
supra, 413 U. S., at 756, 781-782 and n. 38 (1973). If the
Establishment Clause barred the extension of general bene-

13.f"/\J

'" University students are, of course, young adults. They are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that
the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v.
R ichardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-686 (1971). - - - - - - - - - - -
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fits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by
the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk
kept in repair." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U. S. 736, 747
(1976) (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public
Education v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 658, n. 6 (1980). 14 At
least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious
groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not
be the forum's "primary effect."

.
,~

B
Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than
the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect State suport for religion, 15 the University claims a compelling interest
in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri

\ r ) ~onstitution. 16

/< The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general policif of accommodating student groups, applied equally to
those wishing to gather to engage in religious and non-religious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need
not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would decide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide
whether, under the Supremacy Clause, 17 a state interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free

14
This Court has similarly rejected "the recUITent argument that all aid
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair,
413 u. s. 734, 743 (1973).
1
• See, e. g., American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W. 2d 711, 720, (Mo.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) (holding Missouri Constitution
requires stricter separation of church and state than does Federal Constitution); Harfst v. Hogen, 163 S.W. 2d 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1947) (en bane)
(same).
16
Leutkemeyer v. Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (ED Mo. 1973), affd,
419 . 8. 88 (1974)
.
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speech interests protected by the First Amendment. Even
if a State's interest were compelling, its regulations would
have to protect that interest without unnecessary abridgment of protected rights of speech and association. See,
e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 465 (1980); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 489 (1960). Measured against this
standard, the University's policy of discrimination against
religious speech and association fails on grounds of overinclusiveness.
The University regulation challenged in this case applies to
"religious teaching" as well as "religious worship." It is
therefore substantially overbroad. We can imagine no compelling State interest-which would be cognizable under the
Supremacy Clause-in banning all types of religious "teaching'' in an otherwise-open forum, including, for example, informal conversational "instruction." As we have noted in
the past, "[b]road prophylactic rules in an area of free
expresion are fatal. Precision of regulation must be the
touchstone." Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 637 (1980), quoting NAACP v. Button,
371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963) (omitting citations).
IV
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity
of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and
manner regulations. 18 Nor do we question the right of the
University to make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources--"to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study." Sweezy v. New
8
' See, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972).
("The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the
kinds of regulations to time, place, and manner that are reasonable.' ").
(quoting Wright , The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027,
1042 (1969).
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Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment); see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,312-313 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J.,
announcing the decision of the Court). Finally, we also affirm the continuing validity of cases, e. g., Healy v. James,
408 U. S. 169, 18&-189 (1972), that recognize a University's
right to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate
reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the
opportunity of other students to obtain an education.
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a
public forum, the University seeks to enforce a content-based
exclusion of religious speech. Its exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a state regulation of
speech should be content-neutral, and the University is unable to justify this violation under applicable constitutional
standards.
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is,
Affirmed.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80--689

GARY E. WIDMAR, ET AL. , PETITIONERS v. CLARK
VINCENT, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[October - , 1981]

delivered the opinion of the court.
This case presents the question whether a state university,
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities
of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a registered student group desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and religious discussion.
JUSTICE POWELL

I

It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri atKansas City 1 to encourage the activities of student organizations. The University officially recognizes over 100 student
groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the
meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an activity fee of $41 per semester (1978-1979) to help defray the
costs to the University.
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to
conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 1977, how' The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four campuses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri.
2
Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from
various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in
1977, "perhaps twenty students ... participate actively in Cornerstone
and form the backbone of the campus organization. " Affidavit of Florian

-·-
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ever, the University infonned the group that it could no
longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was
based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in
1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or
grounds "for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching." 3
Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone,
brought suit to challenge the regulation in Federal District
Court for the Western District of Missouri. 4 They alleged
Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911
(WD Mo. 1979). Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms
and in the student center. These meeting were open to the public and attracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included
prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and
experiences.
3
The pertinent regulations provide as follows:
"4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups.. . . . The general prohibition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship
or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any
other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offering of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions
held in University facilities ....
"4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be
used for religious services but not for recurring services of any groups.
Special rules and procedures shall be established for each chapel by the
Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to
any religious group."
There is no chapel on the campus of the University of Missouri at Kansas
City. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approximately 125 miles east of UMKC.
Although the University had routinely approved Cornerstone meetings /
before 1977, the District Court found that University officials had never
"authorized a student organization to utilize a University facility for a
meeting when they had full knowledge that the purposes of the meeting
include(d] religious worship or religious teaching." Chess v. Widmar,
supra, at 910.
' Clark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess, the named plaintiff
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that the University's discrimination against religious activity
and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States.
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar,
480 F. Supp. 907 (WD Mo. 1979). It found the regulation not
only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of
the Federal Constitution. !d., at 916. Under Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the
State could not provide facilities for religious use without giving prohibited support to an institution of religion. I d., at
915-916. The District Court rejected the argument that the
University could not discriminate against religious speech on
the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to
less protection than other types of expression. !d., at 918.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (CA8 1980). Rejecting the
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regulation as a content-based discrimination against religious
speech, for which it could find no compelling justification.
!d., at 1315-1320. The Court held that the Establishment
Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities
are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. !d., at 1317.
According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of
such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to
further the neutral purpose of developing students' "'social
· and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curiosity."' !d., at 1317 (quoting from the University bulletin's
in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated
the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the University's Board
of Curators.
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description of the student activities program, reprinted in
id., at 1312, n. 1).
We now affirm.
II
Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the
University has created a forum generally open for use by student groups. 5 Having done so, the University assumed an
obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under
applicable constitutional norms. The Constitution forbids a
State to enforce certain exclusions from a public forum, 6 even
• This Court has recognized that the campus of a public university possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum. "The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of
ideas.'" Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, the capacity of a group or individual "to participate in the intellectual give and
take of campus debate ... [would be] limited by denial of access to the customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students." Id., at 181-182. We therefore have held that
students enjoy First Amendment rights of speech and association on the
campus, and that the "denial [to particular groups] of use of campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to the
level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint. Id., at 181,
184.
'The concept of a "public forum" rests on the recognition, first expressed in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939), that
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places
has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights,
and liberties of citizens."
See also Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
u. s. 536 (1965).
Although a university may create a forum with many of the characteristics of streets and public places, see n. 5, supra, our cases have recognized
that First Amendment rights must be analyzed "in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment.'' Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). We continue to adhere
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if it was not required to create the forum in the first place.
See, e. g., City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167,
175 and n. 8. (1976) (although a State may conduct business in
private session, "where the State has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement," exclusions bear a heavy burden of
justification); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420
U. S. 546, 55~59 (1975) (because municipal theater was a
public forum, city could not exclude a production without satisfying constitutional safeguards applicable to prior
restraints).
The University's institutional mission, which it describes
as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for
Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitutional scrutiny. Our cases leave no doubt that the First
Amendment rights of speech and association extend to the
campuses of state universities. See, e. g., Healy v. James,
408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 u. s. 479, 487 (1960).
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated against
groups and speakers based on their desire to engage in religious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech
and association protected by the First Amendment. See,
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558
(1948). 7 In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a
to that view. A university differs in significant respects from public forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's
mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied its authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon
the use of its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a
campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students and nonstudents alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its
grounds or buildings.
7
The dissent argues that "religious worship" is not speech generally

I
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public forum based on the religious content of a group's intended speech, the University must therefore satisfy the
standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions.
It must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a comprotected by the "free speech" guarantee of the First Amendment and the
"equal protection" guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. lf"religious
worship" were protected "speech," the dissent reasons, "the Religion
Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in
which religious practice took the form of speech." Dissenting opinion,
post, at 4. This is a novel argument. The dissent does not deny that
speech about religion is speech entitled to the general protections of the
First Amendment. See id., at 3 and n. 1. It does not argue that descriptions of religious experiences fail to qualify as "speech." Nor does it repudiate last Term's decision in Krishna, supra, which assumed that religious appeals to nonbelievers constituted protected "speech." Rather, the
dissent seems to attempt a distinction between the kinds of religious
speech explicitly protected by our cases and a new class of religious
"speech act[s]," dissenting opinion, at 5, comprising "worship." There are
at least three difficulties with this distinction.
First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction has intelligible
content.
There is no indication when "singing hymns, reading scripture,
and teaching biblical principles," id., at 2-3, cease to be "singing, teaching,
and reading''-all apparently forms of "speech," despite their religious subject matter-and become unprotected "worship."
Second, even if the distinction drew an arguably principled line, it is
highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial competence to administer. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67, 70 (1953). Merely to draw
the distinction would require the university-and ultimately the courts-to
inquire into the significance of words and practices to different religious
faiths, and in varying circumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries
would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner forbidden by our cases. E. g., Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 668
(1970).
Finally, the dissent fails to establish the relevance of the distinction on
which it seeks to rely. The dissent apparently wishes to preserve the vitality of the Establishment Clause. See dissenting opinion, post, at 4.
But it gives no reason why the Establishment Clause, or any other provision of the Constitution, would require different treatment for religious
speech designed to win religious converts, see Krishma, supra, than for
religious worship by persons already converted. It is far from clear that
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pelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve
that end. See Carey v. Broum, 447 U. S. 455, 461, 464-465
(1980). 8
III
In this case the University claims a compelling interest in
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives
this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the
Federal and Missouri Constitutions.
A

The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to
other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of
the Constitution of the United States. 9 We agree that the
interest of the University in complying with its constitutional
obligations may be characterized as compelling. It does not
follow, however, that an "equal access" policy would be incompatible with this Court's Establishment Clause cases.
Those cases hold that a policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can pass a three-pronged test: "First, the
[governmental policy] must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the [policy]
the State gives greater support in the latter case than in the former.
8
See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972):
"It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial of recognition
was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range
of associational activities described above. While a college has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which .. . may justify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the
appropriateness of that action."
9
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .
. . ." U. S. Const., Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).
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must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion."' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613
(1971). See Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444
U. S. 646, 653 (1980); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works
Bd., 426 U. S. 736, 748 (1976).
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an
open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against religious speech, would have a secular purpose 10 and would avoid
entanglement with religion. u But the District Court concluded, and the University argues here, that allowing religious groups to share the limited public forum would have the
"primary effect" of advancing religion. 12
It is the avowed purpose of UMKC to provide a forum in which students can exchange ideas. The University argues that use of the forum
for religious speech would undermine this secular aim. But by creating a
forum the University does not thereby endorse or promote any of the particular ideas aired there. Undoubtedly many views are advocated in the
forum with which the University desires no association.
Because this case involves a forum already made generally available to
student groups, it differs from those cases in which this Court has invalidated statutes permitting school facilities to be used for instruction by religious groups, but not by others. See, e. g., McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). In those cases the school may appear to
sponsor the views of the speaker.
11
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk
greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of "religious
worship and religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1318.
Initially, the University would need to determine which words and
activites fall within "religious worship and religious teaching." This alone
could prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs
meet the constitutional definition of religion." O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.
2d 931, 936 (CADC 1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-16 (1978). There would also be a continuing need to
monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule.
12
In finding that an "equal access" policy would have the primary effect
of advancing religion, the District Court in this case relied primarily on
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this Court upheld
10
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The University's argument misconceives the nature of this
case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious
forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The University has opened its facilities to student groups, and the question is whether it can now exclude groups because of the content of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169
(1972). '3 In this context we are unpersuaded that the prithe grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges for secular
purposes, but circumscribed the terms of the grant to ensure its constitutionality. Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized
buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 years,
the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of 20
years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise
used to promote religious interests the original federal grant will in part
have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion."
Id., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposition that State funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used
by religious organizations.
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the
Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally
funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the imprimatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the
State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other discussions. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of
religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See,
e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101
S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).
13
This case is different from the cases in which religious groups claim
that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of
Educ., 635 F. 2d 971, 97~976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-1396;
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (SD W. Va. 1971).
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, andrespondents' claim to use that forum does not-as in Brandon or Hunf,-rest
solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents'
claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association,
and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the
case. Accordingly, we need not inquire into the extent, if any, to which
Free Exercise interests are infringed by the challenged University regulation. Neither do we reach the difficult questions that would arise if State

!
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mary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of discourse, would be to advance religion.
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely
effects. It is possible-perhaps even foreseeable-that religious groups will benefit from access to University facilities.
But this Court has explained that a religious organization's
enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the
prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion.
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756,
771 (1973); see, e. g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426
U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1972);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961).
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open
forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of
our cases. Two factors are especially relevant.
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer
any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects or practices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a policy "would no more commit the University ... to religious
goals," than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students
for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or
any other group eligible to use its facilities. Chess v.
Widmar, supra, at 1317. 14
accommodation of Free Exercise and Free Speech rights should, in a par- /
ticular case, conflict with the prohibition of the Establishment Clause.
14
University students are, of course, young adults. They are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that
the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 685-686 (1971). The University argues that
the Cornerstone students themselves admitted in affidavits that "[s]tudents know that if something is on campus, then it is a student organization, and they are more likely to feel comfortable attending a meeting."
Affidavit of Florian Frederick Chess, Joint Appendix, at 18, 19 (Sept. 29,
1977). In light of the large number of groups meeting on campus, however, we doubt students could draw any reasonable inference of University
support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place. The University's
student handbook already notes that the University's name will not "be
identified in any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opin-
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Second, the forum is available to a broad class of non-religious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recognized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to
so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229,
240-241 (1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,
supra, 413 U. S., at 756, 781-782 and n. 38 (1973). If the
Establishment Clause barred the extension of general benefits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by
the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk
kept in repair." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U. S. 736, 747
(1976) (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public
Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 658, n. 6 (1980). 15 At
least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious
groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not
be the forum's "primary effect."
B

Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than
the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect State support for religion, 16 the University claims a compelling interest
in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri
Constitution. 17
ions of any organization of its members." 1980-1981 UMKC Student
Handbook, at 25.
15
This Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent argument that all aid
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair,
413 u. s. 734, 743 (1973).
16
See, e. g., American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W. 2d 711, 720, (Mo.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) (holding Missouri Constitution
requires stricter separation of church and state than does Federal Constitution); Harfst v. Hogen, 163 S.W. 2d 609, 613-Q14 (Mo. 1947) (en bane)
(same).
17
See Mo. Const. Art. 1, § 6; Art. 1, § 7; Art. 9, § 8. In Leutkemeyer v.
Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (ED Mo. 1973), affd, 419 U. S. 88 (1974), the

j
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The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general policy of accommodating student groups, applied equally to
those wishing to gather to engage in religious and non-religious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need
not, however, detennine how the Missouri courts would decide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide
whether, under the Supremacy Clause, 18 a state interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free
speech interests protected by the First Amendment. Even
if a State's interest were compelling, its regulations would
have to protect that interest without unnecessary abridgment of protected rights of speech and association. See,
e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 465 (1980); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 489 (1960). Measured against this
standard, the University's policy of discrimination against
religious speech and association fails on grounds of overinclusiveness.
The University regulation challenged in this case applies to
"religious teaching'' as well as "religious worship." It is
therefore substantially overbroad. We can imagine no compelling State interest-which would be cognizable under the
Supremacy Clause-in banning all types of religious "teaching'' in an otherwise-open forum, including, for example, informal conversational "instruction." As we have noted in
the past, "[b]road prophylactic rules in an area of free
expresion are fatal. Precision of regulation must be the
touchstone." Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 637 (1980), quoting NAACP v. Button,
371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963) (omitting citations).
IV
Our holding in this case in no way undennines the capacity
of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and
District Court found Missouri had a compelling interest in compliance with \
its own constitution.
8
' U. S. Const., Art. VI , § 2.

t

•
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manner regulations. 19 Nor do we question the right of the
University to make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources--"to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study." Sweezy v. New
Hampshire , 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment); see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312-313 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J.,
announcing the decision of the Court). Finally, we also affirm the continuing validity of cases, e. g., Healy v. James,
408 U. S. 169, 188-189 (1972), that recognize a University's
right to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate
reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the
opportunity of other students to obtain an education.
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a
public forum, the University seeks to enforce a content-based
exclusion of religious speech. Its exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a state regulation of
speech should be content-neutral, and the University is unable to justify this violation under applicable constitutional
standards.
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is,

Affirmed.

19
See, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972).
(''The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the
kinds of regulations to time, place, and manner that are reasonable."').
(quoting Wright , The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027,
1042 (1969).
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APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[October-, 1981]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the court.
This case presents the question whether a state university,
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities
of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a registered student group desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and religious discussion.
I
It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri at Kansas City 1 to encourage the activities of student organizations. The University officially recognizes over 100 student
groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the
meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an activity fee of $41 per semester (1978--1979) to help defray the
costs to the University.
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to
conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 1977, how' The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four campuses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri.
2
Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from
various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in
1977, "perhaps twenty students ... participate actively in Cornerstone
and form the backbone of the campus organization." Affidavit of Florian
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ever, the University informed the group that it could no
longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was
based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in
1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or
grounds "for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching." 3
Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone,
brought suit to challenge the regulation in Federal District
Court for the Western District of Missouri. 4 They alleged
Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911
(WD Mo. 1979). Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms
and in the student center. These meeting were open to the public and attracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included
prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and
experiences.
3
The pertinent regulations provide as follows:
"4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohibition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship
or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any
other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offering of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions
held in University facilities ....
"4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be
used for religious services but not for recurring services of any groups.
Special rules and procedures shall be established for each chapel by the
Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to
any religious group."
There is no chapel on the campus of the University of Missouri at Kansas
City. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approximately 125 miles east of UMKC.
Although the University had routinely approved Cornerstone meetings
before 1977, the District Court found that University officials had never
"authorized a student organization to utilize a University facility for a
meeting when they had full knowledge that the purposes of the meeting
include[d] religious worship or religious teaching." Chess v. Widmar,
supra, at 910.
' Clark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess, the named plaintiff
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that the University's discrimination against religious activity
and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States.
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar,
480 F. Supp. 907 (WD Mo. 1979). It found the regulation not
only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of
the Federal Constitution. !d., at 916. Under Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the
State could not provide facilities for religious use without giving prohibited support to an institution of religion. I d., at
915-916. The District Court rejected the argument that the
University could not discriminate against religious speech on
the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to
less protection than other types of expression. !d., at 918.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (CA8 1980). Rejecting the
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regulation as a content-based discrimination against religious
speech, for which it could find no compelling justification.
!d., at 1315-1320. The Court held that the Establishment
Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities
are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. I d., at 1317.
According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of
such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to
further the neutral purpose of developing students' "'social
and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curiosity."' !d., at 1317 (quoting from the University bulletin's
in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated
the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the University's Board
of Curators.
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description of the student activities program, reprinted in
id., at 1312, n. 1).
We now affirm.
II

-

Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the
"versity has created a forum generally open for use by student gro
. Having done so, the Universityfa'~sumed an
(~••'(
obligation to justify its discrimiiJations and exclusions under
~:::r·rt L ~~
applicable constitutional norms.5 The Constitution forbids a _/_ ""' -rv
State to enforce certain exclusions from a J*lrruznr,seven
o~

['

This Court has recognized that the campus of a public university possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum. "The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of
ideas. " ' Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, thecapacity of a group or individual "to participate in the intellectual give and
take of campus debate ... [would bel limited by denial of access to the customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students." !d. , at 181-182. We therefore have held that
students enjoy First Amendment rights of speech and association on the
campus, and that the "denial [to particular groups] of use of campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to the
level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint. !d., at 181,
184.
• The concept of a "public forum" rests on the recognition, first expressed in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939), that
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places
has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights,
and liberties of citizens."
See also Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
u. s. 536 (1965).
Although a university may create a forum with many of the characteristics of streets and public places, see n. 5, supra, our cases have recognized
that First Amendment rights must be analyzed "in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). We continue to adhere
5

pJo''' j

.--
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if it was not required to create the forum in the first place.
See, e. g., City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167,
175 and n. 8. (1976) (although a State may conduct business in
private session, "where the State has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement," exclusions bear a heavy burden of
justification); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420
U. S. 546, 555-559 (1975) (because municipal theater was a
public forum, city could not exclude a production without satisfying constitutional safeguards applicable to prior
restraints).
The University's institutional mission, which it describes
as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for
Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitutional scrutiny. Our cases leave no doubt that the First
Amendment rights of speech and association extend to the
campuses of state universities. See, e. g., Healy v. James,
408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 u. s. 479, 487 (1960).
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated against
groups and speakers based on their desire to engage in religious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech
and association protected by the First Amendment. See,
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558
(1948). 7 In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a
to that view. A university differs in significant respects from public forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's
mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied its authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon
the use of its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a
campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students and nonstudents alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its
grounds or buildings.
7
The dissent argues that "religious worship" is not speech generally
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public forum based on the religious content of a group's intended speech, the University must therefore satisfy the
standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions.
It must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a comprotected by the "free speech" guarantee of the First Amendment and the
"equal protection" guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. If "religious
worship" were protected "speech," the dissent reasons, "the Religion
Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in
which religious practice took the form of speech." Dissenting opinion,
post, at 4. This is a novel argument. The dissent does not deny that
speech about reli 'on is speech entitled to the general protections of the
·
ment. See t . , a and n. 1. It does not argue that descriptions of religious experiences fai to qualify as "speech." Nor does it re·
, supra, w 1c assume t at relipudiate last Term's decision in
gious appeals to nonbelievers constituted protected "speech." Rather, the
dissent seems to attempt a distinction between the kinds of religious
s eech ex licitl
rotected b ~ases and a new class of religious
"speec act[s]," dissenting opinion, at comprising "worship." There are
at least three difficulties with this dis mction.
First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction has intelligible
content.
There is no indication when ;:~;~ns, read~ng s~ripture. ~
and teaching biblical principles," id., at
se to be "singmg, e~
and reading''-all apparently forms of "spe~," despite their religious subject matter-and become unprotected "worship."
Second, even if the distinction drew an arguably principled line, it is
highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial competence to administer. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island , 345 U. S. 67, 70 (1953). Merely to draw
the distinction would require the university-and ultimately the courts-to
inquire into the significance of words and practices to different religious
faiths, and in varying circumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries
would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner forbidden by our cases. E. g. , Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 668
(1970).
Finally, the dissent fails to establish the relevance of the distinction on
which it seeks to rely. The dissent apparently wishes to preserve the vitality of the Establishment Clause. See dissenting opinion, post, at 4.
But it gives no reason why the Establishment Clause, or any other provision of the Constitution, would require different treatment for religious
speech designed to win religious converts, see Jfir@8liM e;Supra, than tor
religious worship by persons already converted. It is far from clear that

)
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pelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve
that end. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 461, 464-465
(1980). 8
III
In this case the University claims a compelling interest in
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives
this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the
Federal and Missouri Constitutions.
A
The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to
other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of
the Constitution of the United States. 9 We agree that the
interest of the University in complying with its constitutional~
obligations may be characterized as compelling. It does not
follow, however, that an "equal access" policy would be incompatible with this Court's Establishment Clause cases.
Those cases hold that a policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can pass a three-pronged test: "First, the
[governmental policy] must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the [policy]
the State gives greater support in the latter case than in the former.
8
See also Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 184 (1972):
"It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial of recognition
was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range
of associational activities described above. While a college has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which ... may justify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the
appropriateness of that action."
9
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .
. . ." U. S. Const., Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).
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must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion."' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613
(1971). See Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444
U. S. 646, 653 (1980); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works
Bd., 426 U. S. 736, 748 (1976).
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both
the District Court and the Court of A . peals held that an
open-forum policv../iilcluding nondiscrimma nn~ s re igious speec~d have a secular purpose 10 and would avoid
entanglement with religion. 11 But the District Court concluded, and the University argues here, that allowing religious groups to share the limited public forum would have the
"Rrimary effect" of advancing religion. 12
10
It is the avowed purpose of UMKC to provide a forum in which students can exchange ideas. The University argues that use of the forum
for religious speech would undermine this secular aim. But by creating a
forum the University does not thereby endorse or promote any of the particular ideas aired there. Undoubtedly many views are advocated in the
forum with which the University desires no association.
Because this case involves a forum already made generally available to
student groups, it differs from those cases in which this Court has invalidated statutes permitting school facilities to be used for instruction by religious groups, but not by others. See, e. g., McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). In those cases the school may appear to
sponsor the views of the speaker.
11
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk
greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of "religious
worship and religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1318.
Initially, the University would need to determine which words and
activites fall within "religious worship and religious teaching." This alone
could prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs
meet the constitutional definition of religion." O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.
2d 931, 936 (CADC 1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-16 (1978). There would also be a continuing need to
monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule.
12
In finding that an "equal access" policy would have the primary effect
of advancing religion, the District Court in this case relied primarily on
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this Court upheld

9A.

As the dissent argues, it is sometimes necessary to

distinguish between "religious" and "nonreligious" speech.

See,

~·Stone

But

v. Graham,

u.s.

(November 17, 1980).

our cases have never required the State to distinguish between
religious and nonreligious speech by private speakers in a public
forum.

The dissent's hypotheticals of classes entitled "Sunday

Mass" and "The History of the Catholic Church" are irrelevant to
this case.

By relying on them, the dissent blurs the critical

distinction between a state university itself acting to further a
religion or its establishment, and the case before us, in which
the university has created a public forum for use by private
speakers.
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The University's argument misconceives the nature of this
case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious
forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The University has opened its facilities ~t gt oaps, and file question is whether it can now exc ude groups because of the content of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169
(1972). 13 In this context we are unpersuaded that the prithe grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges for secular
purposes, but circumscribed the terms of the grant to ensure its constitutionality. Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized
buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 years,
the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of 20
years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise
used to promote religious interests the original federal grant will in part
have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion."
Id., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposition that State funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used
by religious organizations.
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the
Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally
funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the imprimatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the
State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other discussions. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of
rTligious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See,
e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101
Sl\ Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).
13
This case is different from the cases in which religious groups claim
that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of
Educ., 635 F. 2d 971, 975-976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-1396;
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (SD W. Va. 1971).
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, andrespondents' claim to use that forum does no~as in Brandon or Hunt-rest
solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents'
claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association,
and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the
case. Accordingly, we need not inquire into the extent, if any, to which
Free Exercise interests are infringed by the challenged University regulation. N oith" do wo ""'h tho ~qu.,tions that would ariso if State

0$0689G, 1115/81, rev. DICK

80--689-0PINION
10

WIDMAR V. VINCENT

mary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of discourse, would be to advance religion.
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely
effects. It is possible-perhaps even foreseeable-that religious groups will benefit from access to University facilities.
But this Court has explained that a religious organization's
enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the
prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion.
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756,
771 (1973); see, e. g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426
U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1972);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961).
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open
forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of
our cases. Two factors are especially relevant.
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer
any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects or practices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a policy "would no more commit the University ... to religious
goals," than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students
for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or
any other group eligible to use its facilities. Chess v.
Widmar, supra, at 1317. 14
accommodation of Free Exercise and Free Speech rights should, in a particular case, conflict with the prohibition of the Establishment Clause.
"University students are, of course, young adults. They are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that
the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 685-686 (1971). The University argues that
the Cornerstone students themselves admitted in affidavits that "[s]tudents know that if something is on campus, then it is a student organization, and they are more likely to feel comfortable attending a meeting."
Affidavit of Florian Frederick Chess, Joint Appendix, at 18, 19 (Sept. 29,
1977). In light of the large number of groups meeting on campus, however, we doubt students could draw any reasonable inference of University
support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place. The University's
student handbook already notes that the University's name will not "be
identified in any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opin-
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Second, the forum is available to a broad class of non-religious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recognized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to
so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229,
240--241 (1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,
supra, 413 U. S., at 756, 781-782 and n. 38 (1973). If the
Establishment Clause barred the extension of general benefits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by
the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk
kept in repair." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U. S. 736, 747
(1976) (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public
Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 658, n. 6 (1980). 15 At
least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious
groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not
be the forum's "primary effect."
B
Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than
the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect State support for religion, 16 the University claims a compelling interest
in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri
Constitution. 17
ions of any organization of its members." 1980-1981 UMKC Student
Handbook, at 25.
·~ This Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent argument that all aid
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair,
413 u. s. 734, 743 (1973).
6
' See, e. g., American United v. Rogers, 538 S. W. 2d 711, 720, (Mo.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) (holding Missouri Constitution
requires stricter separation of church and state than does Federal Constitution); Harfst v. Hogen, 163 S.W. 2d 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1947) (en bane)
(same).
17
See Mo. Const. Art. 1, § 6; Art. 1, § 7; Art. 9, § 8. In Leutkemeyer v.
Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (ED Mo. 1973), aff'd, 419 U. S. 88 (1974), the
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The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general policy of accommodating student groups, applied equally to
those wishing to gather to engage in religious and non-religious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need
not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would decide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide
whether, under the Supremacy Clause, 18 a state interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free
speech interests protected by the First Amendment. r-~+~:;;;.=~'=1 W~ j.·"""":t- o L.l.r
if a ~tate's inieFest v,re:pe eoml'elling, it~ regt:IlatioJ:li woutd.o
~olot i ""j -h> ti-,L
itave t o protect that ist8r8it w:itl:.leHt HRRQS8ssary al3rielg ..>- c. .,.,5~ lot?+or.e. 4 ~ •
..ment of pt otected t igfitE~ of ~:peeeh arHi assoeisiion. ~filii , >~. Carey v. Bmwn, 447
g, 4:86, 466 (lQgO); ghflltgqq, ~
'Pttcker, ~04 U. ~. 4?9, 4go (10€i0), Mlilaiwre€l agaiast thjs ..)-:5tandard, the Univet sity's f.H~ligy of discrimiaa.ties ~gain ~ .....>--"

u.

L--------

'
IV
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity
of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and
District Court found Missouri had a compelling interest in compliance with
its own constitution.
18
U. S. Const., Art. VI, § 2.

On one hand, respondents' First Amendment rights are
entitled to special constitutional solicitude.
Our cases
have required the most exacting scrutiny in cases in which
a State undertakes iGt
o regulate speech on the basis of its
content.
See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980);
?olice Dept. v. Mos ley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
On the other
hand, the State interest asserted here -- in achieving
greater separation of church and State than is already ensured under the Establishment Clause· of the Federal Constitution -- is inherently limited by the Free Exercise
Clause}
In this constitutional context, we are unabl
to recognize H1At interest as suffic1ently "compelling" to
justify conten{-based discrimination against respondents'
religious speech.
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manner regulations. 19 Nor do we question the right of the
University to make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources--"to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach_,what may be taught, how it shall be
-)
taught, and who may be admitted to study." Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment); see Regents of the Univ. of~
al. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,312-313 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J.,
announcing the decision of the Court). Finally, we
afirm the continuing validity of cases, e. g., Healy v. James,
II
408 U. S. 169, 18&-189 (1972), that recognize a University's
~ftl\ ff"c:t
°f'"'
right to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate
S.~ J...t. ""k
reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the
-\o
~o\A~;
opportunity of other students to obtain an education.
--------:~T;.;h~e~b~asis for our decision is narrow. Having created a
the University seeks to enforce a content-based
exclusion o eligious speech. Its exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a state regulation of
speech should be content-neutral, and the University is unable to justify this violation under applicable constitutional
standards.
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is,

1

Affirmed.

19
See, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972).
("The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the
kinds of regulations to time, place, and manner that are reasonable.'").
(quoting Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027,
1042 (1969).
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-689

GARY E. WIDMAR, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. CLARK
VINCENT, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[November-, 1981]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the court.
This case presents the question whether a state university,
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities
of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a registered student group desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and religious discussion.
I
It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri atKansas City 1 to encourage the activities of student organizations. The University officially recognizes over 100 student
groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the
meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an activity fee of $41 per semester (1978-1979) to help defray the
costs to the University.
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to
conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 1977, how1

The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four campuses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri.
2
Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from
various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit f'Jed in
1977, "perhaps twenty students ... participate actively in Cornerstone
and form the backbone of the campus organization." Affidavit of Florian
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ever, the University informed the group that it could no
longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was
based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in
1972, that prohibits the use . of University buildings or
grounds "for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching." 3
Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone,
brought suit to challenge the regulation in Federal District
Court for the Western District of Missouri. 4 They alleged
Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911
(WD Mo. 1979). Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms
and in the student center. These meeting were open to the public and attracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included
prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and
experiences.
3
The pertinent regulations provide as follows:
"4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohibition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship
or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any
other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offering of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions
held in University facilities ....
"4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be
used for religious services but not for recurring services of any groups.
Special rules and procedures shall be established for each chapel by the
Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to
any religious group."
There is no chapel on the campus of the University of Missouri at Kansas
City. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approximately 125 miles east of UMKC.
Although the University had routinely approved Cornerstone meetings
before 1977, the District Court found that University officials had never
"authorized a student organization to utilize a University facility for a
meeting when they had full knowledge that the purposes of the meeting
include[d] religious worship or religious teaching." Chess v. Widmar,
supra, at 910.
'Clark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess, the named plaintiff
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that the University's discrimination against religious activity
and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States.
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar,
480 F. Supp. 907 (WD Mo. 1979). It found the regulation not
only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of
the Federal Constitution. !d., at 916. Under Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the
State could not provide facilities for religious use without giving prohibited support to an institution of religion. I d., at
91~916. The District Court rejected the argument that the
University could not discriminate against religious speech on
the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to
less protection than other types of expression. !d., at 918.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (CA8 1980). Rejecting the
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regulation as a content-based discrimination against religious
speech, for which it could find no compelling justification.
!d., at 131~1320. The Court held that the Establishment
Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities
are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. !d., at 1317.
According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of
such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to
further the neutral purpose of developing students' "'social
and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curiosity."' /d., at 1317 (quoting from the University bulletin's
in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated
the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the University's Board
of Curators.
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description of the student activities program, reprinted in
id., at 1312, n. 1).
We now affirm.
II
Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the
University has created a forum generally open for use by student groups. Having done so, the University has assumed
an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions
under applicable constitutional norms. 5 The Constitution
forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum
generally open to the public, 6 even if it was not required to
s This Court has recognized that the campus of a public university possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum. "The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of
ideas."' Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, thecapacity of a group or individual "to participate in the intellectual give and
take of campus debate ... [would bel limited by denial of access to the customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students." Id., at 181-182. We therefore have held that
students enjoy First Amendment rights of speech and association on the
campus, and that the "denial [to particular groups] of use of campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to the
level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint. I d., at 181,

184.
6

The concept of a "public forum" rests on the recognition, first expressed in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939), that
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places
has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights,
and liberties of citizens."
See also Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379

u. s. 536 (1965).

Although a university may create a forum with many of the characteristics of streets and public places, see n. 5, supra, our cases have recognized
that First Amendment rights must be analyzed "in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment." Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-

0$0689G, 11-16-81, rev. Wilma

80-689--0PINION
WIDMAR

v. VINCENT

5

create the forum in the first place. See, e. g., City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment
Relations Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167, 175 and n. 8. (1976) (although a State may conduct business in private session,
"where the State has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement," exclusions bear a heavy burden of justification);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546,
555-559 (1975) (because municipal theater was a public
forum, city could not exclude a production without satisfying
constitutional safeguards applicable to prior restraints).
The University's institutional mission, which it describes
as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for
Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitutional scrutiny. Our cases leave no doubt that the First
Amendment rights of speech and association extend to the
campuses of state universities. See, e. g., Healy v. James,
408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 u. s. 479, 487 (1960).
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated against
groups and speakers based on their desire to engage in religious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech
and association protected by the First Amendment. See,
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'yfor Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558
(1948). 7 In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a
pendent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). We continue to adhere
to that view. A university differs in significant respects from public
forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's
mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied its authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon
the use of its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a
campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students and nonstudents alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its
grounds or buildings.
' The dissent argues that "religious worship" is not speech generally
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public forum based on the religious content of a group's intended speech, the University must therefore satisfy the
standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions.
It must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a comprotected by the "free speech" guarantee of the First Amendment and the
"equal protection" guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. If "religious
worship" were protected "speech," the dissent reasons, "the Religion
Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in
which religious practice took the form of speech." Dissenting opinion,
post, at 4. This is a novel argument. The dissent does not deny that
speech about religion is speech entitled to the general protections of the
First Amendment. See id., at 2-3 and n. 1. It does not argue that descriptions of religious experiences fail to qualify as "speech." Nor does it
repudiate last Term's decision in Heffron v. International Soc'y for {
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., supra, which assumed that religious appeals
to nonbelievers constituted protected "speech." Rather, the dissent
seems to attempt a distinction between the kinds of religious speech explicitly protected by our cases and a new class of religious "speech act[s]," dissenting opinion, at 4, comprising "worship." There are at least three difficulties with this distinction.
First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction has intelligible
content.
There is no indication when "singing hymns, reading scripture,
and teaching biblical principles," id., at 2, cease to be "singing, teaching,
and reading''-all apparently forms of "speech," despite their religious subject matter-and become unprotected "worship."
Second, even if the distinction drew an arguably principled line, it is
highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial competence to administer. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67, 70 (1953). Merely to draw
the distinction would require the university-and ultimately the courts-to
inquire into the significance of words and practices to different religious
faiths, and in varying circumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries
would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner forbidden by our cases. E. g., Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 668

I

(1970).

Finally, the dissent fails to establish the relevance of the distinction on
which it seeks to rely. The dissent apparently wishes to preserve the vitality of the Establishment Clause. See dissenting opinion, post, at 4.
But it gives no reason why the Establishment Clause, or any other provision of the Constitution, would require different treatment for religious
speech designed to win religious converts, see Heffron, supra, than for re-

0$0689G, 11-16-81, rev. Wilma

8Q....U89-0PINION
WIDMAR

v.

VINCENT

7

pelting state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve
that end. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 461, 464-465
(1980). 8
III
In this case the University claims a compelling interest in
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives
this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the
Federal and Missouri Constitutions.
A
The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to
other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of
the Constitution of the United States. 9 We agree that the
interest of the University in complying with its constitutional
obligations may be characterized as compelling. It does not
follow, however, that an "equal access" policy would be incompatible with this Court's Establishment Clause cases.
Those cases hold that a policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can pass a three-pronged test: "First, the
[governmental policy] must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
ligious worship by persons already converted. It is far from clear that the
State gives greater support in the latter case than in the former.
8
See also Healy v. James , 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972):
"It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial of recognition
was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range
of associational activities described above. While a college has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which ... may justify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the
appropriateness of that action."
'"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .
. . . " U. S. Const., Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).
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neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the [policy]
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion."' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613
(1971). See Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444
U. S. 646, 653 (1980); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works
Bd., 4~6 U. S. 736, 748 (1976).
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an
open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against religious speech, 10 would have a secular purpose 11 and would
avoid entanglement with religion. 12 But the District Court
10
As the dissent argues, it is sometimes necessary to distinguish between "religious" and "nonreligious" speech. See, e. g., Stone v. Graham,
- - U. S. --(November 17, 1980). But our cases have never required
the State to distinguish between religious and nonreligious speech by private speakers in a public forum. The dissent's hypotheticals of classes entitled "Sunday Mass" and "The History of the Catholic Church" are irrelevant to this case. By relying on them, the dissent blurs the critical
distinction between a state university itself acting to further a religion or
its establishment, and the case before us, in which the university has created a public forum for use by private speakers.
11
It is the avowed purpose of UMKC to provide a forum in which students can exchange ideas. The University argues that use of the forum
for religious speech would undermine this secular aim. But by creating a
forum the University does not thereby endorse or promote any of the particular ideas aired there. Undoubtedly many views are advocated in the
forum with which the University desires no association.
Because this case involves a forum already made generally available to
student groups, it differs from those cases in which this Court has invalidated statutes permitting school facilities to be used for instruction by religious groups, but not by others. See, e. g. , McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). In those cases the school may appear to
sponsor the views of the speaker.
12
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk
greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of ''religious
worship and religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1318.
Initially, the University would need to determine which words and
activites fall within "religious worship and religious teaching." This alone
could prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs
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concluded, and the University argues here, that allowing religious groups to share the limited public forum would have the
"primary effect" of advancing religion. 13
The University's argument misconceives the nature of this
case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious
forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The University has opened its facilities for use by student groups, and j
the question is whether it can now exclude groups because of
the content of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S.
169 (1972). 14 In this context we are unpersuaded that the
meet the constitutional definition of religion." O'Hair v. Andrus, 613
F. 2d 931, 936 (CADC 1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law§ 14-16 (1978). There would also be a continuing need
to monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule.
•• In finding that an "equal access" policy would have the primary effect
of advancing religion, the District Court in this case relied primarily on
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this Court upheld
the grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges for secular
purposes, but circumscribed the terms of the grant to ensure its constitutionality. Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized
buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 years,
the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of 20
years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise
used to promote religious interests the original federal grant will in part
have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion."
Id., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposition that State funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used
by religious organizations.
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the
Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally
funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the imprimatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the
State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other discussions. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of
religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See,
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'yfor Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101
S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).
14
This case is different from the cases in which religious groups claim
that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of
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primary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of discourse, would be to advance religion.
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely
effects. It is possible-perhaps even foreseeable-that religious groups will benefit from access to University facilities.
But this Court has explained that a religious organization's
enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the
prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion.
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756,
771 (1973); see, e. g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426
U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1972);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961).
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open
forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of
our cases. Two factors are especially relevant.
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer
any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects or practices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a policy "would no more commit the University ... to religious
goals," than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students
for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or
any other group eligible to use its facilities. Chess v.
Widmar, supra, at 1317. 15
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of
Educ., 635 F. 2d 971, 975-976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-1396;
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (SD W. Va. 1971).
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, andrespondents' claim to use that forum does not-as in Brandon or Hunt-rest
solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents'
claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association,
and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the
case. Accordingly, we need not inquire into the extent, if any, to which
Free Exercise interests are infringed by the challenged University regulation. Neither do we reach the questions that would arise if State accom- \
modation of Free Exercise and Free Speech rights should, in a particular
case, conflict with the prohibition of the Establishment Clause.
15
University students are, of course, young adults. They are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that
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Second, the forum is available to a broad class of non-religious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recognized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to
so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229,
240-241 (1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,
supra, 413 U. S., at 756, 781-782 and n. 38 (1973). If the
Establishment Clause barred the extension of general benefits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by
the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk
kept in repair." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U. S. 736, 747
(1976) (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public
Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 658, n. 6 (1980). 16 At
least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious
groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not
be the forum's "primary effect."
B
Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than
the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect State supthe University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 685-686 (1971). The University argues that
the Cornerstone students themselves admitted in affidavits that "[s]tudents know that if something is on campus, then it is a student organization, and they are more likely to feel comfortable attending a meeting."
Affidavit of Florian Frederick Chess, Joint Appendix, at 18, 19 (Sept. 29,
1977). In light of the large number of groups meeting on campus, however, we doubt students could draw any reasonable inference of University
support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place. The University's
student handbook already notes that the University's name will not "be
identified in any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opinions of any organization of its members." 1980-1981 UMKC Student
Handbook, at 25.
18
This Court has similarly rejected ''the recurrent argument that all aid
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair,
413

u. s. 734, 743 (1973).
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port for religion, 17 the University claims a compelling interest
in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri
Constitution. 18
The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general policy of accommodating student groups, applied equally to
those wishing to gather to engage in religious and non-religious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need
not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would decide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide
whether, under the Supremacy Clause, 19 a state interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free
speech interests protected by the First Amendment. We
limit our holding to the case before us.
On one hand, respondents' First Amendment rights are entitled to special constitutional solicitude. Our cases have required the most exacting scrutiny in cases in which a State
undertakes to regulate speech on the basis of its content.
See, e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980); Police Dept.
v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972). On the other haz:1d, the State
interest asserted here-in achieving greater separation of
church and State than is already ensured under the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution-is inherently
limited by the Free Exercise Clause and in this case by the
Free Speech Clause as well. In this constitutional context,
we are unable to recognize the State's interest as sufficiently
17

See, e. g., American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W. 2d 711, 720, (Mo.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) (holding Missouri Constitution
requires stricter separation of church and state than does Federal Constitution); Harfst v. Hogen, 163 S.W. 2d 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1947) (en bane)
(same).
18
See Mo. Const. Art. 1, § 6; Art. 1, § 7; Art. 9, § 8. In Leutkemeyer v.
Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (ED Mo. 1973), aff'd, 419 U. S. 88 (1974), the
District Court found Missouri had a compelling interest in compliance with
its own constitution.
19
U. S. Const., Art. VI, § 2.
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"compelling'' to justify content-based discrimination against \
respondents' religious speech.
IV
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity
of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and
manner regulations. 20 Nor do we question the right of the
University to make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources--"to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study." Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment); see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312-313 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J.,
announcing the decision of the Court). Finally, we affirm
the continuing validity of cases, e. g., Healy v. James, 408
U. S. 169, 188-189 (1972), that recognize a University's right
to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the
opportunity of other students to obtain an education.
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a
forum generally open to student groups, the University seeks\
to enforce a content-based exclusion of religious speech. Its
exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a
state regulation of speech should be content-neutral, and the
University is unable to justify this violation under applicable
constitutional standards.
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is,

I

Affirmed .
., See, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972).
(''The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the
kinds of regulations to time, place, and manner that are reasonable.'").
(quoting Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027,
1042 (1969).
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the court.
This case presents the question whether a state university,
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities
of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a registered student group desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and religious discussion.
I
It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri at Kansas City 1 to encourage the activities of student organizations. The University officially recognizes over 100 student
groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the
meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an activity fee of $41 per semester (1978-1979) to help defray the
costs to the University.
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to
conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 1977, how'The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four campuses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri.
2
Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from
various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in
1977, "perhaps twenty ::stuueHt~ ... participate actively in Cornerstone
and form the backbone of the campus organization." Affidavit of Florian

0$0689G, 11-24-81, rev. Drb

80--689-0PINION

2

WIDMAR

v.

VINCENT

ever, the University informed the group that it could no
longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was
based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in
1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or
grounds "for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching." 3
Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone,
brought suit to challenge the regulation in Federal District
Court for the Western District of Missouri. 4 They alleged
Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911
(WD Mo. 1979). Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms
and in the student center. These meeting were open to the public and attracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included
prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and
experiences.
3
The pertinent regulations provide as follows:
"4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohibition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship
or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any
other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offering of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions
held in University facilities ....
"4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be
used for religious services but not for recurring services of any groups.
Special rules and procedures shall be established for each chapel by the
Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to
any religious group."
There is no chapel on the campus of the University of Missouri at Kansas
City. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approximately 125 miles east of UMKC.
Although the University had routinely approved Cornerstone meetings
before 1977, the District Court found that University officials had never
"authorized a student organization to utilize a University facility for a
meeting when they had full knowledge that the purposes of the meeting
include(d] religious worship or religious teaching." Chess v. Widmar,
supra, at 910.
' Clark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess, the named plaintiff
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that the University's discrimination against religious activity
and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States.
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar,
480 F. Supp. 907 (WD Mo. 1979). It found the regulation not
only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of
the Federal Constitution. Id., at 916. Under Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the
State could not provide facilities for religious use without giving prohibited support to an institution of religion. I d., at
91~916. The District Court rejected the argument that the
University could not discriminate against religious speech on
the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to
less protection than other types of expression. I d., at 918.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (CA8 1980). Rejecting the
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regulation as a content-based discrimination against religious
speech, for which it could find no compelling justification.
Id., at 131~1320. The Court held that the Establishment
Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities
are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. Id., at 1317.
According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of
such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to
further the neutral purpose of developing students' " 'social
and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curiosity."' /d., at 1317 (quoting from the University bulletin's
description of the student activities program, reprinted in
in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated
the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the University's Board
of Curators.
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id., at 1312, n. 1).
We now affirm.
II

Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the
University has created a forum generally open for use by student groups. Having done so, the University has assumed
an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions
under applicable constitutional norms. 5 The Constitution
forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum
generally open to the public, 6 even if it was not required to
• This Court has recognized that the campus of a public university possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum. "The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of
ideas."' Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, the capacity of a group or individual "to participate in the intellectual give and
take of campus debate ... [would be] limited by denial of access to the customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students." Id., at 181-182. We therefore have held that
students enjoy First Amendment rights of speech and association on the
campus, and that the "denial [to particular groups] of use of campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to the
level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint. Id., at 181,

184.
The concept of a "public forum" rests on the recognition, first expressed in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939), that
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places
has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights,
and liberties of citizens."
See also Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
u. s. 536 (1965).
Although a university may create a forum with many of the characteristics of streets and public places, see n. 5, supra, our cases have recognized
that First Amendment rights must be analyzed "in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). We continue to adhere
6
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create the forum in the first place. See, e. g., City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment
Relations Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167, 175 and n. 8. (1976) (although a State may conduct business in private session,
"where the State has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement," exclusions bear a heavy burden of justification);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546,
555-559 (1975) (because municipal theater was a public
forum, city could not exclude a production without satisfying
constitutional safeguards applicable to prior restraints).
The University's institutional mission, which it describes
as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for
Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitutional scrutiny. With respect to persons entitled to be
there, our cases leave no doubt that the First Amendment
rights of speech and association extend to the campuses of
state universities. See, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S.
169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School
District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
u. s. 479, 487 (1960).
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated against
groups and speakers based on their desire to engage in religious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech
and association protected by the First Amendment. See,
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558
(1948). 7 In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a
to that view. A university differs in significant respects from public
forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's
mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied its authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon
the use of its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a
campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students and nonstudents alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its
grounds or buildings.
7
The dissent argues that "religious worship" is not speech generally
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public forum based on the religious content of a group's intended speech, the University must therefore satisfy the
standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions.
It must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a comprotected by the "free speech" guarantee of the First Amendment and the
"equal protection" guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. If"religious
worship" were protected "speech," the dissent reasons, "the Religion
Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in
which religious practice took the form of speech." Dissenting opinion,
post, at 4. This is a novel argument. The dissent does not deny that
speech about religion is speech entitled to the general protections of the
First Amendment. See id., at 2-3 and n. 1. It does not argue that descriptions of religious experiences fail to qualify as "speech." Nor does it
repudiate last Term's decision in Heffron v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., supra, which assumed that religious appeals
to nonbelievers constituted protected "speech." Rather, the dissent
seems to attempt a distinction between the kinds of religious speech explicitly protected by our cases and a new class of religious "speech act[s)," dissenting opinion, at 4, comprising "worship." There are at least three difficulties with this distinction.
First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction has intelligible
content.
There is no indication when "singing hymns, reading scripture,
and teaching biblical principles," id., at 2, cease to be "singing, teaching,
and reading''-all apparently forms of "speech," despite their religious subject matter-and become unprotected "worship."
Second, even if the distinction drew an arguably principled line, it is
highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial competence to administer. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67, 70 (1953). Merely to draw
the distinction would require the university-and ultimately the courts-to
inquire into the significance of words and practices to different religious
faiths, and in varying circumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries
would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner forbidden by our cases. E. g., Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 668
(1970).
Finally, the dissent fails to establish the relevance of the distinction on
which it seeks to rely. The dissent apparently wishes to preserve the vitality of the Establishment Clause. See dissenting opinion, post, at 4.
But it gives no reason why the Establishment Clause, or any other provision of the Constitution, would require different treatment for religious
speech designed to win religious converts, see Heffron, supra, than for re-
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pelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve
that end. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 461, 464-465
(1980). 8
III
In this case the University claims a compelling interest in
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives
this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the
Federal and Missouri Constitutions.
A

The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to
other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of
the Constitution of the United States. 9 We agree that the
interest of the University in complying with its constitutional
obligations may be characterized as compelling. It does not
follow, however, that an "equal access" policy would be incompatible with this Court's Establishment Clause cases.
Those cases hold that a policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can pass a three-pronged test: "First, the
[governmental policy] must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
ligious worship by persons already converted. It is far from clear that the
State gives greater support in the latter case than in the former.
8
See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972):
"It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial of recognition
was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range
of associational activities described above. While a college has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which ... may justify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the
appropriateness of that action."
9
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .
. . ." U. S. Const., Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).
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neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . ; finally, the [policy]
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion."' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613
(1971). See Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444
U. S. 646, 653 (1980); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works
Bd., 426 U. S. 736, 748 (1976).
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an
open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against religious speech, 10 would have a secular purpose 11 and would
avoid entanglement with religion. 12 But the District Court
As the dissent emphasizes, the Establishment Clause requires the
State to distinguish between "religious" speech-speech, undertaken or
approved by the State, the primary effect of which is to support an Establishment of Religion-and "nonreligious" speech-speech, undertaken or
approved by the State, the primary effect of which is not to support an
Establishment of Religion. This distinction is required by the plain text of
the Constitution. It is followed in our cases. E. g., Stone v. Graham,
- - U. S. --(November 17, 1980). The dissent attempts to equate this
distinction with its view of an alleged constitutional difference between religious "speech" and religious "worship." See dissenting opinion, post, at
5 and n. 4. We think that the distinction advanced by the dissent lacks a
foundation in either the Constitution or in our cases, and that it is judicially
unmanageable.
11
It is the avowed purpose of UMKC to provide a forum in which students can exchange ideas. The University argues that use of the forum
for religious speech would undermine this secular aim. But by creating a
forum the University does not thereby endorse or promote any of the particular ideas aired there. Undoubtedly many views are advocated in the
forum with which the University desires no association.
Because this case involves a forum already made generally available to
student groups, it differs from those cases in which this Court has invalidated statutes permitting school facilities to be used for instruction by religious groups, but not by others. See, e. g., McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). In those cases the school may appear to
sponsor the views of the speaker.
12
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk
greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of "religious
worship and religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1318.
10
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concluded, and the University argues here, that allowing religious groups to share the limited public forum would have the
"primary effect" of advancing religion. 13
The University's argument misconceives the nature of this
case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious
forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The University has opened its facilities for use by student groups, and
the question is whether it can now exclude groups because of
the content of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S.
Initially, the University would need to determine which words and
activites fall within "religious worship and religious teaching." This alone
could prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs
meet the constitutional definition of religion." O'Hair v. Andrus, 613
F. 2d 931, 936 (CADC 1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law § 14-16 (1978). There would also be a continuing need
to monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule.
8
' In finding that an "equal access" policy would have the primary effect
of advancing religion, the District Court in this case relied primarily on
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this Court upheld
the grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges for secular
purposes, but circumscribed the terms of the grant to ensure its constitutionality. Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized
buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 years,
the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of 20
years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise
used to promote religious interests the original federal grant will in part
have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion."
Id., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposition that State funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used
by religious organizations.
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the
Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally
funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the imprimatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the
State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other discussions. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of
religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See,
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101
S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).
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169 (1972). 14 In this context we are unpersuaded that the
primary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of discourse, would be to advance religion.
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely
effects. It is possible-perhaps even foreseeable-that religious groups will benefit from access to University facilities.
But this Court has explained that a religious organization's
enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the
prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion.
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756,
771 (1973); see, e. g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426
U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1972);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961).
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open
forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of
our cases. Two factors are especially relevant.
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer
any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects or practices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a policy "would no more commit the University ... to religious
goals," than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students
for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or
This case is different from the cases in which religious groups claim
that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of
Educ., 635 F. 2d 971, 97~976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-1396;
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (SD W. Va. 1971).
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, andrespondents' claim to use that forum does not-as in Brandon or Hunt-rest
solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents'
claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association,
and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the
case. Accordingly, we need not inquire into the extent, if any, to which
Free Exercise interests are infringed by the challenged University regulation. Neither do we reach the questions that would arise if State accommodation of Free Exercise and Free Speech rights should, in a particular
case, conflict with the prohibition of the Establishment Clause.
14
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any other group eligible to use its facilities. Chess v.
Widmar, supra, at 1317. 15
Second, the forum is available to a broad class of non-religious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recognized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to
so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229,
240-241 (1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,
supra, 413 U. S., at 756, 781-782 and n. 38 (1973). If the
Establishment Clause barred the extension of general benefits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by
the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk
kept in repair." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U. S. 736, 747
(1976) (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public
Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 658, n. 6 (1980). 16 At
least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious
groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not
15
University students are, of course, young adults. They are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that
the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 685--686 (1971). The University argues that
the Cornerstone students themselves admitted in affidavits that "[s]tudents know that if something is on campus, then it is a student organization, and they are more likely to feel comfortable attending a meeting."
Affidavit of Florian Frederick Chess, Joint Appendix, at 18, 19 (Sept. 29,
1977). In light of the large number of groups meeting on campus, however, we doubt students could draw any reasonable inference of University
support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place. The University's
student handbook already notes that the University's name will not "be
identified in any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opinions of any organization of its members." 1980-1981 UMKC Student
Handbook, at 25.
16
This Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent argument that all aid
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair,

413

u. s. 734, 743 (1973).
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be the forum's "primary effect."
B

Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than
the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect State support for religion, 17 the University claims a compelling interest
in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri
Constitution. 18
The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general policy of accommodating student groups, applied equally to
those wishing to gather to engage in religious and non-religious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need
not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would decide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide
whether, under the Supremacy Clause, 19 a state interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free
speech interests protected by the First Amendment. We
limit our holding to the case before us.
On one hand, respondents' First Amendment rights are entitled to special constitutional solicitude. Our cases have required the most exacting scrutiny in cases in which a State
undertakes to regulate speech on the basis of its content.
See, e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980); Police Dept.
v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972). On the other hand, the State
interest asserted here-in achieving greater separation of
See, e. g., American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W. 2d 711, 720, (Mo.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) (holding Missouri Constitution
requires stricter separation of church and state than does Federal Constitution); Harjst v. Hogen, 163 S.W. 2d 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1947) (en bane)
(same).
8
' See Mo. Const. Art. 1, § 6; Art. 1, § 7; Art. 9, § 8.
In Leutkemeyer v.
Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (ED Mo. 1973), affd, 419 U. S. 88 (1974), the
District Court found Missouri had a compelling interest in compliance with
its own constitution.
••u. S. Const., Art. VI, §2.
17
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church and State than is already ensured under the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution-is limited here
by the Free Exercise Clause and in this case by the Free
Speech Clause as well. In this constitutional context, we are
unable to recognize the State's interest as sufficiently "compelling'' to justify content-based discrimination against respondents' religious speech.
IV
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity
of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and
manner regulations. 20 Nor do we question the right of the
University to make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources--"to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study." Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment); see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312-313 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J.,
announcing the judgment of the Court). Finally, we affirm
the continuing validity of cases, e. g., Healy v. James, 408
U. S. 169, 188-189 (1972), that recognize a University's right
to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the
opportunity of other students to obtain an education.
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a
forum generally open to student groups, the University seeks
to enforce a content-based exclusion of religious speech. Its
exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a
state regulation of speech should be content-neutral, and the
'" See, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
("The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the
kinds of regulations to time, place, and manner that are reasonable.' ").
(quoting Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027,
1042 (1969).

0$0689G, 11-24-81, rev. Drb

8~89-0PINION

14

WIDMAR

v. VINCENT

University is unable to justify this violation under applicable
constitutional standards.
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is, ·
Affirmed.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-689

GARY E. WIDMAR, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
CLARK VINCENT, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[November-, 1981]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the court.
This case presents the question whether a state university,
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities
of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a registered student group desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and religious discussion.
I

It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri at Kansas City 1 to encourage the activities of student organizations. The University officially recognizes over 100 student
groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the
meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an activity fee of $41 per semester (1978-1979) to help defray the
costs to the University.
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to
conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 1977, how'The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four campuses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri.
2
Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from
various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in
1977, "perhaps twenty students . . . participate actively in Cornerstone
and form the backbone of the campus organization." Affidavit of Florian
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ever, the University informed the group that it could no
longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was
based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in
1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or
grounds "for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching." 8
Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone,
brought suit to challenge the regulation in Federal District
Court for the Western District of Missouri. 4 They alleged
Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911
(WD Mo. 1979). Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms
and in the student center. These meeting were open to the public and attracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included
prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and
experiences.
3
The pertinent regulations provide as follows:
"4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohibition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship
or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any
other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offering of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions
held in University facilities ....
"4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be
used for religious services but not for recurring services of any groups.
Special rules and procedures shall be established for each chapel by the
Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to
any religious group."
There is no chapel on the campus of the University of Missouri at Kansas
City. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approximately 125 miles east of UMKC.
Although the University had routinely approved Cornerstone meetings
before 1977, the District Court found that University officials had never
"authorized a student organization to utilize a University facility for a
meeting when they had full knowledge that the purposes of the meeting
include[d] religious worship or religious teaching." Chess v. Widmar,
supra, at 910.
' Clark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess, the named plaintiff

0$0689G, 11-24-81, rev. Drb

80-689--0PINION
WIDMAR

v.

VINCENT

3

that the University's discrimination against religious activity
and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States.
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar,
480 F. Supp. 907 (WD Mo. 1979). It found the regulation not
only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of
the Federal Constitution. Id., at 916. Under Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the
State could not provide facilities for religious use without giving prohibited support to an institution of religion. I d., at
915--916. The District Court rejected the argument that the
University could not discriminate against religious speech on
the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to
less protection than other types of expression. I d., at 918.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (CA81980). Rejecting the
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regulation as a content-based discrimination against religious
speech, for which it could find no compelling justification.
Id., at 1315--1320. The Court held that the Establishment
Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities
are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. Id., at 1317.
According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of
such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to
further the neutral purpose of developing students' " 'social
and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curiosity."' Id., at 1317 (quoting from the University bulletin's
description of the student activities program, reprinted in
in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated
the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the University's Board
of Curators.
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id., at 1312, n. 1).

We now affirm.
II

Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the
University has created a forum generally open for use by student groups. Having done so, the University has assumed
an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions
under applicable constitutional norms. 5 The Constitution
forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum
generally open to the public, 6 even if it was not required to
This Court has recognized that the campus of a public university possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum. "The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of
ideas.'" Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, thecapacity of a group or individual "to participate in the intellectual give and
take of campus debate ... [would be] limited by denial of access to the customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students." Id., at 181-182. We therefore have held that
students enjoy First Amendment rights of speech and association on the
campus, and that the "denial [to particular groups] of use of campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to the
level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint. Id., at 181,
184.
6
The concept of a "public forum" rests on the recognition, first expressed in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939), that
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places
has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights,
and liberties of citizens."
See also Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
u. s. 536 (1965).
Although a university may create a forum with many of the characteristics of streets and public places, see n. 5, supra, our cases have recognized
that First Amendment rights must be analyzed "in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). We continue to adhere
5
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create the forum in the first place. See, e. g., City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment
Relations Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167, 175 and n. 8. (1976) (although a State may conduct business in private session,
"where the State has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement," exclusions bear a heavy burden of justification);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546,
555-559 (1975) (because municipal theater was a public
forum, city could not exclude a production without satisfying
constitutional safeguards applicable to prior restraints).
The University's institutional mission, which it describes
as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for
Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitutional scrutiny. With respect to persons entitled to be
there, our cases leave no doubt that the First Amendment
rights of speech and association extend to the campuses of
state universities. See, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S.
169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School
District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
u. s. 479, 487 (1960).
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated against
groups and speakers based on their desire to engage in religious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech
and association protected by the First Amendment. See,
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558
(1948). 7 In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a
to that view. A university differs in significant respects from public
forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's
mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied its authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon
the use of its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a
campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students and nonstudents alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its
grounds or buildings.
7
The dissent argues that "religious worship" is not speech generally

l
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public forum based on the religious content of a group's intended speech, the University must therefore satisfy the
standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions.
It must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a comprotected by the "free speech" guarantee of the First Amendment and the
"equal protection" guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. If "religious
worship" were protected "speech," the dissent reasons, "the Religion
Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in
which religious practice took the form of speech." Dissenting opinion,
post, at 4. This is a novel argument. The dissent does not deny that
speech about religion is speech entitled to the general protections of the
First Amendment. See id., at 2-3 and n. 1. It does not argue that descriptions of religious experiences fail to qualify as "speech." Nor does it
repudiate last Term's decision in Heffron v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., supra, which assumed that religious appeals
to nonbelievers constituted protected "speech." Rather, the dissent
seems to attempt a distinction between the kinds of religious speech explicitly protected by our cases and a new class of religious "speech act[s]," dissenting opinion, at 4, comprising "worship." There are at least three difficulties with this distinction.
First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction has intelligible
content.
There is no indication when "singing hymns, reading scripture,
and teaching biblical principles," id., at 2, cease to be "singing, teaching,
and reading''-all apparently forms of "speech," despite their religious subject matter-and become unprotected "worship."
Second, even if the distinction drew an arguably principled line, it is
highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial competence to administer. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67, 70 (1953). Merely to draw
the distinction would require the university-and ultimately the courts-to
inquire into the significance of words and practices to different religious
faiths, and in varying circumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries
would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner forbidden by our cases. E . g., Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 668
(1970).
Finally, the dissent fails to establish the relevance of the distinction on
which it seeks to rely. The dissent apparently wishes to preserve the vitality of the Establishment Clause. See dissenting opinion, post, at 4.
But it gives no reason why the Establishment Clause, or any other provision of the Constitution, would require different treatment for religious
speech designed to win religious converts, see Heffron, supra, than for re-
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pelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve
that end. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 461, 464-465
(1980). 8
III
In this case the University claims a compelling interest in
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives
this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the
Federal and Missouri Constitutions.
A
The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to
other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of
the Constitution of the United States. 9 We agree that the
interest of the University in complying with its constitutional
obligations may be characterized as compelling. It does not
follow, however, that an "equal access" policy would be incompatible with this Court's Establishment Clause cases.
Those cases hold that a policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can pass a three-pronged test: "First, the
[governmental policy] must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
ligious worship by persons already converted. It is far from clear that the
State gives greater support in the latter case than in the former.
8
See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972):
"It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial of recognition
was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range
of associational activities described above. While a college has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which ... may justify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the
appropriateness of that action."
9
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .
. . ." U. S. Const., Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).

0$0689G, 11-24-81, rev. Drb

80--Q89-0PINION
8

WIDMAR

v.

VINCENT

neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the [policy]
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion."' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613
(1971). See Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444
U. S. 646, 653 (1980); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works
Bd., 426 U. S. 736, 748 (1976).
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an
open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against religious speech, 10 would have a secular purpose 11 and would
avoid entanglement with religion. 12 But the District Court
0
' As the dissent emphasizes, the Establishment Clause requires the
State to distinguish between "religious" speech-speech, undertaken or
approved by the State, the primary effect of which is to support an Establishment of Religion-and "nonreligious" speech-speech, undertaken or
approved by the State, the primary effect of which is not to support an
Establishment of Religion. This distinction is required by the plain text of
the Constitution. It is followed in our cases. E. g., Stone v. Graham,
- - U. S. --(November 17, 1980). The dissent attempts to equate this
distinction with its view of an alleged constitutional difference between religious "speech" and religious "worship." See dissenting opinion, post, at
5 and n. 4. We think that the distinction advanced by the dissent lacks a
foundation in either the Constitution or in our cases, and that it is judicially
unmanageable.
11
It is the avowed purpose of UMKC to provide a forum in which students can exchange ideas. The University argues that use of the forum
for religious speech would undermine this secular aim. But by creating a
forum the University does not thereby endorse or promote any of the particular ideas aired there. Undoubtedly many views are advocated in the
forum with which the University desires no association.
Because this case involves a forum already made generally available to
student groups, it differs from those cases in which this Court has invalidated statutes permitting school facilities to be used for instruction by religious groups, but not by others. See, e. g., McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). In those cases the school may appear to
sponsor the views of the speaker.
12
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk
greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of "religious
worship and religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1318.
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concluded, and the University argues here, that allowing religious groups to share the limited public forum would have the
"primary effect" of advancing religion. 13
The University's argument misconceives the nature of this
case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious
forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The University has opened its facilities for use by student groups, and
the question is whether it can now exclude groups because of
the content of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S.
Initially, the University would need to determine which words and
activites fall within "religious worship and religious teaching." This alone
could prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs
meet the constitutional definition of religion,." O'Hair v. Andrus, 613
F . 2d 931, 936 (CADC 1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law § 14-16 (1978). There would also be a continuing need
to monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule.
13
In finding that an "equal access" policy would have the primary effect
of advancing religion, the District Court in this case relied primarily on
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this Court upheld
the grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges for secular
purposes, but circumscribed the terms of the grant to ensure its constitutionality. Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized
buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 years,
the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of 20
years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise
used to promote religious interests the original federal grant will in part
have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion."
Id., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposition that State funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used
by religious organizations.
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the
Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally
funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the imprimatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the
State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other discussions. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of
religious speakers .to use public forums on equal terms with others. See,
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101
S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. N ew York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).
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169 (1972). 14 In this context we are unpersuaded that the
primary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of discourse, would be to advance religion.
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely
effects. It is possible-perhaps even foreseeable-that religious groups will benefit from access to University facilities.
But this Court has explained that a religious organization's
enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the
prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion.
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756,
771 (1973); see, e. g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426
U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1972);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961).
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open
forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of
our cases. Two factors are especially relevant.
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer
any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects or practices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a policy "would no more commit the University ... to religious
goals," than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students
for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or
This case is different from the cases in which religious groups claim
that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of
Educ., 635 F. 2d 971, 975-976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-1396;
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (SD W. Va. 1971).
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, andrespondents' claim to use that forum does not-as in Brandon or Hunt-rest
solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents'
claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association,
and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the
case. Accordingly, we need not inquire into the extent, if any, to which
Free Exercise interests are infringed by the challenged University regulation. Neither do we reach the questions that would arise if State accommodation of Free Exercise and Free Speech rights should, in a particular
case, conflict with the prohibition of the Establishment Clause.
14
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any other group eligible to use its facilities. Chess v.
Widmar, supra, at 1317. '5
Second, the forum is available to a broad class of non-religious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recognized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to
so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229,
240-241 (1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,
supra, 413 U. S., at 756, 781-782 and n. 38 (1973). If the
Establishment Clause barred the extension of general benefits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by
the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk
kept in repair." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U. S. 736, 747
(1976) (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public
Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 658, n. 6 (1980).'6 At
least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious
groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not
16

University students are, of course, young adults. They are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that
the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 685-686 (1971). The University argues that
the Cornerstone students themselves admitted in affidavits that "[s]tudents know that if something is on campus, then it is a student organization, and they are more likely to feel comfortable attending a meeting."
Affidavit of Florian Frederick Chess, Joint Appendix, at 18, 19 (Sept. 29,
1977). In light of the large number of groups meeting on campus, however, we doubt students could draw any reasonable inference of University
support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place. The University's
student handbook already notes that the University's name will not "be
identified in any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opinions of any organization of its members." 1980-1981 UMKC Student
Handbook, at 25.
16
This Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent argument that all aid
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair ,
413

u. s.

734 , 743 (1973).
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be the forum's "primary effect."
B

Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than
the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect State support for religion, 17 the University claims a compelling interest
in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri
Constitution. 18
The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general policy of accommodating student groups, applied equally to
those wishing to gather to engage in religious and non-religious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need
not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would decide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide
whether, under the Supremacy Clause, 19 a state interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free
speech interests protected by the First Amendment. We
limit our holding to the case before us.
On one hand, respondents' First Amendment rights are entitled to special constitutional solicitude. Our cases have required the most exacting scrutiny in cases in which a State
undertakes to regulate speech on the basis of its content.
See, e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980); Police Dept.
v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972). On the other hand, the State
interest asserted here-in achieving greater separation of
"See, e. g., American United v. Rogers, 538 S. W. 2d 711, 720, (Mo.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) (holding Missouri Constitution
requires stricter separation of church and state than does Federal Constitution); Harfst v. Hogen, 163 S.W. 2d 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1947) (en bane)
(same).
18
See Mo. Const. Art. 1, § 6; Art. 1, § 7; Art. 9, § 8. In Leutkemeyer v.
Kaufman, 364 F . Supp. 376 (ED Mo. 1973), affd, 419 U. S. 88 (1974), the
District Court found Missouri had a compelling interest in compliance with
its own constitution.
19
U. S. Const., Art. VI, § 2.
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church and State than is already ensured under the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution-is limited here
by the Free Exercise Clause and in this case by the Free
Speech Clause as well. In this constitutional context, we are
unable to recognize the State's interest as sufficiently "compelling'' to justify content-based discrimination against respondents' religious speech.
IV
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity
of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and
manner regulations. 20 Nor do we question the right of the
University to make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources--"to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study." Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment); see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312-313 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J.,
announcing the judgment of the Court). Finally, we affirm J
the continuing validity of cases, e. g., Healy v. James, 408
U. S. 169, 188-189 (1972), that recognize a University's right
to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the
opportunity of other students to obtain an education.
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a
forum generally open to student groups, the University seeks
to enforce a content-based exclusion of religious speech. Its
exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a
state regulation of speech should be content-neutral, and the
20

See, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972).
("The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the
kinds of regulations to time, place, and manner that are reasonable.'").
(quoting Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027,
1042 (1969).
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University is unable to justify this violation under applicable
constitutional standards.
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is,
Affirmed.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-689

GARY E. WIDMAR, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
CLARK VINCENT, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[N6vemaer - , 1981]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the court.
This case presents the question whether a state university,
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities
of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a registered student group desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and religious discussion.
I
It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri at Kansas City 1 to encourage the activities of student organizations. The University officially recognizes over 100 student
groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the
meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an activity fee of $41 per semester (1978-1979) to help defray the
costs to the University.
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to
conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 1977, how1

f Jut~

The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four campuses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri.
2
Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from
various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in
1977, "perhaps twenty studeuL:s ... participate actively in CurnersLone
and form the backbone of the campus organization." Affidavit of Florian

2 4 '"'
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ever, the University informed the group that it could no
longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was
based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in
1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or
grounds "for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching." 3
Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone,
brought suit to challenge the regulation in Federal District
Court for the Western District of Missouri. 4 They alleged
Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911
(WD Mo. 1979). Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms
and in the student center. These meeting were open to the public and attracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included
prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and
experiences.
3
The pertinent regulations provide as follows:
"4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohibition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship
or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any
other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offering of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions
held in University facilities ....
"4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be
used for religious services but not for recurring services of any groups.
Special rules and procedures shall be established for each chapel by the
Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to
any religious group."
There is no chapel on the campus of the University of Missouri at Kansas
City. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approximately 125 miles east of UMKC.
Although the University had routinely approved Cornerstone meetings
before 1977, the District Court found that University officials had never
"authorized a student organization to utilize a University facility for a
meeting when they had full knowledge that the purposes of the meeting
include[d] religious worship or religious teaching." Chess v. Widmar,
supra, at 910.
'Clark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess, the named plaintiff
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that the University's discrimination against religious activity
and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States.
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar,
480 F. Supp. 907 (WD Mo. 1979). It found the regulation not
only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of
the Federal Constitution. Id., at 916. Under Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the
State could not provide facilities for religious use without giving prohibited support to an institution of religion. I d., at
91&-916. The District Court rejected the argument that the
University could not discriminate against religious speech on
the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to
less protection than other types of expression. I d., at 918.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (CA81980). Rejecting the
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regulation as a content-based discrimination against religious
speech, for which it could find no compelling justification.
Id., at 131&-1320. The Court held that the Establishment
Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities
are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. Id., at 1317.
According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of
such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to
further the neutral purpose of developing students' " 'social
and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curiosity."' Id., at 1317 (quoting from the University bulletin's
description of the student activities program, reprinted in
in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated
the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the University's Board
of Curators.
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id., at 1312, n. 1).
We now affirm.
II

Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the
University has created a forum generally open for use by student groups. Having done so, the University has assumed
an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions
./ under applicable constitutional norms. 5 The Constitution
v forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum
generally open to the public, ~ven if it was not required to

See.. ~e."'e.~"'lll ~c\,·ce.
Oep+. V· tfos /e.1 , "'dB
U. •~ . 9;t (l q ') '-.) j £o.x..
V. J....o,,..Jsc'""~"' ) J')?
l-{.

5 . S3v (_ '~"s) ..

This Court has reco ·
the campus of a public universit~ assesses many o the characteristics of a pu 1c orum "The college c assroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of
ideas.'" Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, thecapacity of a group or individual "to participate in the intellectual give and
take of campus debate ... [would be] limited by denial of access to the customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students." Id., at 181-182. We therefore have held that
students enjoy First Amendment rights of speech and association on the
campus, and that the "denial [to particular groups] of use of campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to the
level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint. !d., at 181,
5

184
6
The concept of a "public forum" rests on the recognition,
pre
in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939), that

..fl,e..

s "..,e 4--1..., eJ

\,owf.ver

7

L--=*~~~~!!!~ml=f"mli~IR<m;r~J:DT=fj.;=~~t<our

cases have recognized
that First Amendment rights must be analyzed "in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). We continue to adhere
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create the forum in the first place. See, e. g., City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment
Relations Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167, 175 and n. 8. (1976) (although a State may conduct business in private session,
"where the State has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement," exclusions bear a heavy burden of justification);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546,
555-559 (1975) (because municipal theater was a public
forum, city could not exclude a production without satism·pg__~!!!!JII!!!!!!!I'
constitutional safeguards applicable to prior restraints).
The University's institutional mission, which it describes
as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for
Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitutional scrutiny. With respect to persons entitled to be
there, our cases leave no doubt that the First Amendment
rights of speech and association extend to the campuses of
state universities. See, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S.
/
~
169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School
District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364A l ' ;
u.s. 479, 487 (1960).
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated against
se C\. ~et1u~lly
4
groups and speakers based on their desire to engage m re ~
gious worship and discussion. These are orms of speech
...._o_,f'-t:-'1
_ _ _ _ _,.....,
and association protected by the First Amendment. See,
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558
----n(1"""'9,..,48~~n order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a

v

[F/'1

\,tflC,l

'(U'''-'M

to that view. A university differs in significant respects from public
forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's
mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied its authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon
the use of its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a
campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students and nonstudents alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its
nds or buildings.
he dissent argues that "religious worship" is not speech generally
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public forum based on the religious content of a group's intended speech, the University must therefore satisfy the
standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions.
It must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a comprotected by the "free speech" guarantee of the First Amendment and the
"equal protection" guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. lf"religious
worship" were protected "speech," the dissent reasons, "the Religion
Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in
which religious practice took the form of speech." Dissenting opinion,
post, at 4. This is a novel argument. The dissent does not deny that
speech about religion is speech entitled to th
ral rotections o
First Amendment. See id., at 2-3 and n.
It does not argue that descriptions of religious experiences fail to qualify as "speech." Nor does it
repudiate last Term's decision in Heffron v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., supra, which assumed that religious appeals
to nonbelievers constituted protected "speech." Rather, the dissent
seems to attempt a distinction between the kinds of religious speech explicitly protected by our cases and a new class of religious "speech act[s]," dissenting opinion, at 4, comprising "worship." There are at least three difficulties with this distinction.
First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction has intelligible
content.
There is no indication when "singing hymns, reading scripture,
and teaching biblical principles," id., at 2, cease to be "singing, teaching,
and reading''-all apparently forms of "speech," despite their religious subject matter-and become unprotected "worship."
Second, even if the distinction drew an arguably principled line, it is
highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial competence to administer. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67, 70 (1953). Merely to draw
the distinction would require the university-and ultimately the courts-to
inquire into the significance of words and practices to different religious
faiths, and in varying circumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries
would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner forbidden by our cases. E. g., Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 668
(1970).
Finally, the dissent fails to establish the relevance of the distinction on
which it seeks to rely. The dissent apparently wishes to preserve the vitality of the Establishment Clause. See dissenting opinion, post, at 4.
But it gives no reason why the Establishment Clause, or any other provision of the Constitution, would require different treatment for religious
speech designed to win religious converts, see Heffron, supra, than for re-
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pelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve
that end. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 461, 464-465
(1980).8..
III
In this case the University claims a compelling interest in
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives
this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the
Federal and Missouri Constitutions.
A

. \§/

The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to
other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of
the Constitution of the United States.\ We agree that the
interest of the University in complying with its constitutional
obligations may be characterized as compelling. It does not
follow, however, that an "equal access" policy would be incompatible with this Court's Establishment Clause cases.
Those cases hold that a policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can pass a three-pronged test: "First, the
[governmental policy] must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
ligious worship by persons already converted. It is far from clear that the
State gives greater support in the latter case than in the former.
/ See also Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 184 (1972):
"It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial of recognition
was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range
of associational activities described above. While a college has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which . . . may justify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rei;~ts on the college to demonstrate the
appropriateness of that action."
/ "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .
. . ." U. S. Const. , Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).
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neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the [policy]
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion.'" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613
(1971). See Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444
U. S. 646, 653 (1980); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works
Bd., 426 U. S. 736, 748 (1976).
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an
open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against religious speech,o~e would have a secular purposeM" and would
avoid entanglement with religion. 12 But the District Court

~s the dissent emphasizes, the Establishment Clause requires the
State to distinguish between "religious" speech-speech, undertaken or
approved by the State, the primary effect of which is to support an Establishment of Religion-and "nonreligious" speech-speech, undertaken or
approved by the State, the primary effect of which is not to support an
Establishment of Religion. This distinction is required by the plain text of
the Constitution. It is followed in our cases. E. g., Stone v. Graham,
- - U. S. --(November 17, 1980). The dissent attempts to equate this
distinction with its view of an alleged constitutional difference between reli 'ous "s eech" and religious "worship." See dissenting opinion, post, at
a
n. 1 We think that the distinction advanced by the dissent lacks a
oundation m either the Constitution or in our cases, and that it is judicially
unmanageable.
/ It is the avowed purpose of UMKC to provide a forum in which students can exchange ideas. The University argues that use of the forum
for religious speech would undermine this secular aim. But by creating a
forum the University does not thereby endorse or promote any of the particular ideas aired there. Undoubtedly many views are advocated in the
forum with which the University desires no association.
Because this case involves a forum already made generally available to
student groups, it differs from those cases in which this Court has invalidated statutes permitting school facilities to be used for instruction by religious groups, but not by others. See, e. g., McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). In those cases the school may appear to
sponsor the views of the speaker.
JYWe agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk
greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of "religious
worship and religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1318.
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concluded, and the University argues here, that allowing religious groups to share the limited public forum would have the
"primary effect" of advancing religion. ~
The University's argument misconceives the nature of this
case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious
forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The University has opened its facilities for use by student groups, and
the question is whether it can now exclude groups because of
the content of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S.
Initially, the University would need to determine which words and
activites fall within "religious worship and religious teaching." This alone
could prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs
meet the constitutional definition of religion." O'Hair v. Andrus, 613
F. 2d 931, 936 (CADC 1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law§ 14-16 (1978). There would also be a continuing need
to monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule.
f"31n finding that an "equal access" policy would have the primary effect
of advancing religion, the District Court in this case relied primarily on
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this Court upheld
the grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges for secular
purposes, but circumscribed the terms of the grant to ensure its constitutionality. Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized
buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 years,
the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of 20
years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise
used to promote religious interests the original federal grant will in part
have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion."
Id., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposition that State funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used
by religious organizations.
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the
Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally
funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the imprimatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the
State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other discussions. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of
religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See,
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101
S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).
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169 (1972)./ In this context we are unpersuaded that the
primary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of discourse, would be to advance religion.
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely
effects. It is possible-perhaps even foreseeable-that religious groups will benefit from access to University facilities.
But this Court has explained that a religious organization's
enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the
prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion.
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756,
771 (1973); see, e. g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426
U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1972);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961).
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open
forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of
our cases. Two factors are especially relevant.
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer
any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects or practices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a policy "would no more commit the University ... to religious
goals," than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students
for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or
~This case is different from the cases in which religious groups claim
that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of
Educ., 635 F. 2d 971, 975-976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-1396;
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (SD W. Va. 1971).
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, andrespondents' claim to use that forum does not--as in Brandon or Hunt--rest
solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents'
claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association,
and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the
case. Accordingly, we need not inquire into the extent, if any, to which
Free Exercise interests are infringed by the challenged University regulation. Neither do we reach the questions that would arise if State accommodation of Free Exercise and Free Speech rights should, in a particular
case, conflict with the prohibition of the Establishment Clause.
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any other group eligible to use its facilities.

Widmar, supra, at 1317~

11

Chess v .J1LJ... "'
'{!..;V

Second, the forum is available to a broad class of non-religious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recognized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to
so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229,
240-241 (1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,
supra, 413 U. S., at 756, 781-782 and n. 38 (1973). If the
Establishment Clause barred the extension of general benefits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by
the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk
kept in repair." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U. S. 736, 747
(1976) (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public
Education v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 658, n. 6 (1980r.w- At
least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious
groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not
~niversity students are, of course, young adults. They are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that
the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 681H>86 (1971). The University argues that
the Cornerstone students themselves admitted in affidavits that "[s]tudents know that if something is on campus, then it is a student organization, and they are more likely to feel comfortable attending a meeting."
Affidavit of Florian Frederick Chess, Joint Appendix, at 18, 19 (Sept. 29,
1977). In light of the large number of groups meeting on campus, however, we doubt students could draw any reasonable inference of University
support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place. The University's
student handbook already notes that the University's name will not "be
identified in any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opinions of any organization of its members." 1980-1981 UMKC Student
Handbook, at 25 .
......-wThis Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent argument that all aid
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair,

413

u. s. 734, 743 (1973).

{(/~
.:· ./
~
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be the forum's "primary effect."
B

Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than
the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect State support for religion;rrthe University claims a compelling interest
in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri

Constitution~

The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general policy of accommodating student groups, applied equally to
those wishing to gather to engage in religious and non-religious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need
not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would decide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide
whether, under the Supremacy Clause,~ a state interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free
speech interests protected by the First Amendment. We
limit our holding to the case before us.
On one hand, respondents' First Amendment rights are entitled to special constitutional solicitude. Our cases have required the most exacting scrutiny in cases in which a State
undertakes to regulate speech on the basis of its content.
See, e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980); Police Dept.
v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972). On the other hand, the State
interest asserted here-in achieving greater separation of
/""See, e. g., American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W. 2d 711, 720, (Mo.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) (holding Missouri Constitution
requires stricter separation of church and state than does Federal Constitution); Harfst v. Hogen, 163 S.W. 2d 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1947) (en bane)
(same).
)"See Mo. Const. Art. 1, § 6; Art. 1, § 7; Art. 9, § 8. In Leutkemeyer v.
Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (ED Mo. 1973), affd, 419 U. S. 88 (1974), the
District Court found Missouri had a compelling interest in compliance with
its own constitution.
/ u. S. Const., Art. VI, § 2.
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church and State than is already ensured under the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution-is limited ~
by the Free Exercise Clause and in this case by the Free
Speech Clause as well. In this constitutional context, we are
unable to recognize the State's interest as sufficiently "compelling'' to justify content-based discrimination against respondents' religious speech.
IV
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity
of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and
manner regulations.-eo- Nor do we question the right of the
University to make acad
c
w best to allocate scarce resource "to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, hoi, ij:, shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study. ~eezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment); see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,312-313 (1978) (opinion of POWELL ., f
announcing the judgment of the Court). Finally, we affirm
the continuing validity of cases, e. g., Healy v. James, 408
U. S. 169, 188-189 (1972), that recognize a University's right
to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the
opportunity of other students to obtain an education.
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a
forum generally open to student groups, the University seeks
to enforce a content-based exclusion of religious speech. Its
exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a
state regulation of speech should be content-neutral, and the
~ee, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972).
("The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the
kinds of regulations to time, place, and manner that are reasonable.'").
(quoting Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027,
10~2 (1969).

----
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his opinion concurring in the j udgmen J J ust i ce

expresses concern that use of the terms "compelling

state interest" and "public forum" may "undermine the
academic freedom of public universities".

As the text above

makes clear, this concern is unjustified.

See also n. 5,

ante , at p. 4.
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University is unable to justify this violation under applicable
constitutional standards.
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is, -7

Affirmed.

Proposed Substitute Language for the Text in
Widmar v. Vincent, No. 80-689, beginning at the top of page 12:

The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general policy
of accommodating student groups, applied equally to those wishing
to gather to engage in religious and non-religious speech, would
offend the State Constitution.

We need not, however, determine

how the Missouri courts would decide this issue.

It is also

unnecessary for us to decide whether, under the Supremacy Clause,
a state interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever
outweigh free speeech interests protected by the First Amendment.
We limit our holding to the case before us.
First Amendment rights are entitled to special
constitutional solicitude.

Our cases require the most exacting

scrutiny in cases in which a State undertakes to regulate speech
on the basis of its content.

See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447

455 (1980); Police Dept. v. MosJley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).

u.s.

In this

constitutional context, we are unable to recognize the State
interest asserted here--an interest in achieving greater
separation of church and State than is already ensured under the
Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution--as sufficiently
"compelling" to justify content-based discrimination against
religious speech.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80--689
GARY E. WIDMAR, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
CLARK VINCENT, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[December-, 1981]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the court.
This case presents the question whether a state university,
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities
of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a registered student group desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and religious discussion.
I
It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri at Kansas City 1 to encourage the activities of student organizations. The University officially recognizes over 100 student
groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the
meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an activity fee of $41 per semester (197~1979) to help defray the
costs to the University.
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to
conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 1977, how1
The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four campuses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri.
2
Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from
various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in
1977, "perhaps twenty students . . . participate actively in Cornerstone
and form the backbone of the campus organization." Affidavit of Florian
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ever, the University informed· the group that it could no
longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was
based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in
1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or
grounds "for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching." 3
Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone,
brought suit to challenge the regulation in Federal District
Court for the Western District of Missouri. 4 They alleged
Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911
Mo. 1979). Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms
and in the student center. These meeting were open to the public and attracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included
prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and
experiences.
3
The pertinent regulations provide as follows:
"4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohibition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship
or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any
other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offering of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions
held in University facilities ....
"4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be
used for religious services but not for recurring services of any groups.
Special rules and procedures shall be established for each chapel by the
Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to
any religious group."
There is no chapel on the campus of the University of Missouri at Kansas
City. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approximately 125 miles east of UMKC.
Although the University had routinely approved Cornerstone meetings
before 1977, the District Court found that University officials had never
"authorized a student organization to utilize a University facility for a
meeting when they had full knowledge that the purposes of the meeting
include[d] religious worship or religious teaching." Chess v. Widmar,
supra, at 910.
'Clark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess, the named plaintiff
(WD
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that the University's discrimination against religious activity
and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States.
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar,
480 F. Supp. 907 (WD Mo. 1979). It found the regulation not
only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of
the Federal Constitution. Id., at 916. Under Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the
State could not provide facilities for religious use without giving prohibited support to an institution of religion. I d., at
915-916. The District Court rejected the argument that the
University could not discriminate against religious speech on
the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to
less protection than other types of expression. I d., at 918.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (CA8 1980). Rejecting the
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regulation as a content-based discrimination against religious
speech, for which it could find no compelling justification.
Id., at 1315-1320. The Court held that the Establishment
Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities
are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. Id., at 1317.
According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of
such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to
further the neutral purpose of developing students' " 'social
and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curiosity."' Id., at 1317 (quoting from the University bulletin's
description of the student activities program, reprinted in
in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated
the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the University's Board
of Curators.

80-689--0PINION
WIDMAR

4

v.

VINCENT

id., at 1312, n. 1).
We now affirm.
II
Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the
University has created a forum generally open for use by student groups. Having done so, the University has assumed
an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions
under applicable constitutional norms. 5 The Constitution
forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum
generally open to the public, even if it was not required to
create the forum in the first place. See, e. g., City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment
5

This Court has recognized that the campus of a public university, at
least for its students, possesses many of the characteristics of a public
forum. See generally, Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 (1965). ''The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of ideas.'" Healy v.
James, 408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, the capacity of a group or
individual ''to participate in the intellectual give and take of campus debate
... [would be] limited by denial of access to the customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students."
/d., at 181-182. We therefore have held that students enjoy First Amendment rights of speech and association on the campus, and that the "denial
[to :particular groups] of use of campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to the level of scrutiny appropriate
to any form of prior restraint. /d., at 181, 184.
At the same time, however, our cases have recognized that First
Amendment rights must be analyzed "in light of the special characteristics
of the school environment.'' Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School
District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). We continue to adhere to that view.
A university differs in significant respects from public forums such as
streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied its authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of
its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a campus
must make all of its facilities equally available to students and nonstudents
alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its grounds or
buildings.

J
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Relations Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167, 175 and n. 8. (1976) (although a State may conduct business in private session,
"where the State has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement," exclusions bear a heavy burden of justification);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546,
555-559 (1975) (because municipal theater was a public
forum, city could not exclude a production without satisfying
constitutional safeguards applicable to prior restraints).
The University's institutional mission, which it describes
as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for
Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitutional scrutiny. With respect to persons entitled to be
there, our cases leave no doubt that the First Amendment
rights of speech and association extend to the campuses of
state universities. See, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S.
169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School
District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
u. s. 479, 487 (1960).
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated against
student groups and speakers based on their desire to use a t
generally open forum to engage in religious worship and dis- f..
cussion. These are forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment. See, e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'yfor Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 S. Ct.
2559 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951);
Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). 6 In order to justify
6
The dissent argues that "religious worship" is not speech generally
protected by the "free speech" guarantee of the First Amendment and the
"equal protection" guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. If "religious
worship" were protected "speech," the dissent reasons, "the Religion
Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in
which religious practice took the form of speech." Dissenting opinion,
post, at 4. This is a novel argument. The dissent does not deny that
speech about religion is speech entitled to the general protections of the
First Amendment. See id., at 2--;3 and n. 2. It does not argue that descriptions of religious experiences fail to qualify as "speech." Nor does it
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discriminatory exclusion from a public forum based on the religious content of a group's intended speech, the University
must therefore satisfy the standard of review appropriate to
content-based exclusions. It must show that its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end. See Carey v. Brown,
447

u. s. 455, 461, 464-465 (1980).

7

repudiate last Term's decision in Heffron v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., supra, which assumed that religious appeals
to nonbelievers constituted protected "speech." Rather, the dissent
seems to attempt a distinction between the kinds of religious speech explicitly protected by our cases and a new Class of religious "speech act[s]," dissenting opinion, at 4, comprising "worship." There are at least three difficulties with this distinction.
First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction has intelligible
content.
There is no indication when "singing hymns, reading scripture,
and teaching biblical principles," id., at 2, cease to be "singing, teaching,
and reading''-all apparently forms of "speech," despite their religious subject matter-and become unprotected "worship."
Second, even if the distinction drew an arguably principled line, it is
highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial competence to administer. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67, 70 (1953). Merely to draw
the distinction would require the university-and ultimately the courts-to
inquire into the significance of words and practices to different religious
faiths, and in varying circumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries
would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner forbidden by our cases. E. g., Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 668
(1970).
Finally, the dissent fails to establish the relevance of the distinction on
which it seeks to rely. The dissent apparently wishes to preserve the vitality of the Establishment Clause. See dissenting opinion, post, at 4.
But it gives no reason why the Establishment Clause, or any other provision of the Constitution, would require different treatment for religious
speech designed to win religious converts, see Heffron, supra, than for religious worship by persons already converted. It is far from clear that the
State gives greater support in the latter case than in the former.
7
See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972):
"It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial of recognition
was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range
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III
In this case the University claims a compelling interest in
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives
this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the
Federal and Missouri Constitutions.
A

The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to
other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of
the Constitution of the United States. 8 We agree that the
interest of the University in complying with its constitutional
obligations may be characterized as compelling. It does not
follow, however, that an "equal access" policy would be incompatible with this Court's Establishment Clause cases.
Those cases hold that a policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can pass a three-pronged test: "First, the
[governmental policy] must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the [policy]
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion.'" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613
(1971). See Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444
U. S. 646, 653 (1980); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works
Bd., 426 U. S. 736, 748 (1976).
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an
of associational activities described above. While a college has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which ... may justify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the
appropriateness of that action."
8
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .
. . . " U. S. Const., Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).
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open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against religious speech, 9 would have a secular purpose 10 and would
avoid entanglement with religion. 11 But the District Court
concluded, and the University argues here, that allowing religious groups to share the limited public forum would have the
"primary effect" of advancing religion. 12
1

As the dissent emphasizes, the Establishment Clause requires the
State to distinguish between ''religious" speech-speech, undertaken or
approved by the State, the primary effect of which is to support an Establishment of Religion-and "nonreligious" speech-speech, undertaken or
approved by the State, the primary effect of which is not to support an
Establishment of Religion. This distinction is required by the plain text of
the Constitution. It is followed in our cases. E. g., Stone v. Graham,
- - U. S. - - (November 17, 1980). The dissent attempts to equate this
distinction with its view of an alleged constitutional difference between religious "speech" and religious "worship." See dissenting opinion, post, at
5 and n. 6. We think that the distinction advanced by the dissent lacks a
foundation in either the Constitution or in our cases, and that it is judicially
unmanageable.
10
It is the avowed purpose of UMKC to provide a forum in which students can exchange ideas. The University argues that use of the forum
for religious speech would undermine this secular aim. But by creating a
forum the University does not thereby endorse or promote any of the particular ideas aired there. Undoubtedly many views are advocated in the
forum with which the University desires no association.
Because this case involves a forum already made generally available to
student groups, it differs from those cases in which this Court has invalidated statutes permitting school facilities to be used for instruction by religious groups, but not by others. See, e. g., McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). In those cases the school may appear to
sponsor the views of the speaker.
11
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk
greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of "religious
worship and religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1318.
Initially, the University would need to determine which words and
activites fall within "religious worship and religious teaching." This alone
could prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs
meet the constitutional definition of religion." O'Hair v. Andrus, 613
F. 2d 931, 936 (CADC 1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law § 14-16 (1978). There would also be a continuing need
to monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule.
12
In finding that an "equal access" policy would have the primary effect
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The University's argument misconceives the nature of this
case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious
forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The University has opened its facilities for use by student groups, and
the question is whether it can now exclude groups because of
the content of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S.
169 (1972). 13 In this context we are unpersuaded that the
of advancing religion, the District Court in this case relied primarily on
Tilwn v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this Court upheld
the grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges for secular
purposes, but circumscribed the terms of the grant to ensure its constitutionality. Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized
buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 years,
the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of 20
years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise
used to promote religious interests the original federal grant will in part
have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion."
Id., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposition that State funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used
by religious organizations.
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilwn the
Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally
funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the imprimatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the
State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other discussions. Cases before and after Tilton have aclmowledged the right of
religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See,
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'yfor Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101
S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).
13
This case is different from the cases in which religious groups claim
that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of
Educ., 635 F. 2d 971, 975-976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-1396;
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (SD W. Va. 1971).
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, and respondents' claim to use that forum does not-as in Brandon or Hunt-rest
solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents'
claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association,
and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the
case. Accordingly, we need not inquire into the extent, if any, to which
Free Exercise interests are infringed by the challenged University regula-
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primary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of discourse, would be to advance religion.
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely
effects. It is possible-perhaps even foreseeable-that religious groups will benefit from access to University facilities.
But this Court has explained that a religious organization's
enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the
prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion.
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756,
771 (1973); see, e. g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426
U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1972);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961).
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open
forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of
our cases. Two factors are especially relevant.
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer
any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects or practices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a policy "would no more commit the University ... to religious
goals," than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students
for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or
any other group eligible to use its facilities. Chess v.
Widmar, supra, at 1317. 14
tion. Neither do we reach the questions that would arise if State accommodation of Free Exercise and Free Speech rights should, in a particular
case, conflict with the prohibition of the Establishment Clause.
,. University students are, of course, young adults. They are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that
the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 685--686 (1971). The University argues that
the Cornerstone students themselves admitted in affidavits that "[s]tudents know that if something is on campus, then it is a student organization, and they are more likely to feel comfortable attending a meeting."
Affidavit of Florian Frederick Chess, Joint Appendix, at 18, 19 (Sept. 29,
1977). In light of the large number of groups meeting on campus, however, we doubt students could draw any reasonable inference of University
support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place. The University's
student handbook already notes that the University's name will not "be
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Second, the forum is available to a broad class of non-religious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recognized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to
so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229,
240-241 (1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,
supra, 413 U. S., at 756, 781-782 and n. 38 (1973). If the
Establishment Clause barred the extension of general benefits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by
the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk
kept in repair." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U. S. 736, 747
(1976) (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public
Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 658, n. 6 (1980). 15 At
least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious
groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not
be the forum's "primary effect."
B
Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than
the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect State support for religion, 16 the University claims a compelling interest
in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri
Constitution. 17
identified in any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opinions of any organization of its members." 1980-1981 UMKC Student
Handbook, at 25.
15
This Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent argument that all aid
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair,
413 u. s. 734, 743 (1973).
16
See, e. g., American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W. 2d 711, 720, (Mo.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) (holding Missouri Constitution
requires stricter separation of church and state than does Federal Constitution); Harfst v. Hogen, 163 S.W. 2d 609, 613--614 (Mo. 1947) (en bane)
(same).
17
See Mo. Const. Art. 1, § 6; Art. 1, § 7; Art. 9, § 8. In Leutkemeyer v.
Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (ED Mo. 1973), aff'd, 419 U. S. 88 (1974), the
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The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general policy of accommodating student groups, applied equally to
those wishing to gather to engage in religious and non-religious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need
not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would decide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide
whether, under the Supremacy Clause, 18 a state interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free
speech interests protected by the First Amendment. We
limit our holding to the case before us.
On one hand, respondents' First Amendment rights are entitled to special constitutional solicitude. Our cases have required the most exacting scrutiny in cases in which a State
undertakes to regulate speech on the basis of its content.
See, e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980); Police Dept.
v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972). On the other hand, the State
interest asserted here-in achieving greater separation of
church and State than is already ensured under the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution-is limited by
the Fre~ Exercise Clause and in this case by the Free Speech
Clause as well. In this constitutional context, we are unable
to recognize the State's interest as sufficiently "compelling''
to justify content-based discrimination against respondents'
religious speech.
IV
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity
of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and
manner regulations. 19 Nor do we question the right of the
District Court found Missouri had a compelling interest in compliance with
its own constitution.
18
U. S. Const., Art. VI, § 2.
19
See, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972).
("The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the
kinds of regulations to time, place, and manner that are reasonable."').
(quoting Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027,

I
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University to make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources or "to determine for itself on aca- I
demic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring in the judgment); see Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312-313 (1978) (opinion of PowELL, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). 20 Finally, f
we affinn the continuing validity of cases, e. g., Healy v.
James, 408 U. S. 169, 188-189 (1972), that recognize a University's right to exclude even First Amendment activities
that violate reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an
education.
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a
forum generally open to student groups, the University seeks
to enforce a content-based exclusion of religious speech. Its
exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a
state regulation of speech should be content-neutral, and the
University is unable to justify this violation under applicable
constitutional standards.
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is,

Affirmed.

1042 (1969).

In his opinion concurring in the judgment, post, at 1, JUSTICE STEVENS expresses concern that use of the tenns "compelling state interest"
and "public forum" may "undermine the academic freedom of public universities". As the text above makes clear, this concern is unjustified. See
also n. 5, ante, at p. 4. Our holding is limited to the context of a public
forum created by the University itself.
20

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See
United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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The University of Missouri at Kansas City, a state university, makes its
facilities generally available for the activities of registered student
groups. A registered student religious group that had previously received permission to conduct its meetings in University facilities was informed that it could no longer do so because of a University regulation
prohibiting the use of University buildings or grounds "for purposes of
religious worship or religious teaching." Members of the group then
brought suit in Federal District Court, alleging that the regulation violated, inter alia, their rights to free exercise of religion and freedom of
speech under the First Amendment. The District Court upheld the
regulation as being not only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed,
viewing the regulation as a content-based discrimination against religious speech, for which it could find no compelling justification, and holding that the Establishment Clause does not bar a policy of equal access,
in which facilities are open to groups and speakers of all kind.
Held: The University's exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a state regulation of speech should be content-neutral.
Pp. 4-13.
(a) Having created a forum generally open for use by student groups,
the University, in order to justify discriminatory exclusion from such
forum based on the religious content of a group's intended speech, must
satisfy the standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions;
i. e., it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.
Pp. 4-7.
(b) Although the University's interest in complying with its constitutional obligations under the Establishment Clause may be characterized
as compelling, an "equal access" policy would not be incompatable with
that Clause. A policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can
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No. 80-689
GARY E. WIDMAR, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
CLARK VINCENT ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[December 8, 1981]

JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the court.
This case presents the question whether a state university,
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities
of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a registered student group desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and religious discussion.
I

It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri at Kansas City 1 to encourage the activities of student organizations. The University officially recognizes over 100 student
groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the
meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an activity fee of $41 per semester (1978-1979) to help defray the
costs to the University.
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to
conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 1977, how'The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four campuses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri.
2
Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from
various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in
1977, "perhaps twenty students ... participate actively in Cornerstone
and form the backbone of the campus organization." Affidavit of Florian
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that the University's discrimination against religious activity
and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States.
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar,
480 F. Supp. 907 (WD Mo. 1979). It found the regulation not
only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of
the Federal Constitution. Id., at 916. Under Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the
State could not provide facilities for religious use without giving prohibited support to an institution of religion. I d., at
915-916. The District Court rejected the argument that the
University could not discriminate against religious speech on
the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to
less protection than other types of expression. I d., at 918.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (CA8 1980). Rejecting the
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regulation as a content-based discrimination against religious
speech, for which it could find no compelling justification.
Id., at 1315-1320. The Court held that the Establishment
Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities
are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. Id., at 1317.
According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of
such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to
further the neutral purpose of developing students' "'social
and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curiosity."' Id., at 1317 (quoting from the University bulletin's
in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated
the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the University's Board
of Curators.
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son Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment
Relations Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167, 175 and n. 8. (1976) (although a State may conduct business in private session,
"where the State has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement," exclusions bear a heavy burden of justification);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546,
555-559 (1975) (because municipal theater was a public
forum, city could not exclude a production without satisfying
constitutional safeguards applicable to prior restraints).
The University's institutional mission, which it describes
as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for
Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitutional scrutiny. With respect to persons entitled to be
there, our cases leave no doubt that the First Amendment
rights of speech and association extend to the campuses of
state universities. See, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S.
169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School
District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
u. s. 479, 487 (1960).
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated against
student groups and speakers based on their desire to use a
generally open forum to engage in religious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment. See, e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'yfor Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 S. Ct.
2559 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951);
Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). 6 In order to justify
The dissent argues that "religious worship" is not speech generally
protected by the "free speech" guarantee of the First Amendment and the
"equal protection" guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. If "religious
worship" were protected "speech," the dissent reasons, "the Religion
Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in
which religious practice took the form of speech." Dissenting opinion,
post, at 4. This is a novel argument. The dissent does not deny that
speech about religion is speech entitled to the general protections of the
First Amendment. See id., at 2-3 and n. 2. It does not argue that de6
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III
In this case the University claims a compelling interest in
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives
this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the
Federal and Missouri Constitutions.
A
The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to
other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of
the Constitution of the United States. 8 We agree that the
interest of the University in complying with its constitutional
obligations may be characterized as compelling. It does not
follow, however, that an "equal access" policy would be incompatible with this Court's Establishment Clause cases.
Those cases hold that a policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can pass a three-pronged test: "First, the
[governmental policy] must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the [policy]
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion."' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613
(1971). See Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444
U. S. 646, 653 (1980); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works
Bd., 426 U. S. 736, 748 (1976).
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an
open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against religious speech, 9 would have a secular purpose 10 and would
mate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which . . . may justify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the
appropriateness of that action."
8
"Congress shall make no Jaw respecting an establishment of religion .
. . . " U. S. Canst., Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).
9
As the dissent emphasizes, the Establishment Clause requires the
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The University's argument misconceives the nature of this
case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious
forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The University has opened its facilities for use by student groups, and
the question is whether it can now exclude groups because of
the content of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S.
169 (1972). 13 In this context we are unpersuaded that the
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this Court upheld
the grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges for secular
purposes, but circumscribed the terms of the grant to ensure its constitutionality. Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized
buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 years,
the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of 20
years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise
used to promote religious interests the original federal grant will in part
have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion."
Id., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposition that State funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used
by religious organizations.
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the
Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally
funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the imprimatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the
State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other discussions. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of
religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See,
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc ., 101
S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).
13
This case is different from the cases in which religious groups claim
that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of
Educ., 635 F. 2d 971, 975-976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-1396;
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (SD W. Va. 1971).
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, and respondents' claim to use that forum does not-as in Brandon or Hunt-rest
solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents'
claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association,
and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the
case. Accordingly, we need not inquire into the extent, if any, to which
Free Exercise interests are infringed by the challenged University regula-
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Second, the forum is available to a broad class of non-religious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recognized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to
so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229,
24~241 (1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,
supra, 413 U. S., at 756, 781-782 and n. 38 (1973). If the
Establishment Clause barred the extension of general benefits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by
the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk
kept in repair." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U. S. 736, 747
(1976) (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public
Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 658, n. 6 (1980). 15 At
least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious
groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not
be the forum's "primary effect."
B
Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than
the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect State support for religion, 16 the University claims a compelling interest
in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri
Constitution. 17
identified in any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opinions of any organization of its members." 1980-1981 UMKC Student
Handbook, at 25.
15
This Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent argument that all aid
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair,
413 u. s. 734, 743 (1973).
6
' See, e. g. , American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W. 2d 711, 720, (Mo.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) (holding Missouri Constitution
requires stricter separation of church and state than does Federal Constitution); Harfst v. Hogen, 163 S.W. 2d 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1947) (en bane)
(same).
17
See Mo. Const. Art. 1, § 6; Art. 1, § 7; Art. 9, § 8. In Luetkemeyer v.
Kaufmann, 364 F. Supp. 376 (ED Mo. 1973), aff'd, 419 U. S. 888 (1974),
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University to make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources or "to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring in the judgment); see Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312-313 (1978) (opinion of PowELL, J., announcing the judgment of the Court).20 Finally,
we affirm the continuing validity of cases, e. g., Healy v.
James, 408 U. S. 169, 188-189 (1972), that recognize a University's right to exclude even First Amendment activities
that violate reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an
education.
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a
forum generally open to student groups, the University seeks
to enforce a content-based exclusion of religious speech. Its
exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a
state regulation of speech should be content-neutral, and the
University is unable to justify this violation under applicable
constitutional standards.
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is,
Affirmed.

1042 (1969).
20
In his opinion concurring in the judgment, post, at 1, JuSTICE STEVENS expresses concern that use of the terms "compelling state interest"
and "public forum" may "undermine the academic freedom of public universities". As the text above makes clear, this concern is unjustified. See
also n. 5, ante, at p. 4. Our holding is limited to the context of a public
forum created by the University itself.
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1310

( CA 8
'--

19 8 0 ) .

"

Rejecting

Chess v. Widmar, 635
the

analysis

of

the

~istrict G:> urt, it viewed the University regulation as a

-,

~

content-based discrimination against religious speech, for
which

it could

1313-1316.

find

no compelling

justification.

Id.

at

The Establishment Clause did not bar a policy

of equal access, in which facilities were opened to groups

5.

and

speakers

of

all

kinds.

According

to

the 60 urt of

-

Q ppeals, the "primary effect" of such a policy would not
'l

be to advance religion, but rather to further the neutral
purpose

of

developing

students'

"social

and

cultural

awareness as well as [their] intellectual curiosity."

Id.

at 1317.
Essentially for

the

reasons

stated by the c;ourt of

-

~-~-· -

·~~
r15.~,-r

appeals, we now affirm.
....

II.

··~~
{V

;;;::

Through

registered student groups, the University has created for

~ .1-~J.L
,.- i t,s
~

•'

4

students a quasi-public

~~~oseley,

y ,)'\

its policy of accommodating the meetings of

408

u.s.

92

(1972);

for urn.
Cox v.

See Police oe12t • v.
Louisiana,

crJ..~·

6

] 36

(1965) ; see also HasUe v. CIO, 307

u.s.

496

379

u.s.

(1939) • 5

~-/'- - - - - - - - - - yc

~

5 The concept of a "public forum"
~ ~ recognition, first expressed in Hague v.
~~
/ 496, 515 (1939), that

rests on
CIO, 307

vv·
JMt

the

u.s.

~ I~~ :~:~~v~~eythheav:i i!~em~~ iasli~ee;:en a~~llairnk\r~=~

t~
~t
/ ~
~

for the use of the public and time out of mind,
have
been used
for
purposes of
assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions.
Such use of the
streets and public places has from ancient
times,
been
a
part
of
the
privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
Footnote continued on next page.

.

6.

The University may have assumed voluntarily the function
of providing rooms for student rneetings. 6

But, by doing

~ly

Such centers for discourse are
affected with
First Amendment concerns of the highest order. t:TU1nder
the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First
Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a
public forum to people whose views it finds acceptable,
but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or
more controversial views.
And it may not select which
-..-.--.~--issues are worth debating in public facilities."
Police
Department v. Moseley, 408 u.s. 92, 96 (1972).
It is
characteristic of a "pure" public forum that it is equally
open to all members of the public. "Once a forum is opened
up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may
hibi t others from assembling or speaking on the
t
b
what they have to say." Id.
campus of a public university possesses many of
the characteristic elements of a public forum.
"The
college classroom, with its surrounding environs, is
peculiarly 'the marketplace of ideas.'"
Healy v. James,
408 u.s. 169, 180 (1972).
Moreover, the capacity of a
group or individual "to participate in the intellectual
give and take of campus debate .•• [would be] limited by
denial of access to the customary media for communicating
with the administration,
faculty members,
and other
students." Id. at 181-182.
We have therefore held that
students en]Oy First Amendment rights of speech and
association on the campus, and that the "denial of use of
campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate
purposes" must be subjected to the level of scrutiny
appropriate to any form of prior restraint.
Id. at 181,
184; cf. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conra~420 u.s.
546, 558 (}97 5)~ of / a~cess \to rnu~icipal th~fterv
rna~·
ntained~~s
~ / putlic
~orurn, \ constitu~es . "priof
re tra · ,.,.t " an t ~t efore/bears "heavy pre~umpt~~/against
it c nstitu ional validity") (citations orn1tted).
On the other hand, our cases have never denied a
university's capacity to impose regulations required to
preserve the tranquility that its mission requires.
We
have not held, for example, that a campus must make all of
its facilities equally available to students and nonstudents alike, or that a university must grant free
access to all of its grounds or all of its buildings.
First Amendment rights must always be applied "in light of
the special characteristics of the ..• environment in the
particular place."
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
School District, 393 u.s. 503, 506 (1969).

../

6 The Uni ver si ty' s obligations may well be different
for its grounds and its buildings.
"The nature of a
place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the
kinds of regulations to time, place, and manner that are
reasonable.'" Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 u.s. 104,
116 (1972).
It is settled, however, that the to nstitution
may bar the State from enforcing exclusions f lbrn a public
Footnote continued on next page.

7.

so,

it

undertook

discriminations
constitutional
mission,

an

and

exclusions

norms.

which

it

obligation

The

justify

to
under

Univeristy's

describes

as

its

applicable
institutional

providing

a

"secular

education" to its students, Brief at 44, does not exempt
its actions from constitutional scrutiny.
no doubt

that

the First Amendment

association

reach
force.

Healy

{1972);

Tinker

v.

see

rights of

university

undiminished

v.

Des

Our cases leave

James,
Moines

speech and

campuses
408 U.S.

with

169,

Independent

180

School

District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 {1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364

u.s.

479, 487 {1960).
Here

the

discriminate
desire

to

Univeristy

of

against groups and

engage

in

religious

Missouri

has

sought

to

speakers based on their
worship

and

discussion.

forum that it has created, even though it was not required
to create the forum ·in the first place.
See City of
Madision Joint School
District
v.
Wisconsin Public
Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 u.s. 167, 175
& n.8.
{1976) {although State could conduct business in private
session, "where the State has opened a forum for direct
citizen involvement," exclusions bear Si heavy burden of
justification);
cf.
Southeastern Promotions,
Ltd.
v.
Conrad, supra {having established municipal theater as a
public forum, city could not exclude production ei "Hair"
without satisfying constitutional safeguards applicable to
prior restraints).

8.

These are forms of speech and association protected by the
First Amendment.
558

(1948) ;

--

See, e.g., Saia v.

Niemotko

v.

u.s.

NAACP v. Alabama, 357

International Soc'y for
S.

Ct.

2559,

2563

Maryland,

New York,

340

U.S.

334

268

u.s.

(1951) ;

449, 460-461 (1958); Heffron v.

Krishna Consciousness,

(1981).

Thus,

in

order

Inc.,
to

101

justify

discr iminat~ exclusion from a public forum based on the
J\

religious

content

University

wotlld

of

a

group's

intended

speech,

the

~~~gQd
a--e
ee~

satisfy

the

standard

of

"\

review appropriate to content-based exclusions.

It would

need to show that its regulation was necessary to serve a
compelling

State

interest

and

that

it

was

narrowly

~
to achieve that end. See Carey v. Brown, 447

tailer~d

455,

465

(1980) ;

u.s.

47 (1919). 7

see also Schenck v.

United States,

III.

7 cf.

Healy v. James, supra, 408

u.s.

at 184:

It is to be rememebered that the effect of the
College's denial of recognition was a form of
prior
restraint,
denying
to
petitioners'
organizations
the
range
of
associational
activity described above. While a college has a
legitimate interest in preventing disruption on
the campus, which may justify such restraint, a
'heavy
burden'
rests
on
the
college
to
demonstrate the appropriateness of that action.

u.s.
249

9.

In

this

interest

, .I

State.

case

the

in maintaining
It

University

claims

a

compelling

strict separation of church and
. $' t h.IS
d er1ve

~EH: ts

interest

t\

'

from

the

,/

"Establishment Clauses" of both the f ederal and Missouri

J

Gonstitutions.
,.

-

-

A.
The

University

argues

that

it

could

not

open

its

facilities to religious groups and speakers, on the same
terms

~

they are open to all other registered student

groups, without violating the Establishment Clause of the
the United States. 8

Constitution of

University does have a

compelling

interest

with its constitutional obligations.
its

conclusion

satisfy
/

the

Establishment
Cornrn'n,
U.S.

that

Clause

612-613

8 "congress

664,

developed

cases.
674

(1971);

See,

(1970);

that the

in complying

But we disagree with

"equal access"

standard

397 U.S.

602,

an

~

We

policy could

in

--

e.g.,

this
Walz

not

Court's
v.

Tax

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403

Committee for Public Education

shall
make
no
law
respecting
an
establishment of religion •••• " U. S. Const., Arndt. 1. The
Establishment Clause ~~ been made applicable to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 u.s. 296, 303 (1940).

10.

v. Nyquist,

413 U.S.

756,

clear

that

a

will

Clause

if

it can pass a

[governmental
purpose;
one

policy

policy]

second,

that

the

government

(1973).

not

Those cases make

offend

the

Establishment

three-pronged test:

must

have

a

"First,

secular

the

legislative

its principal or primary effect must be

neither

finally,

773

advances

[policy]

nor

must

entanglement

inhibits

not

with

***·

religion

foster

'an

religion."

I

excessive

v.

Lemon

Kurtzman, supra, 403 at 612-613.
In

this

~-~probla':mae ic.
appeals

case
Both
held

prongs

two
the

of

district court

that

a

policy

avoid

,

entanglement

the

court of

nondiscrimination

?• s~~'~

~purpose

~~~ ~

with--fA,) religion. 1
..

t~:£4.. ~ \ ( f r}tJ.IC."".... ~0\ t
/
W1!!f! ~-t.s.(. ~ .(:c..-"""""'
~

are .-'\~

test

and

of

against religious speech would have a
would

the

$

0 ""l

4o

t

9

and

But

?

tl:le

~ ( O!o\ ~~~ """'~ ""-t

e""'~~

i

--~.J,
1

-----..~{ f' t,·~, 0> ~ ~, f--i v• t-" e·Jn:l~wr
9 The ~~r~l':{urpose would be to provi..~ a forum ~Y
which ideas can be exchanged freely.
The '=>purpose is ~
neaeF --t, when the public forum has been reated in a publ1c
hall, see City of Madison Joint School District v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, supra; Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, supra, as when it involves the
streets or the parks, see Mosely v. Police Department,
supra; Hague v. CIO, supra.
This case is therefore very
different from those in whic
this Court has struck down
statutes permitting school facilities to be used for
instruction by religious, b t not by other, ·groups. S
McCollum v. Board of Educati n, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
It
1s se~led that the Esta 1~ ent qause do~s not re_qu1r,e
bu~ , ll~tuall
forb'i,ds, / Sta e hosti'\ity tow-ard rel'igi6n.
~51/. Claus-on, 343 u.s.
(1952).
Footnote(s) 10 will

on following pages.

f.N(l ~~~

~t~~
~~~--~
~~;;t~--

~~~..,~~~

11.

district court concluded, and the University argues here,
that allowing religious groups to share the limited public
forum

would

have

the

"prim~ry

effect"

of

advancing

religion. 11

J

10 we agree with the ~urt of litnpeals that the
University
would
risk
g'?'eater
"~~agnglement"
by
attempting to enforce an exclusion of "religious worship
and religious speech."
See Chess v. Widmar, supra, 635
F.2d at 1318.
In order to exclude relig1ous speech and
religious worship, the University would first need to
determine which words and activites fall within the
proscription. At least one Gourt of ~peals has concluded
that this would be "an imp~ssible task in an age where
many
and
various
beliefs
meet
the
constitutional
definition of religion." O'hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931,
937
(1979) (footnote omitted): see L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law § 14-6 (1978); cf. Fowler v. Rhode
Island, 345 u.s. 67, 70 (1953).(.!!-f-I]t is no 6us1ness of
tb~otlr ts
to- say that .what .is a religious prac~tice or
aG-tj ui ty -f
ne._ group is no
religion ~ unde~f'• i!he First
A_me.ndment .--Nor is it in the competence of court under our
constitutional scheme to approve, disapprove, classify,
regulate, or in any manner control sermons delivered at
religious meeting.").~ Even if it could define religion,
see Note, Toward a ~nstitutional Definition of Religion,
91 Harv. L. Rev. 1056 (1978), the University would then
need to monitor group meetings in order to enforce
adherence to its stated policy.
It has been argued
powerfully that the attempt to administer "such a test
would impermissibly entangle government and religion."
O'hair v. Andrus, Supra, 613 F.2d at 937. See Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-676 (1970) (tax exemption for
churches permissible
in part because elimination of
exemption
would
require
more
extensive
government
entanglement) •
11 In finding that an "equal access" policy would
have the primary effect of advancing religion,
the
O,istr ict ~ urt relied primarily on the decision of this
COurt in ~ ilton v. Richardson, 403 u.s. 672 (1971). In
Tilton
th1s
Court
upheld
the prov1s1on of
federal
financial assistance to sectarian colleges.
But it
emphasized that the funds must be used for secular
purposes. Congress had provided that federally subsidized
buildings must not be used for sectarian or religious
worship for a period of 20 years.
This Court found this
restriction to be insufficient. We held that "If, at the
end of 20 years, , the building is, for example, converted
into a chapel or otherwise used to promote religious uses,
the original
federal
grant wiJ l
in part have
the
[constitutionally
impermissible ~~ffect
of
advancing
Footnote continued on next page.

12.

The University's argument misconceives the nature of
this case.

This is not a case in which a religious group

seeks special privileges in order better to practice its
faith.l 2

It

is,

has created a

I

rather,

a case

in which the University

forum open to student groups of all other

religion." From this statement the ~istrict 6ourt derived
the proposition that State funds ~may not ~ be used to
provide buildings for use by religious organizations.
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly.
In Tilton
the Court had worried
that a
sectarian
institution
might
actually
convert
federally
funded
buildings or otherwise stamp them with the imprimatur of
religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on
the State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to
religious and other discussion.
It cannot be held to
reverse longstanding decisions holding that religious
speakers are constitutionally entitled to equal access to
parks and other facilities that have "immemorially been
held in trust for use by the public and have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions."
Heffron, v.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101
S. Ct. 2559, 2565 (1981), quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496, 515 (1939).
There may sometimes be differences
between the exclusionary regulations permissible in a
building and those permitted in a park. But restrictions
based on the nature of the public forum have traditionally
rested on "the State's interest in protecting the safety
and convenience of persons using a public forum," Heffron,
supra, 101 S. Ct. at 2565, not on any interest in
censoring the content of what is said, see Carey, supra,
447 u.s. at 470.

12 cf. Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F. 2d 971 (CA2
1980); Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263 (SD
w. Va. 1971). It is because this case presents no such
issue that we have not couched our discussion in terms of
respondents' rights under the "Free Exercise" clause. We
agree with the petitioners' argument that the policies of
the "Free Exercise" clause and the "Establishment Clause"
may sometimes be in tension, see Abington School District
~
v. Schempp, 373 U.S. 203, 22
("the bre ela~:~se~ ma}'
"\
o~ and
that resolutio
of the tension requires
''
sensi tivil{. to the interest
that both are aimed to
'\
protect.
Cf. Wisconsin v.
oder, 406 U.s. 285, 240-241
oJ
(1972) (Whl e, J. concurr· g) (when it is essential to
\~
protect free exercise v ues which are threatened by an
V ~
otherwise neutral progr
, no forbidden establishment can
~
exist)
But we do not iew this as such a case.
.f ;:~fJl

?
J

J

~t- JtJ'

e."t(\ ,.{

S-l-41\-k

l~
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a\o\"\' . ~l ,e'l,.-\' r (,
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kinds,

and

must

therefore

justify

its

content-based

exclusion of certain forms of religious speech.

As held

-

by the court of appeals, an "equal access"

-

policy would [not] have the primary effect of
advancing religion.
Rather, it would have the
primary effect of advancing the University's
admitted secular purpose--to develop students'
'social and cultural awareness as well as their
intellectual curiosity.' It would simply permit
students to put their religious ideas and
practices in competition with the ideas and
practices of other groups, religious or secular.

635

at

F.2d

is

1317. Cft rt

possible--perhaps

even

foreseeable--that religious groups would benefit from an
open

forum

religious

policy.

But

this

Court

will

not

violate

the

prohibition

"primary advancement" of religion.
Public Works, 426 U.S. 736
~ermi:!l:!lib1e

•• speer• f rca
• 11 i

u.s.

held

organization's enjoyment of merely

benefits

celle9ee

has

734

0

•

(1972) (•tate

FeligiotJ:s colltig,.s, s9

422 (1961)

against

0

•

the

See Roemer v. Board of

(1976) }(~te

II~
ac t rv It: J
;

a

incidental

fUnding O! private

because 1 t does not eir,.ctly

re :I: l!let2~

religions worshj12z);

'

that

Bl:i~~ert!

Hunt v. McNair,

413

may give een:!ltraction grant:! - to
leA~

as 81e1ileing:!l are

ed McGowan

not usee! !or

v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,

{uphold"ifig the validity of Sunday closing laws,

JJ.,,V~
/~~

y\h~

l~a~w~s~~l~s;-tt~o~~p~r~o~v~i~d~e~~a~~Tf~~~av~or--~~~~~~1· ~

rr",/;;,.,.,('

c1tizens;

t

fact

e

that

(o..'

of "'

~+etlrhn:~tgrrtft''C'"an"W"foi~l'te--deft't+H-eHT4;..-GG.~.t.i.a..l+-i;.e.e.4;:s~~"~ ~t:~·
v\ \ '""'~
from

ac 1ev1ng

1 s

secu ar

)

~~

~ ~,'< ,
c,o~"'

f

these cases religious institutions appear ..{;:,<

~ from
~~

""~have

the

indirect

S tate

policies
':/)

benefits

\fe(H'f"'

L,.)"'. ~'v . ~

~£t (...\~l\

di

(q

enacted

to

the

Perha

cha

enged

equally

...[fl/
I

with

(pl~

policies

..J ,v.,
.!sw \•
1v- ~~ V

weighed in
that

\o""S

\ ~e\'0)
=-

But

f"'" •

important,
(

'~
"' ~ t r4'-\

~·
imprimatur of state tiL(/'
f'- \A'

"\~"\ ,,~

In this case

\~\
l~

religious
a publi

forum would be to imply
Wt"

religious
we
appeals.

agree

with

Such

a

actr~ity.

..t..._ o/

C\.

!Ph is

the

jf
of

+

~""unpersuasive.

tl''j ttLNr

the

more

policy

state

court
_.
_..

commit

of
the

-z,-,

University to religious goals,"

id.

at

than it is

now committed to the goals of the Students for a

~#
xY

~

S ~· LKlrf 1 02:e- ~

~rlJ:
~· ~
1;;~

~.

'-1-"H

15.

Society, the Young Socialist Alliance, or any other group
eligible to use its forum. 13

B.
Arguing

~.5,/.,U_~

that

'l

Missouri

has

gone

further

than

the

federal constitution in proscribing indirect State support
for

religion,

the

University

also

claims

a

compelling

interest in complying with the applicable provision of the
State constitution. 14

See Leutkemeyer v. Kaufman, 364 F.

13 rt
should
not
be
overlooked
that
University
students
are
young
adults.
They
may
be
less
impressionable than students in primary school and even in
high school, and better able to comprehend that i tate
neutrality to religion is recisely that.
Se ~~~~~ v.
B
: Note, The
R1 hts
the First
1008' 1052 (1981)
2

14 The Constitution of the State
of Missouri pro~
in pertinent part:
That no person can be compelled to erect,
support, or attend any place of worship, or to
maintain
or
support
any
priest,
minister,
preacher or teacher of any sect, church, creed
or denomination of religion ....
That no money shall ever be taken from the
public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid
of any priest, preacher, minister, or teacher
thereof ..•.
Neither the general assembly, nor any county,
city, town, township, schol district or other
municipal corporation,
shall ever make any
apropr iation or
pay
from
any public
fund
whatever, anything in aid of any religious
creed, church or sectarian purpose .•. : nor shall
any grant or donation of personal property or
real property ever be made by the state, or any
county,
city,
town,
or
wother
municipal
corporation, for any religious creed, church, or
Footnote continued on next page.
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16.

Supp. 376 (E.D. Mo. 1973), aff'd, 419 U.S. 88 (1974).
The Missouri courts have apparently not ruled whether
a general policy of accommodating student groups, applied
equally to those wishing to gather to engage in religious
and

non-religious

~nstitution.

speech,

would

offend

the

State

Nonetheless, we find it unnecessary to our

-

....

decision to make any determination of Missouri law.
do

we

find

it

necessary

to

decide

whether

a

Nor
State

interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever,
under

the

Supremacy

Clause 15 ,

outweigh

free

interests protected by the First Amendment.
State's
ne.ed

interest were compelling,

to.._l::)e- ~~l.-J::¥

interest and
rights

of

ta4lerQ.d

its

speech

Even if the

regulations would

~

bo-t:-h ;( to

protect

that

~~~-~~

....to_a.vo~_unnecess~ar:y

speech

and

abr ig9FReRt of protected

association.

-1

See,

--

e.g.,

Carey,

supra, 447 U.S. at 465; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 u.s. 1, 25

sectarian purpose whatever.
MO. CONST. Art. 1, §6; Art. 1 § 7; Art. 9 § 8.
The Missouri courts have interpreted these prov1s1ons
to be more restrictive than the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution in prohibiting expenditures of
public funds in a way inuring to the benefit of religious
institutions. American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711,
720, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976); Harfst v. Hogen,
163 s.w.ea 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1947) (en bane}.
15 U. S. Const., Art. 6.

17.

(1976);

Shelton

v.

Tucker,

supra,

u.s.

364

at

489.

Measured against this standard, the University's policy of
discrimination

against

religious

speech

and

as soc ia tion

~

fails on grounds of ove ~inclusiveness.
The
applies

~'

~

~~);,
.

~

?

University
to

worship."

"religious

under

the

is

It

imagine

, can

regulation challenged

no

teaching"

therefore

well

this

as

case

"religious

substantially overbroad.

compelling

Supremacy

as

in

Clause,

interest,

state
in

excluding

we

congnizable
all

types

of

~·
religious

"teaching"--including,

conversational

"instruction"

for

in

example,

a

public

analytical exposition in a classroom.

of regulation must be the touchstone."
U.S.

415,

438

(1963) (citations

forum

or

"Broad prophylactic

rules in the area of free expression are fatal.

371

informal

Precision

NAACP v. Button,

omitted),

quoted

in

Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S.
620' 637

(1980) . 16

16 The University has not invoked other possible
interests that might be compelling in an appropriate case.
We have previously recognized a university's right to
restrict
even
First
Amendment
activities
that
are
disruptive of reasonable campus rules or substantially
interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain
an education. Healy v. James, supra, 408 u.s. at 189; see
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, supra,
Footnote continued on next page.

18.

IV.

The decision of the court of appeals is, accordingly,
Affirmed.

393 U.S. at 513.
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This

case

presents
~ ~~·~4.... .-~ •• , ...... -.

university, which makes

its facilities available for

the

~ ......... ~~.
activities
close

(

its

of

all

other

facilities

registered
to

a

student

registered

desiring to use the facilities for

groups,

student

may

group

religious worship and

religious discussion.
I.

It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri
at

Kansas

City 1

organizations.
90

student

to encourage

the

activities

of

student

The University officially recognizes over

groups.

It

routinely

provides

University

1 The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC)
is one of four campuses of the University of Missouri, an
institution of the State of Missouri.

-

2.

facilities

for

the meetings of registered organizations.

Students pay an activity fee of $41 per

semester

(1978-

1979) to help defray the costs to the University.
From

1973

until

1977

a

registered

religious

group

named Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission
to

conduct

its

1977, however,
could

no

meetings · in

University

facilities. 2

In

the University informed the group that it

longer

meet

in

University

buildings.

The

exclusion was based on a regulation, adopted by the Board
of Curators in 1972, that prohibits the use of University
buildings or grounds "for purposes of religious worship or
religious teaching." 3

co~nerstone is an organization of evangelical
Christian
students
from
different
denominational
backgrounds.
According to an affidavit filed in 1977,
"perhaps twenty students
participate actively in
Cornerstone
and
form
the
backbone
of
the
campus
organization."
Affidavit of Florian Frederick Chess,
Sept. 29., 1977, quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp.
907, 911 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
Prior to their termination by
the University, on-campus meetings were held in classrooms
and in the Student Center.
Open to the public, they
sometimes attracted up to 125 students.
It is not
disputed that a typical Cornerstone meeting in University
facilities would include the offereing of prayer, the
singing of hymns, the sharing of personal religious views,
and commentary on the Bible.
2

3 The pertinent regulations provide as follows:
4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds
(except chapels as herein provided) may be used
for purposes of religious worship o!: religious
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups
The general prohibition against use of
Footnote continued on next page.

3.

Eleven
Cornerstone,
the

students at

the University,

all members of

brought suit to challenge the regulation in

Federal District Court

Missouri. 4

They

for

alleged

the Western District of
that

the

University's

discrimination against religious activity and discussion
violated

their

rights

to

free

exercise of

religion,

to

equal protection, and to freedom of speech under the First

University buildings and grounds for religious
worship or religious teaching
is a policy
required,
in the opinion of The Board of
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the
State and is not open to any other construction.
No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid
the offering of prayer or other appropriate
recognition of religion at public functions held
in University facilities •••.
4.0314.0108
Regular chapels established on
University grounds may be used for religious
services but not for recurring services of any
groups.
Special rules and procedures shall be
established for each chapel by the Chancellor.
It is specifically directed that no advantage
shall be given to any religious group."
In spite of the regulation's reference to chapels,
there is no chapel on the campus of the Uni ver si ty of
Missouri at Kansas City. The nearest University chapel is
at the Columbia campus, approximately 125 miles east of
UMKC.
Before 1977 University officials had not been aware
of
the
religious
character
of
the
activities
at
Cornerstone meetings.
The District Court found that
University officials had never "authorized a student
organization to utilize a University facility for a
meeting when they had full knowledge that the purposes of
the meeting include[d] religious worship or religious
teaching." Chess v. Widmar, supra, 480 F. Supp. at 910.
4c1ark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess,
the name plaintiff in the action in the district court,
were among the students who initiated the action on
October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the
University's Board of Curators.

4.

and

Fourteenth

Amendments

to

the

Constitution

of

the

United States.
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District
Court upheld the challenged regulation.
480 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
not

only

Clause of
Tilton

'

v.

justified,

but

reasoned,

the

State

religious

use

without

required,

403

u.s.

could

not

giving

institutiori of religion.
argument

It found the regulation
by

the Federal Constitution.
Richardson,

that

the

Chess v. Widmar,

672

the Establishment
Id.

at 916.

(1972),

provide

Under

the

Court

facilities

prohibited

support

to

religious

University

speech entitled

other types of expression.

an

The District Court rejected the
could

not

discriminate

against religious speech on the basis of its content.
found

for

It

to less protection than

Id. at 918.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (CAS 1980).
analysis of the District Court,
regulation
religious

as

a

speech,

content-based
for

which

Rejecting the

it viewed the University
discrimination

against

it could find no compelling

justification. Id. at 1313-1316.

The Establishment Clause

5.

did not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities
were

opened

to

groups

and

speakers

of

all

kinds.

According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of
such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather
to

further

"social

and

the

neutral

cultural

of

awareness

intellectual curiosity."
Essentially for

purpose

the

developing
as

well

as

students'
[their]

Id. at 1317.
reasons

stated by the court of

appeals, we now affirm.

II.
Through

its policy of accommodating the meetings of

registered student groups, the University has created for
its

students a quasi-public

Moseley,
536

408

(1965);

u.s.

92

(1972);

for urn.
Cox v.

See Pol ice Dept.
Louisiana,

see also :aague v. CIO, 307

u.s.

5 The concept of a "public forum"
recognition, first expressed in Hague v.
496 I 515 (1939) I that

496

379

v.

u.s.

(1939) .5

rests on the
CIO, 307 U.S.

Wherever the title of streets and parks may
rest, they have immemorially been held in trust
for the use of the public and time out of mind,
have
been
used
for
purposes of
assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions.
Such use of the
streets and public places has from ancient
times,
been
a
part
of
the
privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
Footnote continued on next page.

6.

The University may have assumed voluntarily the function
of

providing

rooms

for

student

meetings. 6

But

the

aConstitution

forbids

the

/ tate

to

enforce

certain

exclusions from a public forum that it has created, even
though

it was

first place.

not

required

to create

the

forum

in

the

See City of Madision Joint School District

This Court has recognized that the campus of a public
university possesses many of the salient characteristics
of a public forum.
"The college classroom, with its
surrounding environs, is peculiarly 'the marketplace of
ideas.'"
Healy v. James, 408 u.s. 169, 180 (1972).
Moreover, the capacity of a group or individual "to
participate in the intellectual give and take of campus
debate • . . [would be] limited by denial of access to the
customary media for communicating with the administration,
faculty members, and other students."
Id. at 181-182.
We have therefore held that students enjoy-wirst Amendment
rights of speech and association on the campus, and that
the "denial of use of campus facilities for meetings and
other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to the level
of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint •
.Id. at 181, 184; cf. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
conrad, 420 u.s. 546, 558 ([975) (denial of access 'to
municipal
theater,
maintained
as
a
public
for um..- A-,..
constitutes "prior restraint" and therefore bears ~ "heavy
presumption
against
its
constitutional
validity") (citations omitted).
On the other hand, our cases have never denied a
niversity's capacity to impose regulations required to
reserve the tranquility that its mission requires.
we -L
ave not held, for example, that a campus must make all of
l)
its facilities equally available to students and nonstudents alike, or that a university must grant free J
access to all of its grounds or all of its buildings.
First Amendment rights must always be applied "in ligh
the special characteristics of the ..• environment in the
particular place."
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).

~

6The University's obligations to constitute its
grounds and buildings as public forums may well be
different. Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 u.s. 104,
116 (1972). ("The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its
normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations to
time, place, and manner that are reasonable.'").

2

7.

v. Wisconsin Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S.
167,

175

&

a.-

n.8.

conduct

(1976) (although lf, ate
1\

business in private session, "where the / tate has opened a ?
forum for direct citizen involvement," exclusions bear a
heavy

burden

Promotions,
municipal
exclude

Ltd.

v.

Conrad,

as

production

a

forum

constitutional

to

and
norms.

which

it

forum,

city

could

by

students,

the

justify

its

to

Univer~ty's
as

Thus,

under

exclusions

not

constitutional

to ~s

obligation

describes

established

restraints).

open

The

Southeastern

(having

satisfying

prior

an

cf.

supra

public

generally

undertook

discriminations

a

without

applicable

University

mission,

justification);

theater

safeguards
creating

of

applicable
institutional

providing

a

"secular

education" to its students, Brief at 44, does not exempt
its actions from constitutional scrutiny.
no

doubt

that

association
force.

the First Amendment

reach

Healy

v.

rights of

uni ver si ty

campuses

James,

U.S.

408

Our cases leave

169,

with
180

speech and
undiminished
(1972) ;

see

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393

u.s.

8.

503,

506

(1969);

Shelton

v.

Tucker,

364

U.S.

479,

487

(1960) .
Here

the

discriminate
desire

to

Univeristy

of

against groups and

engage

in

religious

Missouri

has

sought

to

speakers based on their
worship

and

discussion.

These are forms of speech and association protected by the
First Amendment.
558

(1948) ;

See, e.g., Saia v.

Niemotko

v.

Maryland,

New York,

340

U.S.

334

268

u.s.

(1951) ;

NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-461 (1958); Heffron v.
International Soc'y for

Krishna Consciousness,

s.

(1981) •

Ct.

2559,

2563

In

order

Inc.,

101

justify

to

discriminatory exclusion from a public forum based on the
religious

content

of

a

group's

intended

speech,

the

University must therefore satisfy the standard of review

appropriate to content-based exclusions.
show

that

its

regulation

was

It

~~ead 5~

necessary

to

serve

a

compelling j tate interest and that it was narrowly drawn
to achieve that end. See Carey v. Brown, 447

u.s.

(1980); see also Schenck v. United States, 249

455, 465

u.s.

47

9.

(1919). 7
III.
In

this

interest
/ tate.

case

the

in maintaining
It derives

University

claims

a

compelling

strict separation of church and

this interest from the "Establishment

Clauses" of both the Federal and Missouri Constitutions.
A.
The University first
its

facilities

to

argues

that

it could not open

religious groups and speakers, on the

same terms they are open to all other registered student
groups, without violating the Establishment Clause of the
Constitution of

the United States. 8

We

agree

that

the

University has a compelling interest in complying with its

7 cf.

Healy v. James, supra, 408

u.s.

at 184:

It is to be rememebered that the effect of the
College's denial of recognition was a form of
prior
restraint,
denying
to
petitioners'
organizations
the
range
of
associational
activity described above. While a college has a
legitimate interest in preventing disruption on
the campus, which may justify such restraint, a
'heavy
burden'
rests
on
the
college
to
demonstrate the appropriateness of that action.
8 "congress
shall
make
no
law
respecting
an
establishment of religion ••.. " u. S. Const., Arndt. 1. The
Establishment Clause has been made applicable to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 u.s. 296, 303 (1940).

10.

constitutional

obligations.

But

we

disagree

with

its

~~c.
conclusion that an "equal access" policy_.{ ccul Q-*l9 e -satisfy

this
Clause
664,

cases. '

u.s.

e.g., Walz

v.

Committee

756,

773

for

(1973).

Public
Those

Establishment

Tax Comm'n,

u.s.

(1970); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403

674

(1971);

See,

Court's

Education
cases

v.

make

397

U.S.

602, 612-613

Nyquist,
clear

413

that

a

policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can
pass

a

policy]

three-pronged

test:

"First,

the

[governmental

must have a secular legislative purpose;

second,

its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion ***; finally, the [policy]
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion."

Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 at 612-613.

In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that
an open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against
religious speech, would have

11.

a

secular

religion. 10

purpose 9
But

the

and

would

District

avoid
Court

entanglement
concluded,

and

with
the

University argues here, that allowing religious groups to
share

the

9

~~

,-

limited

public

forum would

have

the

"primary

I~: :~~~;::s ~~rJ1°dsebe~~~l~ ~~fvveil~ie~~ ~~

which
ideas.
It does not undermine the State's essentially
secular purpose that some groups Jtti'ght use its forum to
engage
in
religious
speech.
We do not
understand
petitioners to argue that the ;ftate could--much less that
it must--exclude religious speech from the streets or from
the parks that it maintains as public forums.
Yet the
State's purpose is as secular when the public forum has
been created in a public hall, see City of Madison Joint
School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n,
supra; Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, supra, as
when it involves the streets or the parks, see Mosely v.
Police Department, supra; Hague v. CIO, supra. This case
is therefore ~ different from those in which this Court
ha
n statutes permitting school facilities to
instruction by religious, but not by other,
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203
(1948).
It is settled that the Establishment Clause does
not require, but actually forbids, State hostility toward
religion.
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).

~

1~

~ -6-t- 1'1c4~~ . . --~ I"'"
10we agree with
e Court of Appeals that the
University
would
r · sk
greater
"entas.flglement"
by
'-'
attempting to enforc
an exclusion of "religious worship
and religious speech."
See Chess v. Widmar, supra, 635
F.2d at 1318.
In o der to exclude rel1g1ous speech and
religious worship, the University ~tebtiel :fil!ilt RQQd to
determine which words and activites fall within the
proscript\on. This could prove "an impossible task in an
age where many and various beliefs meet the constitutional
definition of religion." O'hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931,
937
(1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law § 14-6 (1978) ; cf. Fowler v. Rhode
~
~ Island, 345 U.S."). Even if it could define religion, see
- ~,.,-~ Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91
~~r~Harv. L. Rev. 1056 (1978), t~ UQiVQ~•i ~~ need
T ~~
to monitor group meetings i order to enforce adherence to
~
its stated policy. It has
en argued powerfully that the
attempt to administer "sue
a test would impermissibly
entangle government and r ligion."
O'hair v. Andrus,
Sulra, 613 F.2d at 937. S e Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
66 ,
674-676
(1970)
ax
exemption
for
churches
permissible in part becau e elimination of exemption would
require more extensive g ernment entanglement).

J

r

12.

effect" of advancing religion. 11
The University's argument misconceives the nature of
this case.
the

Establishment

religious

I

The question is not whether it would violate

forum .1 2

Clause
Once

for
the

the

State

University

to

create
opens

a

its

11 In finding that an "equal access" policy would
have the primary effect of advancing religion,
the
District Court relied primarily on the decision of this
Court in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 u.s. 672 (1971). In
Tilton
this
Court
upheld
the provision of
federal
financial assistance to sectarian colleges.
But it
emphasized that the funds must be used for secular
purposes. Congress had provided that federally subsidized
buildings must not be used for sectarian or religious
worship for a period of 20 years.
This Court found this
restriction to be insufficient. we held that "If, at the
end of 20 years, the building is, for example, converted
into a chapel or otherwise used to promote religious uses,
the original
federal
grant will
in part have
the
[constitutionally
impermissible]
effect
of
advancing
religion." From this statement the District Court derived
------~ the
reposition that State funds rna
not be used to
provi e buildings ~ use y religious organizations.
ot
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadl •
In Tilton
the Court
a
a
sec arian
institution
might
~
convert
federally
funded ~
I Ings
r otherwise stamp them with the imprimatur ~
religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on
the State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to
religious and other discussion.
ve se
o
eciSions
olding that religious
speakers are constitutionally entitled to equal access to
parks and other facilities that have "immemorially been
held in trust for use by the public and have been used for
purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions."
Heffron, v.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101
S. Ct. 2559, 2565 (1981), quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 u.s.
496, 515 (1939).
There may sometimes be differences --~~
between the exclusionary regulations permissible in a
building and those permitted in a park. But restrictions
based on the nature of the public forum have traditionally
rested on "the State's interest in protecting the safety
and convenience of persons using a public forum," Heffron,
supra, 101 S. Ct. at 2565, not on any interest in
censoring the content of what is said, see Carey,
____... U.S. at 470.
Footnote(s) 12 will

13.

facilities to student groups of all other

kinds,

it has

7
already created a quasi-public forum, and the burden lies
on

it

supra.

to
In

justify
this

primary effect of

any

exclusion.

context

we

are

See

Healy

v.

unpersuaded

the public forum,

James,

that

the

if religious speech

were treated equally with other protected discourse, would
be

to

advance

religion. ~

al-~44!-

Jh

the

absence

evidence to the contrary, we agree with the
the Court of Appeals.

of

empirical

judgment of

An "equal access"

policy would [not] have the primary effect of
advancing religion.
Rather, it would have the
primary effect of advancing the University's
admitted secular purpose--to develop students'
'social and cultural awareness as well as their
intellectual curiosity.'
It would simply permit
students to put their
religious ideas and
practices in competition with the ideas and
practices of other groups, religious or secular.

635 F.2d at 1317.

12 cf. Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F. 2d 971 (CA2
1980); Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263 (SD
W. Va. 1971).
It is because this case presents no such
issue that we have not couched our discussion in terms of
respondents' rights under the "Free Exercise" clause. We
agree with the petitioners' argument that the policies of
the "Free Exercise" clause and the "Establishment Clause"
may sometimes be in tension, see, e.g., Committee for
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 770 (1973),
Abington School District v. Schempp, 373 U.S. 203, 222,
and that resolution of the tension requires sensitivity to
the interests that both are aimed to protect.
But we do
not view this as such a case.
'

14.

We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's
likely effects.
-that

It is possible--perhaps even foreseeable-

religious

groups

University facilities.

would

benefit

from

access

to

But this Court has settled that a

religious organization's enjoyment of merely "incidental"
benefits

will

not

violate

the

prohibition

"primary advancement" of religion.
Education v. Nyquist, 413

u.s.

u.s.

413

u.s.

734

the

Committee for Public

756, 771 (1973); see, e.g.,

Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426
v. McNair,

against

u.s.

736 (1976); Hunt

(1972); McGowan v. Maryland, 366

420,422 (1961).
We are

open

forum

meaning

of

satisfied
at

UMKC

our

that any religious benefits of an
would

cases.

be

"incidental"

Two

factors

within

are

the

especially

relevant.
First, the benefits of an open forum would
a

broad

class

of

~~

non-religious

as

well

as

religious

~o&A~ ~~.tl_, .... ~~

tt; 4)

speakers.A The provision of benefits to so broad ar

~

c;i ~

•, . ,.,, a

~ iS-

an

~ za:'"la:

~peoc.t..an..t

*

.a J

:i.A~Qn

Wolman v. Walter, 433

.J-4,.c_
ef" secular

u.s.

ef feet.

See,

. ~.,:;;...
ps

4

e.g. ,

229, 240-251 (1977); Committee

for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra,

413 U.S., at 782

15.

n.38.

Otherwise "a church could not be protected by the

police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk
kept in repair."
736 (plurality

Roemer v. Maryland, supra, 426 U.S., at

opinion)~

Liberty v. Regan, 444

quoted in Committee for Religious

u.s.

646, 658 (1980) . 13

Second, an open forum policy in a public university
would not confer the imprimatur of State approval on any
religious sect or practice.
aptly

stated,

such

a

As the Court of Appeals quite

policy

"would

no more

commit

the

University to religious goals," 635 F.2d, at 1317, than it
is

now

committed

Democratc

Society,

to

the

goals

of

the

Students

the Young Socialist Alliance,

for
or

a
any

other group eligible to use its facilities. 14

13 This Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent
argument that all aid [to parochial schools] is forbidden
because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to
spend all its resources on religious ends."
Hunt v.
McNair, supra, 413 u.s., at 743~ see New York v. Cathedral
Academy, 434 u.s. 125, 134 (1977).
14 It
should
not
be
overlooked
that
University
students
are
young
adults.
They
may
be
less
impressionable than students in primary school and even in
high school, and better able to comprehend that state
neutrality to religion is precisely that.
See Tilton v.
Richardson, supra, 403 u.s., at 687~ Brandon v. Board of
Education,
supra,
635
F.2d at 978,
980~
Gianella,
Religious
Liberty,
Nonestablishment,
and
Doctrinal
Development, pt. II, The Nonestablishment Principle, 81
Harv. L. Rev. 513, 574 (1968) ~ Note, The Rights of
SStudent Religious Groups Under the First Amendment to
Hold Religius Meetings on the Public University Campus, 33
Rutgers L. Rev. 1008, 1052 (1981)

16.

B.
Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further
than

the

proscribing

indirect

State support for religion, the University also

claims a

compelling

Federal

Constitution

interest

in

in

complying

with

provision of the State Constitution. 15

the

applicable

See Leutkemeyer v.

Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (E.D. Mo. 1973), aff'd, 419 U.S.
88 (1974).

15 The Constitution of the State of Missouri provides
in pertinent part:
That no person can be compelled to erect,
support, or attend any place of worship, or to
maintain
or
support
any
priest,
minister,
preacher or teacher of any sect, church, creed
or denomination of religion ....
That no money shall ever be taken from the
public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid
of any priest, preacher, minister, or teacher
thereof •...
Neither the general assembly, nor any county,
city, town, township, schol district or other
municipal corporation,
shall ever make any
apropriation or
pay
from
any
public
fund
whatever, anything in .aid of any religious
creed, church or sectarian purpose ... ~ nor shall
any grant or donation of personal property or
real property ever be made by the state, or any
county,
city,
town,
or
wother
municipal
corporation, for any religious creed, church, or
sectarian purpose whatever.
MO. CONST. Art. 1, §6~ Art. 1 § 7~ Art. 9 § 8.
The Missouri courts have interpreted these provisions
to be more restrictive than the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution in prohibiting expenditures of
public funds in a way inuring to the benefit of religious
institutions. American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711,
720, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976)~ Harfst v. Hogen,
163 S.w.ea 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1947) (en bane).

17.

The Missouri courts have apparently not ruled whether
a general policy of accommodating student groups, applied
equally to those wishing to gather to engage in religious
and

non-religious

speech,

offend

would

the

State

Nonetheless, we find it unnecessary to our

Constitution.

decision to make any determination of Missouri law.
do

we

find

interest,
under

it

necessary

derived from

the

Supremacy

to

decide

whether

interest were

to

have

protect

State

its own constitution, could ever,
Clause 16 ,

outweigh

free

interests protected by the First Amendment.
State's

a

Nor

compelling,

that

its

interest

speech

Even if the

regulations

would

unnecessary

without

abridgment of protected rights of speech and association.
See,

e.g.,

Valeo,
364

Carey,

424 U.S.

u.s.

at

University's
speech

and

1,

489.
policy

supra,
25

(1976);

Measured
of

s.

U.S.

at

association

Const., Art. 6.

465;

Shelton v.

against

discrimination

over inclusiveness.

16 U.

447

fails

this

Tucker,

v.

supra,

standard,

against
on

Buckley

the

religious

grounds

of

18.

The
applies

University
to

worship."
can

"religious
It

imagine

under

regulation

the

is
no

religious

teaching"

therefore

State

Clause,

well

this

as

"religious

"instruction"

interest,

in

"teaching"--including,

conversational

as

in

banning
for
a

in

all

public

438

(1963) (citations

of

informal
or

"Broad prophylactic

of regulation must be the touchstone."
415,

types

forum

rules in an area of free expresion are fatal.

U.S.

we

congnizable

example,

analytical exposition in a classroom.

371

case

substantially overbroad.

compelling

Supremacy

challenged

Precision

NAACP v. Button,

omitted),

quoted

in

Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S.
620, 637 (1980).
IV.
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the
capacity of
place,

the University to establish reasonable time,

and

International
We

also

manner

regulations.

Society

for

recognize

establishing

a

the

Krishna

Cf.

Consciousness,

continuing

University's

right

Heffron

validity

of

v.

supra.
cases

to exclude even First

Amendment activities that violate reasonable campus rules

19.

or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other
students to obtain an education.

Healy v. James, supra,

408

Des Moines

U.S.

at

189;

see

Tinker

School District, supra, 393

v.

u.s.,

at 513.

The basis for our decision is narrow.
a

public

forum, · the

content-based

University

exclusion

exclusionary policy
content

neutrality,

justify

this

of

violated
and

violation

the
under

Having created

sought

to

religious
a

Independent

speech.

fundamental
University
applicable

enforce

a
Its

principle of

was

unable

to

constitutional

standards.
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is,
Affirmed.
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2-

case

presents

the

question

whether

a

state

university, which makes its facilities generally available
for the activities of registered student groups, may close
its facilities to a registered student group desiring to
use

the

f acilities

for

religious

worship

and

r e ligious

discussion.
I

It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri
at

Kansas

Ci ty 1

organizations.
100

student

to

encourage

the

activities of

student

The University officially recog n izes over
groups.

It

routinely

provides

University

1 The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC)
is one of four campuses of the University of Missouri, an
institution of the State of Missouri.

2.

facilities

for

the meetings of

registered organizations.

Students pay an activity fee of $41 per

semester

(1978-

1979) to help defray the costs to the University.
From

1973

until

1977

a

registered

religious

group

named Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission
to

conduct

its

1977, however,
could

no

meetings

in

University

facilities. 2

In

the University informed the group that it

longer

meet

in

University

buildings.

The

exclusion was based on a regulation, adopted by the Board
of Curators in 1972, that prohibits the use of University
buildings or grounds "for purposes of religious worship or
religious teaching." 3

2cornerstone
is
an
organization
of
evangelical
Christian
students
from
various
denominational
backgrounds.
According to an affidavit filed in 1 9 7 v 7
"perhaps twenty students
• participate actively in
Cornerstone
and
form
the
backbone
of
the
campus
organization."
Affidavit of Florian Chess (Sept. 29 ,
1977) , quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911
(W.D. Mo. 1979).
Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings
in classrooms and in the student center.
These meeting
were open to the public and attracted up to 125 students.
A typical Cornerstone meeting included prayer, hymns,
Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and
experiences.
3 The pertinent regulations provide as follows:
"4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds
(except chapels as herein provided) may be used
for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups.
. The general prohibition against use of
University buildings and grounds for religious
worship or
religious
teaching
is a
policy
Footnote continued on next page.

3.

Eleven
Cornerstone,
Federal

all

members

of

brought suit to challenge the regulation in

District

Missouri. 4

students,

University

Court

They

for

alleged

the
that

Western
the

District

of

University's

discrimination against religious activity and discussion
violated their rights to free exercise of religion, equal
protection,

and

freedom

Fourteenth Amendments

to

of

speech

under

the

the Constitution of

First

and

the United

required,
in the opinion of The Bo~rd of
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the
State and is not open to any other construction.
No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid
the offering of prayer or other appropriate
recognition of religion at public functions held
in University facilities • • • •
4.0314.0108
Regular chapels established on
University grounds may be used for religious
services but not for recurring services of any
groups.
Special rules and procedures shall be
established for each chapel by the Chancellor.
It is specifically directed that no advantage
shall be given to any religious group."
There is no chapel on the campus of the University of
Missouri at Kansas City. The nearest University chapel is
at the Columbia campus, approximately 125 miles east of
UMKC.
Before 1977 University officials were unaware of the
religious
character
of
Cornerstone's
meetings.
The
District Court found that University officials had never
"authorized a student organization to utilize a University
facility for a meeting when they had full knowledge that
the purposes of the meeting include [d) religious worship
or religious teaching." Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 910.
4 c1ark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess,
the named plaintiff in the action in the District Court,
were among the students who initiated the action on
October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the
University's Board of Curators.

4.

States.
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District
Court upheld the challenged regulation.
480 F. Supp. 907 (W.O. Mo. 1979).
not

only

justified,

but

It found the regulation

required,

by

Clause of the Federal Constitution.
Tilton

v.

Richardson,

reasoned,

the

State

religious

use

without

403

u. S.

could

not

giving

institution of religion.

Chess v. Widmar,

the Establishment

Id., at 916.

672

(1971),

provide

prohibited

Id., at 915-916.

Under

the

court

facilities
support

for

to

an

The District

Court rejected the argument that the University could not
discriminate against religious speech on the basis of its
content.

It

found

religious

speech

entitled

protection than other types of expression.

to

less

Id., at 918.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (CAS 1980).
analysis of the Dis.trict Court,
regulation
religious

as

a

speech,

justification.
Clause does

not

content-based
for

Id.,
bar

which
at

Rejecting the

it viewed the University
discrimination

against

it could find no compelling

1315-1320.

The

Establishment

a policy of equal access,

in which

5.

facilities are open to groups and speakers of all kinds.
According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of
such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather
to

further

"'social

the

and

neutral
cultural

intellectual curiosity.'"
University

bulletin's

purpose

of

awareness

developing
as

Id., at 1317
description

well

students'

as

[their]

(quoting from the
of

the

student

activities program, reprinted in id., at 1312 n.l).
Essentially for

the

reasons

stated by the Court of

Appeals, we now affirm.
II
Through

its policy of accommodating the meetings of

registered student groups, the University has created for
its students a quasi-public forum. 5

Having done so,

the

5 The concept of a "public forum"
rests on the
recognition, first expressed in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S.
496, 515 (1939), that

Wherever the title of streets and parks may
rest, they have immemorially been held in trust
for the use of the public and time out of mind,
have
been
used
for
purposes
of
assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions.
Such use of the
streets and public places has from ancient
times,
been
a
part
of
the
privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
See also Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92
v. Louisiana, 379 u. S. 536 (1965).

(1972); Cox

6.

University

assumed

discriminations

an

and

obligation
exclusions

constitutional norms.

justify

to
under

its

applicable

The Constitution forbids a State to

enforce certain exclusions from a public forum, even if it
was not required to create the forum in the first place.
See,

e.g.,

Wisconsin
167,

City

of

Madision

Joint

School

District

v.

429 u.

S.

Public Employment Relations Comm'n,

175

&

n.8.

(1976)

(although

a

State may

conduct

business in private session, "where the State has opened a
forum for
heavy
Ltd.

direct citizen involvement," exclusions bear a

burden of
v.

Conrad,

municipal
exclude

justification);

a

420 U.

theater

was

production

S.
a

Southeastern Promotions,

546,
public

without

555-559
forum,

(1975)
city

satisfying

(because
could

not

constitutional

safeguards applicable to prior restraints).
The
describes
students,

University's
as

providing

Brief

for

institutional
a

"secular

Petitioners

mission,
education"

which
to

it
its

44, does not exempt its

actions from constitutional scrutiny. 6

Our cases leave no

6
This Court has recognized that the campus of a
public university possesses many of the characteristics of
Footnote continued on next page.

7.

doubt

that

the

association

First

reach

undiminished force.
169, 180

39 3 U.

u.s.

engage
forms

the

speech

and

campuses

See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408

S.

503,

University

groups
in

of

university

of

with

u.

S.

506

(1969) ;

Shelton v. Tucker,

of

Missouri

479, 487 (1960).

Here
against

state

rights

(1972) ; Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School

District,
364

Amendment

and

religious
speech

and

speakers
worship

based
and

association

on

has

discriminated

their

desire

discussion.

These

protected

the

by

to
are

First

a
public
forum.
"The
college
classroom with
its
surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of
ideas.'"
Healy v. James, 408 u. s. 169, 180 (1972).
Moreover, the capacity of a group or individual "to
participate in the intellectual give and take of campus
debate . • . [would be] limited by denial of access to the
customary media for communicating with the administration,
faculty members, and other students."
Id., at 181-182.
We have therefore held that students enjoy-First Amendment
rights of speech and association on the campus, and that
the "denial [to particular groups] of use of campus
facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes"
must be subjected to the level of scrutiny appropriate to
any form of prior restraint. Id., at 181, 184.
On the other hand, First Amendment rights must of
course
be
analyzed
"in
light
of
the
special
characteristics of
the school environment."
Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent School District, 393 u. S. 503, 506
(1969). A university differs in significant respects from
public forums such as streets or parks or even municipal
theaters.
A university's mission is education,
and
decisions of this Court have never denied its authority to
impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission
upon the use of its campus and facilities.
We have not
held, for example, that a campus must make all of its
facilities equally available to students and nonstudents
alike, or that a university must grant free access to all
of its grounds or buildings.

8.

Amendment.
Krishna

See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for

Consciousness,

Niemotko v. Maryland,
York,

u.

334

s.

Inc.,
340 U.

558

101
S.

S.

268

(1948).

Ct.

2559

(1981);

(1951) ; Saia v. New

In

order

to

justify

discriminatory exclusion from a public forum based on the
religious

content

of

a

group's

intended

speech,

the

University must therefore satisfy the standard of review
appropriate
that

its

to

content-based

regulation

is

It

exclusions.

necessary

to

serve

a

must

show

compelling

state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve
that end. See Carey v. Brown, 447

u.

S. 455, 461, 464-465

(1980). 7
III
In

7 see
(1972):

this

also

case

the

Healy

v.

University

claims

James,

u.

408

a

s.

compelling

169,

"It is to be remembered that the effect of the
College's denial of recognition was a form of
prior
restraint,
denying
to
petitioners'
organization
the
range
of
associational
activities described above. While a college has
a legitimate interest in preventing disruption
on the campus, which
• may justify such
restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college
to demonstrate
the appropriateness of that
action."

184

9.

interest
State.

in maintaining
It derives

strict separation of church and

this interest from the "Establishment

Clauses" of both the Federal and Missouri Constitutions.
A

The University first argues that it cannot offer its
facilities to religious groups and speakers on the terms
available

to

Establishment
States. 8

We

other
Clause
agree

groups
of

that

the

without

violating

Constitution

of

the

the
United

the University has a compelling

interest in complying with its constitutional obligations.
But we disagree with its conclusion that an "equal access"
policy

would

Establishment

be

incompatible

Clause

cases.

with

Those

cases

this
hold

Court's
that

a

policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can
pass

a

policy]

three-pronged

test:

"First,

the

[governmental

must have a secular legislative purpose; second,

its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances

nor

inhibits

religion

finally,

the

8 "Congress
shall
make
no
law
respecting
an
establishment of religion . • • • " u. S. Const., Arndt. 1.
The Establishment Clause has been made applicable to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 u. S. 296, 303 (1940).

10.

[policy]

must

not

foster

'an

excessive

government

entanglement with religion ·,1'

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403

602,

also

612-613

(1971).

Education v. Nyquist, 413

See

u.

Committee

for

u.

S.

Public

S. 756, 773 (1973).

In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that
an open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against
religious speech, would have a secular purpose 9 and would
avoid

entanglement

with

religion. 10

But

the

District

9 The University's secular purpose is to provide a
forum in which students can exchange ideas.
It does not
undermine this purpose that some groups will use the forum
to engage in religious speech.
we do not understand
petitioners to argue that a State could--much less that it
must--exclude religious speech from the streets or from
the parks that it maintains as public forums.
Yet the
State's purpose remains as secular when the forum is a
room within a government building, see City of Madison
Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment
Relations Comm'n, 429 u. S. 167 (1976) (meeting room);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546
(1975)
(municipal theatre), as when it involves the
streets or the parks, see Police Department v. Mosley, 408
U. S. 92 (1972) (outdoor p~cketing); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.
S. 496 (1939) (streets and other public places).
This case is therefore quite different from those in
which this Court has invalidated statutes permitting
school facilities to be used for instruction by religious
groups, but not by others. See McCollum v. Board of
Education, 333 u. S. 203 (1948). The Establishment Clause
does not require, but actually forbids, State hostility
toward religion.
See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 u. s. 306,
312 (1952).
10 we agree with the Court of Appeals that the
University would risk greater "entanglement" by attempting
to enforce
its exclusion of "religious worship and
religious speech."
See Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1318.
Initially, the University would need to determine which
words and activites fall within "religious worship and
religious
teaching."
This
alone
could
prove
"an
Footnote continued on next page.

11.

Court

concluded,

allowing
forum

and

religious

would

have

the

groups
the

University
to

share

"primary

argues
the

effect"

here,

limited
of

that
public

advancing

religion. 11
The University's argument misconceives the nature of
this case.

The question is not whether the creation of a

religious forum would violate the Establishment Clause. 12

impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs
meet the constitutional definition of religion."
O'hair
v.
Andrus,
613 F. 2d 9 31,
936
(CADC 1979) (footnote
omitted); see L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §14-6
(1978). There would also be a continuing need to monitor
group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule.
11 In finding that an "equal access" policy would
have the primary effect of advancing religion,
the
District Court relied primarily on the decision of this
Court in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 u. S. 672 (1971). In
Tilton this Court upheld the grant of federal financial
assistance to sectarian colleges for secular purposes.
Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized
buildings could not be used for sec tar ian or religious
worship
for
20
years,
the
Court
considered
this
restriction insufficient:
"If, at the end of 20 years,
the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or
otherwise used to promote religious interests the original
federal grant will in part have the [constitutionally
impermissible] effect of advancing religion."
Id., at
683.
From this statement the District Court derived the
proposition that State funds may not be used to provide or
maintain buildings used by religious organizations.
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly.
In Tilton the Court was concerned that a sectarian
institution might convert federally funded buildings to
religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the imprimatur
of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation
on the State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to
religious and other discussions.
Cases before and after
Tilton have acknowledged the right of religious speakers
to use public forums on equal terms with others.
See,
e.g.,
Heffron
v.
International
Soc•y
for
Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 101 s. Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New
York, 334 u.s. 558 (1948).
Footnote(s) 12 will appear on following pages.

12.

The

University

groups,

and

the

has

opened

question

its

facilities

is whether

to

it can now exclude

groups because of the content of their speech.
v. James,

408 U. S. 169

(1972).

student

See Healy

In this context we are

unpersuaded that the primary effect of the public forum,
open

to

all

forms

of

discourse,

would

be

to

advance

religion.
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's
likely effects.
-that

religious

It is possible--perhaps even foreseeablegroups

University facilities.
a

religious

"incidental"

will

from

access

to

But this Court has explained that

organization's
benefits

benefit

does

not

enjoyment
violate

the

against the "primary advancement" of religion.

of

merely

prohibition
Committee

12 This case is different from the cases in which
religious groups claim that the denial of facilities not
available to bther groups deprives them of their rights
under the Free Exercise Clause.
See Brandon v. Board of
Educ., 635 F. 2d 971, 975-976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending,
No. 80-1396; Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp.
1263, 1266 (SD w. Va. 1971).
Here, the University's
forum
is
already
available
to
other
groups,
and
respondents' claim to use that forum does not--as in
Brandon or Hunt--rest solely on rights claimed under the
Free Exercise Clause.
Respondents' claim also implicates
First Amendment rights of speech and association, and it
is on the bases of speech and association rights that we
decide the case.
It is for this reason that we have
declined petitioners • invitation to couch our discussion
in terms of respondents • rights under the Free Exercise
Clause.
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for

Public

(1973)
S.

~

Education

v.

Nyquist,

413

u.

S.

756,

771

see, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.

736

(1976)

~

Hunt

v.

McNair,

413

u.

S.

734

(1972)

~

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 u. S. 420, 422 (1961).
We are
open

forum

meaning

satisfied
at

of

that any religious benefits of an

UMKC

our

would

be
Two

cases.

"incidental"
factors

are

within

the

especially

relevant.
First, an open forum in a public university does not
confer any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects
or practices.

As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated,

such a policy "would no more commit the University •
to

religious

goals,"

than

it

is

"now committed

to

the

goals of the Students for a Democratc Society, the Young
Socialist Alliance,"

non-religious

any other group eligible to use

Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1317. 13

its facilities.
Second,

or

the forum is available to a broad class of
as

well

as

religious

speakers~

there

are

13 university students are, of course, young adults.
They are less impressionable than younger students and
should be able to appreciate that the University's policy
is one of neutrality toward religion.
See Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 u. S. 672, 685-686 (1971) •

14.

over 100 recognized student groups UMKC.

The provision of

benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups is an important
index of secular effect.
U. S.
v.

229, 240-241

Nyquist,

(1973).

See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433

(1977); Committee for Public Education

supra,

413

u. S.,

at

756,

781-782

&

n.38

If the Establishment Clause barred the extension

of general benefits to religious groups,

"a church could

not be protected by the police and fire departments, or
have

its

Maryland,

public

sidewalk

426 u. S.

736,

kept
747

in

repair."

(1976)

Roemer

v.

(plurality opinion);

quoted in Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U.
S.

646,

empirical

658

n. 6

(1980) • 14

evidence

that

At

least

religious

in

groups

the

absence

will

of

dominate

UMKC's open forum, we therefore agree with the Court of
Appeals that the advancement of religion would not be the
forum's "primary effect."
B

Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further

14
This Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent
argument that all aid [to parochial schools] is forbidden
because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to
spend its other resources on religious ends."
Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 743 (1973).

15.

than

the

State

Federal

support

compelling

Constitution

in

proscribing

religion, 15

the

University

for

.interest

in

complying

with

indirect
claims

the

a

applicable

provisions of the Missouri Constitution. 16
The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general
policy of accommodating student groups, applied equally to
those wishing to gather

to engage

in religious and non-

religious speech, would offend the State Constitution.

we

need not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would
decide

this

decide

whether,

interest,
outweigh
Amendment.
its

issue.

under

derived
free

It

from

speech

Even

regulations

if

is
the

also

Supremacy

a State's
have

for

Clause, 1 7

its own constitution,
interests

would

unnecessary

protected

us
a

to

state

could ever

by

the

First

interest were compelling,
to

protect

that

interest

15
see, ~' American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d
711, 720, (Mo.) (en bane), cert. denied, 429 u.s. 1029
(1976)
(holding Missouri Constitution requires stricter
separation
of
church
and
state
than
does
Federal
Constitution)~
Harfst v. Hogen, 163 S.W.2d 609, 613-614
(Mo. 1947) (en bane) (same).
16 see Leutkemeyer v. Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (E.D.
Mo. 1973), aff'd, 419 U.S. 88 (1974) (finding State has
compelling
interest
in
compliance
with
its
own
constitution).
17 u. S. Const., Art. VI, §2.

16.

without

unnecessary

abridgment

speech and association.
S.

455, 465

(1960).
policy

(1980)

~

of

protected

rights

of

See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447

Shelton v. Tucker, 364

u. s.

u.

479, 489

Measured against this standard, the University's
of

discrimination

against

religious

speech

and

association fails on grounds of overinclusiveness.
The
applies

University
to

worship."
can

regulation

"religious
It

is

challenged

teaching"

therefore

as

well

in

this

case

as

"religious

substantially overbroad.

We

imagine no compelling State interest--which would be

congnizable

under

the

Supremacy

Clause--in

banning

all

types of religious "teaching" in an otherwise-open forum,
including,

for

"instruction."

example,
As

we

have

informal
noted

in

conversational

the

past,

"[b]road

prophylactic rules in an area of free expresion are fatal.
Precision

of

regulation

must

be

the

touchstone."

Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444
620,

637

u.

S.

(1980), quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 u. S. 415,

438 (1963) (omitting citations).
IV
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the

17.

capacity of the University to establish reasonable time,
place,

and

regulations. 18

manner

we

also

affirm

the

continuing valiqity of cases, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 u.
S.

169,

right

188-189

to

(1972),

exclude

even

that
First

recognize

a

Amendment

University's

activities

that

violate reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere
with

the

opportunity

of

other

students

to

obtain

an

education.
The basis for our decision is narrow.

Having created

a public forum, the University seeks to enforce a contentbased

exclusion

of

religious

speech.

Its

exclusionary

policy violates the fundamental principle that the State
should be content-neutrality, and the University is unable
to justify this violation under applicable constitutional
standards.
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is,
Affirmed.

18see, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 u.s.
104, 116 (1972). ("The nature of a place, 'the pattern of
its normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations to
time, place, and manner that are reasonable.'").

